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 i 
SYNOPSIS 
 
My thesis contributes to research on the consequences of labour 
market institutions for employment using an original Greek dataset I have 
constructed, the TERS. This survey gives a representative sample of micro-
enterprises as well as small and medium enterprises. I investigate whether 
firms use temporary (and family) employment as ―escape‖ routes from 
mandated wage floors (corporate collective wage agreements) and working 
conditions floors (employment protection legislation (EPL) monitored by 
the Labour Inspectorate). My basic hypothesis is thus that temporary and 
family work are forms of insurance for the poorer firms which cannot cope 
with EPL coupled with wage floors.  
 I find significant wage floor effects, in particular, where firms have 
many workers at the minimum (or below it – in the case of ―grey‖ market 
firms), they are more likely to employ temporary workers. The implication 
is that where firms have many workers on the minimum they are likely to 
worry about the possibility of a rise in the minimum, and hence will 
employ on a more temporary basis. Wage floors thus matter.  
 I also find significant EPL effects. In particular, firms whose 
managers believe that temps have low EPL are more likely to employ 
temps, ceteris paribus. My result thus shows that an advantage of 
employing temps is quite simply their low EPL.  
 My findings for family worker employment are similarly 
confirmatory. Workplaces in the ―grey‖ category, paying low wages 
probably below nationally agreed rates, are much more likely to employ a 
high percentage of family workers, other things equal– they are easy to 
layoff, and less likely to complain about low wages. The policy implication 
of my research is therefore that Greece‘s wages and working conditions 
floors indeed appear both to promote precarious temporary employment, 
and also small-scale family business, which is not the way to grow and 
prosper. 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
“The Greek economy exhibits a number of costly institutional frameworks 
that prevent speedy adjustments to external changes and market signals. 
These include inefficient regulatory regimes in key sectors,… a relatively 
rigid labour market environment due to the high cost of labour 
dismissals…and a surge in pension expenditures from 6% of GDP in the 
mid-1970s to 13% in 1999” (OECD, 2001, 29).  
 
 “This poor labour market performance in Greece...is principally 
due to rigidities in labour market institutions. Minimum labour costs are 
likely to have negative consequences on vulnerable groups” (OECD, 2007, 
98). “Unemployment remains high, particularly among first-time labour 
market entrants (mainly the young) and re-entrants (mainly women), while 
the long-term unemployed account for a high share of the total” (OECD, 
2007, 85). "Greece needs to pursue structural reforms on labour and goods 
markets to stimulate competition and while boosting participation rates and 
reducing unemployment” (OECD, 2009, 45). 
 
“Greece has the second highest rate of temporary employment among the 
EU countries, a fact that can partly be explained by the extensive use of 
fixed-term contracts, a practice that has existed since 1925 as a means of 
circumventing one of the most rigid legislative regimes concerning 
employment protection” (Voudouris, 2004, 132). 
 
“Greece is the last Soviet-style economy in Europe”…“Every stone you 
turn here, there are regulations." Stournaras Y., Governmental Economic 
Advisor and Director of the Athens-based Foundation for Economic and 
Industrial Research (The New York Times, October 14, 2010). 
 
As Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxembourg and President of 
Euro Group, said memorably in 2007: “We all know what to do, but we 
don‟t know how to get re-elected once we have done it” (The Economist, 
July 8, 2010).  
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1.1 The Research Hypothesis and the Objectives  
The Rationale 
 Labour markets, in the international context, have been going 
through dramatic changes over the post-war period. European countries‘ 
aim of building a social model try to achieve ―fair working conditions as 
regards pay and hours‖ can be traced back to the European Social Charter 
in 1961. During those years, employment security provisions were 
launched in the majority of continental European countries. Many 
economists argue that the resulting labour market rigidities are responsible 
for high unemployment in Europe (Saint Paul, 1996). In particular, they 
link unemployment to factors such as employment protection legislation, 
wage-setting institutions, welfare schemes and labour taxes.  
Many studies have been carried out in order to examine comparative 
measures of the labour regulation strictness across different countries 
(Emerson, 1988; Bertola, 1990; Lazear, 1990; Addison and Grosso, 1996; 
Grubb and Wells, 1993; OECD, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
Empirical evidence as to the effects of labour rigidities also comes from a 
plethora of scholars (Nickel and Layard, 1999; Siebert 2002 and 2005; 
Nickel et al., 2005; Feldmann, 2009, Kahn 2007 and 2010). In this study, 
researchers have emphasized on the insider-outsider dichotomy, with 
outsiders being the long-term unemployed, female workers, the young and 
the inexperienced. 
 Greece has followed the European path of social and employment 
protectionism. Its industrial relations are subject to a comprehensive and 
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complex framework of legal regulation (Kritsantonis, 1998:520). In 
addition, Greece's labour monitoring system is thorough, with the Labour 
Inspectorate given the right, for example, to receive all the necessary 
information about a business‘s new hires within 15 days. Duties between 
governmental monitoring organizations (e.g., the Labour Inspectorate and 
the Public Employment Service) also overlap and create administrative and 
legal burdens to the employment, as I will further present you.  
It is worth noting that regulation on product markets as well as 
employment is applied to many aspects of the Greek economy. More than 
150,000 Greeks are self-employed in about seventy closed-shop professions 
such as pharmacists, engineers, lawyers and several others (The Economist, 
2010). These vested interest groups are protected from competition by a 
―byzantine tangle‖ of regulations and licensing requirements; that results in 
job barriers in the labour market, high prices for consumers – but a reliable 
living for insiders (The New York Times, 2010).  
Organised labour groups naturally take advantage of the insider-
outsider dichotomy. Unions in public sector and workers/unions in large 
scale firms use their voting power to influence politicians against reforming 
the law. Thus, they enjoy better working conditions and higher wages 
compared to those who work in "atypical" employment or in micro firms 
where unionism is not possible.  
My basic hypothesis is that Greek firms resort to temporary and 
family work when they feel pressurised by the law. Temporary and family 
work are thus forms of insurance for the poorer firms, which cannot cope 
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with the wage and working conditions floors enforced by strict labour 
regulation. My hypothesis follows what has become a standard line of 
argument (see, e.g., Kahn 2007, 2010a, 2010b). It is true that the link 
between regulation and temporary employment has not always been clear 
(see Addison and Teixeira, 2003) when using panels of country aggregate 
data (though Kahn 2007 has recently offered a stronger result). However, 
my thesis aims to test this hypothesis, using a different approach based on 
firm-level data collected after a special survey in 200 businesses in 
Thessaly and described in detail in the following chapters. 
 
The Objectives 
The first aim is to describe and analyse the Greek labour market 
framework, given that the purpose of this thesis is to create a better 
understanding of the current labour market situation in Greece. Ultimately 
we wish to understand why businesses remain so small, and hiring rates so 
low – and unemployment, particularly among the young, so high. 
Therefore, a comparative picture of labour market indicators, among OECD 
countries, is also given in order to understand Greek labour market 
performance in the international context.  
The second aim is to analyse the effects of labour market 
institutions on job creation. My main research question is whether – and 
how – Greek firms feel constraints by the wage and working condition 
floors, imposed by labour regulation. As far as the wages are concerned, I 
investigate whether centralized wage-setting institutions give rise to high 
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minimum wages and discourage employment among poorer firms in 
provincial labour markets such as Thessaly. On the working conditions 
side, I examine, for example, firms‘ opinions about EPL law, and the role 
of the labour inspectorate, and link these opinions to their temporary 
worker hiring decisions. 
 The central empirical contribution of my thesis focuses on the 
estimation of the determinants of temporary and family work among the 
firms in Thessaly. I put emphasis on this point, since Greece has high 
regulation which protects permanently employed insiders at the expense of 
outsiders such as temporary workers and family workers. I hypothesise that 
temporary (and family) work is resorted to when there is heavy regulation, 
other things being equal. 
Previous research in Greece has investigated small and medium 
enterprises, but studies on flexible working practices are limited and remain 
primarily descriptive (see Papalexandris, 1997; Kufidu and Michail, 1999; 
Michail, 2003; Voudouris, 2004). Some of the above mentioned 
investigations refer only to part-time and temporary contracts, while others 
examine only the use of independent contractors and subcontractors as 
forms of flexible employment. The strong point of my empirical research is 
that it includes a representative sample of micro-enterprises as well as small 
and medium enterprises, taking into consideration both temporary and 
family work, as types of flexible employment. 
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1.2 The Structure of the Thesis  
Structure 
 This thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate 
Greek labour market regulation in an international context, providing 
comparisons with OECD countries. The design and the conduct of the 
survey together with the preliminary descriptive results are discussed in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 then focuses on the empirical analysis of temporary 
and family employment and Chapter 6 concludes. Let us look at these 
chapters in turn. 
 One of the main tasks of the thesis is to describe and analyse the 
Greek labour market framework which is done in Chapter 2. To begin with, 
the historical background - since the birth of the Greek state - and labour 
law evolution is explored. Botero et al. (2004), argue that Greece‘s law is 
based on the French legal model, which might explain the regulatory 
tendencies of Greek labour market law. Two further background 
characteristics (perhaps themselves a consequence of regulation) also affect 
the Greek labour market: its many micro-sized family-run firms and its 
quite large public sector. 
Chapter 2 then takes up the collective bargaining system and 
Greece‘s centralised wage setting institutions. These obviously affect 
business hiring decisions and form an important part of the Thessaly 
business questionnaire, on which my research is based (see Chapter 4). I 
describe the different levels of collective agreements as well as the 
legislation on trade union structures. Finally, I describe  the Greek labour 
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market monitoring organizations: the Labour Inspectorate, the Public 
Employment Services, and the Social Security Organisation. The Labour 
Inspectorate is central, but the fact that it is small, relative to the number of 
businesses, means it cannot be pro-active; instead it exerts more a 
―negative‖ power to prevent change.  
 In Chapter 3, I turn to discussion of the causes and the 
consequences of labour regulation, in theoretical terms. The main question 
in this chapter, is why labour regulation is stricter, mainly, in continental 
European countries and whether this strictness underlies the persistence of 
European unemployment. As part of this discussion, I take up the various 
approaches to measuring labour rigidities. In addition, I present the political 
insider-outsider theory of labour regulation, and observe the predictions of 
this model, regarding the case of Greece. Basically, the main argument is 
that Greek workers with job security (insiders) obtain and use their union 
and public sector power at the expense of outsiders. Such regulation of 
standard employment is then hypothesized to force employers to find 
―escape‖ routes, such as temporary employment which is more flexible, 
particularly where, minimum wages are also imposed (see Kahn, 2007, for 
a recent description of this model). This hypothesis is the main subject of 
my Thessaly Employment Relations Survey (TERS) which begins in 
Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 4, I describe the procedures followed to implement the 
TERS. The TERS, which is based on the UK‘s Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS), was conducted in Thessaly, the main business 
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region of Central Greece, over the period 2006-2007. 226 enterprises 
belonging to 10 major economic groups were interviewed; public sector 
enterprises being excluded. Empirical research on Greek industrial relations 
is limited (Michail, 2003 and Voudouris, 2004) while it mainly applies on 
large scale establishments, so my survey is more representative.  
In the second section of this chapter I describe the design and the 
conduct of the survey, including the selection of the sampling frame, the 
weighting and the sampling procedures, the development of the 
questionnaire, the pilot survey and the fieldwork. Obviously, these 
procedures are important in ensuring the results, since they are 
representative of the region‘s population. The Chapter ends with a 
discussion of basic descriptive statistics from the Survey. One of the 
preliminary findings here is how small businesses appear to achieve 
flexibility, primarily through their family members. Large businesses on the 
other hand appear to use temporary employment as a major source of 
flexibility.  
In Chapter 5, I continue examining whether rigidities in the Greek 
labour market promote temporary and family employment using 
multivariate analysis. At this point of my research, I follow in the footsteps 
of others Greek scholars including Voudouris (2004:136) and Mihail 
(2003) who studied flexible employment types including temporary and 
subcontracting work in small samples of large firms. My sample is more 
representative, since I put emphasis on different aspects, aiming to isolate 
the effects of legal constraints on employment.  
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Conclusions 
As it will be seen, I find significant wage floor effects, in particular, where 
firms have many workers at the minimum (or below it – in the case of 
―grey‖ market firms), they are more likely to employ temporary workers. 
The implication is that where firms have many workers on the minimum 
they are likely to worry about the possibility of a rise in the minimum, and 
hence they will employ on a more temporary basis. Wage floors thus 
matter.  
 I also find significant EPL effects. In particular, firms whose 
managers believe that temps have low EPL are more likely to employ 
temps, ceteris paribus. This result surely must be taken at its face value: an 
advantage of employing temps is simply their low EPL. In fact, my findings 
using firm-level data accord with Kahn‘s (2007) recent findings based on 
cross country data, that strict EPL means women, the less skilled and young 
workers are more likely to hold temporary jobs relative to otherwise similar 
prime-age men, and these effects increase with collective bargaining 
coverage. Thus the TERS evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
temporary work is resorted to when there is heavy regulation, other things 
being equal.  
 Findings for family worker employment are similarly confirmatory. 
Workplaces in the ―grey‖ category, paying low wages probably below 
nationally agreed rates, are much more likely to employ a high percentage 
of family workers, other things equal. As was the case for temp workers, I 
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conclude that family workers are favoured because they are easy to layoff, 
and less likely to complain about low wages. Admittedly, I do not find so 
much effect for the labour regulation variables. Still, there is a positive 
dummy for feeling temps have low EPL, indicating that firms that employ 
family workers are conscious of EPL. In general, I find substitutability 
between temps, family workers and part-time workers, which is reasonable, 
since these groups represent alternative pathways to flexibility.  
 Overall, then, my findings support the opening quotations‘ gloomy 
view of the consequences of current Greek labour market regulation. The 
regulation appears to promote precarious temporary employment, and to 
promote small-scale family business employment. Since these findings 
have a robust microeconometric basis, coming from analysis of a 
representative sample of provincial businesses, they need to be taken 
seriously. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK LABOUR 
MARKET REGULATION 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will report the development of Greek labour market 
regulation and analyse the labour market framework in Greece. First, the 
historical foundations of labour regulation in Greece will be considered as 
well as the evolution of labour law after the post-war period in Greece. 
Then, two important characteristics which play a significant role in the 
Greek labour market will be investigated, the small-sized firms which 
comprise the vast majority of firms in Greece as well as the quite large 
public sector. 
Furthermore, we will observe Greece‘s labour market performance 
in the European context. An analysis of the employment protection 
legislation (EPL) on dismissals and other restrictions will be made to 
determine whether difficulties arise in businesses when hiring and firing 
employees under regular employment contracts. Then, labour laws, 
concerning flexible forms of employment such as part/temporary-time as 
well as family employment will be examined. These are particularly 
important in Greece where a high number of small firms exist.  
Moreover, a thorough analysis of the collective bargaining system 
which determines Greek wages is provided in this chapter. Legislation on 
trade union structure as well as the significance of trade union density in 
the public and private sector is described. The different levels of collective 
agreements (central, sectoral, occupational, enterprise) are also investigated 
here along with collective bargaining coordination and centralization 
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indicators. A comparative analysis with other OECD countries depicts the 
Greek reality within an international industrial relations context.  
The final section of this chapter gives a description of the Greek 
labour market organizations and their involvement in regulation and public 
policy making. We explore how the three main organizations – the Labour 
Inspectorate, the Public Employment Services, and the Social Security 
Organisation - apply and enforce policies which create obstacles in the 
Greek firms  
The Chapter ends with a concluding section which draws together 
the implications of the Greek labour market institutions described. In 
particular, we will see that Greek labour market regulation comes from a 
tradition of strict regulation – and that this regulation has tended to become 
yet stricter over time. High and increasing regulation has had consequences 
for business development. Business tend to remained small to avoid 
regulation, and workers continue being hired on an increasingly temporary 
basis. In the following chapters we draw out hypotheses about how 
businesses might react to regulation, and then subject some of these 
hypotheses (in particular the issue of temporary vs. permanent work) to test 
in the empirical work to follow. 
 
2.2 Labour History 
Greek labour laws have mainly followed the labour legislation of 
other major European countries during the last century. Botero et al. (2004) 
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examine the employment laws in 85 countries and conclude that ―a 
country‘s approach to regulation is shaped by its legal tradition‖. According 
to Botero et al., most countries in the world have inherited their basic legal 
traditions from their colonizers. Admittedly, in the Greek case, the position 
is complicated; Greece was occupied by Ottoman Empire and Turkey, until 
removed from that position in 1832, after the Greek war of independence 
against Turkey with the assistance of France, Britain and Russia. France, 
being the nearest Great Power then developed much influence – enough for 
Botero et al. (2004) to characterize Greece as a country with a French legal 
origin. Dacoronia (2002) also claims the adoption of the French legal model 
―when parts of the French commercial code of 1804 had been translated 
into Greek and were in use among Greek merchants‖ since the first years of 
independence of the Modern Greek state. Nevertheless, we should note that 
Dacoronia (2002) also states that apart from the French influence, civil laws 
were also influenced by German laws (with the arrival of Bavarian King 
Otho in 1833) as well as by Byzantine laws, so that to take Greece‘s 
regulatory tradition as being an outgrowth of the Napoleonic Code is 
perhaps over-simple. Compared to EC Member States, which became 
industrialized earlier, labour law in Greece developed rather belatedly 
(European Employment and Industrial Relations Glossaries (EMIRE) - 
Labour Law). As reported by Federation of European Employers (FedEE 
web page), the first comprehensive legal codifications during the modern 
era were enacted in France during the nineteenth century, with Napoleonic 
Law and in the newly unified state of Germany in 1900 in the form of the 
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German Civil Code. Building on this foundation, the process of labour 
regulation in Greece continued in the 20
th
 century (EMIRE, Labour Law), 
when the Venizelos government commenced a major political reformation 
of the country. The ratification by the Greek parliament followed, as early 
as 1920, of the International Labour Conventions adopted during the first 
International Labour Conference held by the ILO in Washington, DC in 
1919. 
A set of protective laws, particularly in two areas was enacted by 
the Venizelos government: the agricultural sector and employment. This 
liberal government enacted provisions to promote ―secure‖ jobs for civil 
servants, provide for the control and improvement of working conditions 
concerning health and safety issues in the manufacturing sector, as well as 
regulating children‘s and women‘s employment and labour dispute 
arrangements (Avdela, 1997).  
Legislation on individual labour focused on dismissals which have 
been regulated since the 1920s together with a number of the most 
significant Greek laws (Act No. 2112 of March 11, 1920; Royal Decree of 
July 16, 1920; Legislative Decree of April 21, 1926 & Law No. 4558 of 
1930) (Schwenning, 1932). These are characterized by the Greek law as 
―termination of employment contracts of indefinite duration from the 
employer‖. This was the first time that employers experienced state 
intervention in a common-law regulated field in Greece (Apostolakou 
1997).  
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Avdela (1997) emphasises on the ―Europeanization‖ of Greece in 
those years, when Venizelos was probably seeking assistance in the 
enlargement of the weak Greek state. During his leadership (1910 - mid 
1930s including some intervals) Venizelos tried to harmonise European 
labour laws for the Greek state. However, the Greek employment map 
received a shock when the country‘s population increased by 20 % almost 
overnight as a result of the population exchange between Greece and 
Turkey, propertyless, desperate people, willing to work for any wage; 
unsurprisingly, the 1920s coincide with the first wave of industrialisation in 
Greece (Pirounakis N., 1997). Although the period between the wars saw 
the first legal provisions for collective agreements, the period of the 
Metaxas dictatorship (1935-41) did not favour the development of 
collective labour law in the context of trade union freedom any more than 
the periods which followed it, i.e. the German Occupation and the 1946-49 
Civil War (EMIRE, Labour Law). 
Between the 1950s and 1960s many Greeks migrated, nearly one 
million between 1945-1973 mainly to North America, Europe and Australia 
(Cohen 1995), changing once again the employment map of the country. 
However, from 1958 to 1973 the Greek economy experienced high growth 
rates; in fact, the second highest in the OECD after Japan (Pirounakis, 
1997). The beginning of decline in the post-war Greek economy coincided 
with the two oil shocks, in 1973 and 1979. As reported by Katsanevas et al. 
(2004), unemployment was not an issue until the beginning of the 1970s, 
when basically other European countries faced similar problems. At the end 
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of 1974, after the seven year military dictatorship which had suppressed 
union activity, wages increased dramatically in both the government and 
private sectors while the unemployment rate was at a low of about 3 
percent. However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the Greek labour 
market performed badly, thus Greece‘s unemployment rate accelerated 
after those years and for the last 15 years has become one of the highest in 
Europe. While other countries faced similar problems, Greece seems to 
have suffered more, perhaps due to heavier labour regulation, as we will 
discuss below. ―Labour market flexibility‖ was generated as a new concept 
which attracted much interest in the mid-80s (Burgess, 1992). This concept 
was created since unemployment had risen especially in the European 
Community (EC), more than anywhere else, from 3 to 11 %, between 1973 
and 1986 (Layard et al., 2005) and new ideas were developed to solve this 
problem. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), for example, claim that an 
explanation for the persistence of high unemployment can be based on 
labour market rigidities. This type of argument will be furthered discussed 
later in chapter 3. In fact, flexibility may have become more important 
since the early 1980s due to rapid technological change and increased 
integration of the world‘s economies. Although the United States has 
arguably been able to rely on its flexible markets for the accommodation of 
this change, European countries suffered from anachronistic institutions 
that slowed down this change (Pissarides, 2001). Under these 
circumstances, the OECD (Jobs Study 1994, Employment Outlook 1999, 
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2004) encouraged European countries to increase flexibility in their labour 
markets by reducing employment protection.  
 Even though other EU countries followed the OECD guidelines, 
―flexible‖ measures in the Greek labour market have been delayed in 
application– for example, temporary employment (till 2001) agencies were 
not recognized by law, but were permitted for job counselling only (Storrie, 
2002). Gavroglou et al. (2001) report that flexible forms of employment 
were later introduced to the Greek labour market, in an effort for the Greek 
state to keep up with the tendencies that prevailed in the rest of Europe. 
Based on the EIRO study (1997) the delay in expanding employment 
flexibility is due to (i) Greece‘s effort to promote internal and functional 
flexibility with an emphasis on training and (ii) significant increases in 
illegal flexibility in conjunction with an increase in the ―informal‖ or 
―submerged‖ economy. Reports on Greece by international organizations 
conclude that flexibility is still a vital issue for the Greek labour market. To 
begin with, the OECD (Economic Survey, Greece, 2007) mentions that 
―much of the poor labour market performance can be explained by 
relatively rigid labour market institutions‖. Greece is considered the fourth 
strictest in EPL out of the 26 OECD countries (Employment Outlook, 
2004). Moreover, the IMF (2007) states that broader labour market reforms 
are essential for regaining lost competitiveness and reducing the 
unemployment rate (which still remains among the highest among OECD 
countries).  
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All the above mentioned provide us with a general outline of the 
Greek labour market in the European framework since the birth of the 
Greek state. We now consider in more detail labour legislation in regular 
employment as well as the regulations on individual and collective 
dismissals, working hours and wage rigidities (the National and Sectoral 
Wage Agreement system). Additionally, regulations on flexible 
employment will be reported regarding part-time, temporary time (fixed-
term contracts, seasonal workers, temporary work agencies), subsidized 
employment as a field of active labour market policies and family workers 
in mainly family-owned firms. Moreover, Labour Management 
Organizations which enforce and implement the law will also be studied. 
These Organizations are actively involved in public policy-making and 
enforcing hiring and firing regulations (the Labour Inspectorate) and high 
labour taxes (the Public Employment Services and the Social Security 
Organisation). 
 
 
2.3 Significant Characteristics of the Private and Public Greek Labour 
Market  
Industry and Firm-size  
Before considering Greek employment, it is essential to explore its 
relationship with the Greek businesses structure which is characterized by a 
combination of micro-enterprises and self-employment. Small and micro-
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enterprises are relevant for my inquiry, because this type of firm structure 
might itself be a response to strict labour regulation, since small firms can 
more easily avoid regulation – and family firms also. An overwhelming 
majority of 98 percent of businesses
1
 have less than ten employees (General 
Secretariat of Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG), 2002).  
In fact, micro-enterprises account for 63 percent of total 
employment in Greece, while enterprises with more that 50 persons 
employed account for only around 11 percent of total employment 
(Kikilias, 2005). Even the manufacturing sector is dominated mainly by 
―small businesses‖; mainly small and family-owned processing plants with 
a low number of workers. Almost ninety-five percent of manufacturing 
plants employ less than 10 workers (NSSG, 2002). More than 20 percent of 
the workforce in the manufacturing sector is employed in food products and 
beverage processing firms, while another 20 percent is divided almost 
equally among clothing, furniture and other wood manufacturing plants 
(our calculations were based on Labour Force Survey (NSSG-LFS, 2005). 
 
Based on the above observations, the Greek labour market may be 
categorised into the two types:  
(a) The ―Athenian or central‖ labour market, which centralised wage 
agreements are based on union-employer negotiations and affect the 
provincial labour markets which our TERS survey analyses  
                                               
1 For comparisons with other EU countries see on Observatory of European SMEs, No 7 - SMEs in Europe 2003,  
at Table 3.2: Roles of SMES in European Countries, 2003, p. 29   - See more on web page: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/files/analysis/doc/smes_observatory_2003_report7_en.pdf 
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 (b) The second category is the provincial labour markets which incorporate 
the rest of Greece, including the Thessaly region centred on Larissa to 
which my empirical study below relates. 
 
Employment in the public sector 
  Employment in the public sector is important for discussion of 
private sector employment, because wage setting in the public sector 
arguably influences wages in the private sector (to which my TERS survey 
relates). Unions in the public sector are powerful, set their own national 
agreements, and may also influence private sector agreements (which are 
naturally determined in Athens, where unions are strongest) as discussed 
below. The public sector in fact is by far the largest employer in corporate 
Greece (Michail, 2003). According to the government budget report (2008) 
- coming from the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance, the number of 
employees in public administration is just more than a half million (Table 
3.15, p.89). However, based on personal contact with a Greek officer of the 
Ministry of National Economy
2
 we have to take into consideration (a) more 
than two hundred thousand additional public servants, who are employees 
of the national services, the local governments and the public entities and 
(b) more than two hundred thousand public servants under indetermined or 
fixed-term contracts. All things considered, employment in public sector 
amounts to 20% of the country's total employment.  
 
                                               
2
 Telephone contact on 18th September 2008 with officer Mr. Giannakopoulos Christos, General Accounting 
Office 
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The above outline shows that the Greek labour market has a ―dual‖ 
character, with a large and more protected government sector, and a less 
protected private sector. This private sector is dominated by tourism and 
retail/wholesale distribution, while the manufacturing industry remaining 
underdeveloped. At the same time, collective agreements covering this 
sector are determined in the central Athenian labour market, where trade 
union influence is also high. Wages set in this way are arguably too high 
for the rest of the country. However, the private sector is formed mainly of 
micro-enterprises characterized by family ownership. Such enterprises are 
quite difficult to regulate; for example, wages are difficult to monitor in 
family enterprises, which gives the Greek labour market a form of 
flexibility, as we will see. Let us turn next to a more detailed discussion of 
the Greek labour law framework. 
 
 
2.4 The Legislation on Regular Employment in the Greek Labour 
Market  
One of the main rigidities that causes unemployment (see numerous 
OECD reports) – is restrictions on dismissals. Greece is a country where 
individual, as well as collective dismissals, face restrictions (Karantinos, 
2006). Employment protection in Greece made it first steps with the 
regulation of dismissals in the 1920s as mentioned in section 2.1. It is also 
worth mentioning here that apart from a few modifications - with a number 
of ministerial fiats and laws - the overall picture of dismissal regulations 
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has remained relatively unchanged and anachronistic in Greece. This 
section will mainly focus on the issue of individual dismissals of regular 
and temporary workers. 
 
The OECD‘s Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Index is a 
frequently used labour market indicator (see further in chapter 3). In our 
case, we examine the EPL-version 1 which refers to (a) the strictness of 
labour regulation on regular employment and (b) the temporary contracts. 
Both types of employment are relevant in our TERS survey chapter and are 
also used in our regressions chapter, as we will see below. Another version 
is also used by the OECD (EPL-version 2) which takes collective 
dismissals into consideration. Since dramatic fluctuations are not evident 
within a single year, all figures given represent five-year averages. Data for 
Greece were calculated according to OECD methodology (developed in 
chapter 3) for the last 30 years (early 80s - late 00s - from 2003 onward the 
figures were estimated by the author). In the following paragraphs, an 
analysis of the Greek EPL is given:  
As it will be discussed in Chapter 3, EPL is likely to have consequences on 
hiring, for example, prompting the hiring of less skilled workers, and also 
of temps. We aim to test these consequences in the TERS work, and 
therefore need a good understanding of Greek EPL. 
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The Individual Dismissal Mechanism in Greece 
There are two main costs of dismissal procedures according to the 
OECD‘s sub-index of EPL on regular employment: (a) administrative 
dismissal procedures, which create bureaucracy and (b) firing costs, which 
mainly take severance payment/notice period into consideration. 
 
In Greece, the administrative difficulties which a firm faces in 
individual dismissals are the following: (i) written statement to employee 
(ii) additional notification to the local office of Public Employment 
Services (OAED) within eight days and (iii) additional restricted reasons 
for unfair dismissals. Flexible procedures take place at this stage, since the 
employer may notify a temporary employee of dismissal within a shorter 
period of time and without being obliged to justify or state the reasons for 
dismissal. However, a dismissal is automatically characterised as unfair in 
some cases - when applied to (a) trade union representatives and work 
council members, (b) employees during their annual leave and (c) recent 
mothers returning to their workplace. In addition, reasons of pregnancy and 
discrimination (to vulnerable group members) are considered as unfair 
dismissals. An important consideration for a firm is also the time spent on 
these disputes - longer than one year may be required in court, and if the 
case goes to higher courts the final ruling often takes more than two years. 
(EIRO, 2004). Thus, EPL is a potentially expensive factor which employers 
have to take into account, as we will see below when analysing the TERS. 
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In terms of severance payments, three main characteristics are taken 
into consideration: (a) the length of service (tenure) of the employee, (b) 
the employee's status (wage earner or salary earner) and (c) the notice 
period. The employee‘s tenure is the main factor in dismissal. The length of 
service defines the period of notice of termination of the employment 
contract. In other words, the more years someone is employed worked for 
the same employer, the earlier the notification necessary for a forthcoming 
dismissal (this is only applied to white-collar employees). In addition, the 
employee's status plays a significant role in dismissal. In Greece as well as 
in some other EU countries white-collar employees ―are more protected‖ 
than blue-collar employees in the dismissal procedure. Furthermore, only 
white-collar employees must be notified about a forthcoming dismissal in 
advance and the severance payment is much higher for salaried employees 
compared to wage earners. For white-collar workers, in cases of dismissal 
with due notice, severance pay amounts to half of the pay corresponding to 
the period of notice (Law 3198/1955, Article 4).  
 
In cases of dismissal without the due period of notice (Table 2.1), 
severance pay is calculated by multiplying the employee's monthly pay by 
the number of months of notice that should otherwise have been observed 
by the employer, subject to a maximum of 24 months' pay (minimum 1 
month‘s pay), when the length of service is 28 years or more. For manual 
workers, maximum severance pay is set at 165 days' wages (while 
 25 
minimum are 5 days‘ wages), when the length of service exceeds 30 years 
(Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.1: Severance Payment for White Collar 
 
Dismissal without notice period Dismissal with notice period 
Employees‘ length  
of service to  
the same employer 
Severance Pay 
(in months) 
Notice Period  
before the 
Dismissal 
(in months) 
Severance Pay 
(in months) 
2 months – 1 year 1 1 month ½ 
1 – 4 years 2 2 months 1 
4 – 6 years 3 3 months 1 ½ 
6 – 8 years 4 4 months 2 
8 – 10 years 5 5 months 2 ½ 
10 years 6 6 months 3 
Over 10 years 
1 month‘s salary  
per yr of service  
(up to 24 months) 
Over 6 months 
1/2 month‘s salary  
per month of service  
(up to 12 months) 
 
 Sources: Law 2112/ 1920 (FEK 67A/1920) and Law 3198/1955 (FEK 9A/1955) 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Severance Payment for Blue Collar* 
 
Dismissal without notice period 
Employees‘ length of service 
To the same employer 
Severance Pay 
(in days) 
1 – 2 years 7 
2 – 5 years 15 
5 – 10 years 30 
10 – 15 years 60 
15 – 20 years 100 
20 – 25 years 120 
25 – 30 years 145 
Over 30 years 165 
  
Source: Royal Decree 18/1920, Law 3198/1955, Law 2849/1989.  
Also based on modifications which have been signed for the National 
General Collective Agreements between 1989 -2006. 
Notes: *Blue collar workers cannot be notified of a dismissal in advance. 
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It should be noted that an employer is obliged to pay compensation 
only when an employee has been working for the company for a period of 
over two months from the date of recruitment (Seferiades, 2003). If the 
actual sum is not paid, the termination of the contract of employment is 
rendered null and void (Law 3198/1955, Article 5). This severance pay is 
always payable irrespective of the reason for termination of the contract, 
i.e. even in cases where the reasons are relating to the employee's 
individual person or behaviour (incompetence, unsuitability, failure to fulfil 
contractual obligations, etc.). We consider below how Greece‘s EPL 
strictness compares with other countries, however, first let us bring in the 
Greek debate on EPL. 
 
Debate on Severance Payment and Employment Protection Legislation 
A debate on severance payment takes place between the Greek 
General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) and the Employers‘ 
Associations, usually during the bargaining process, prior to signing the 
National General Collective Agreement. The main point of discussion 
generally focuses on increasing blue-collar workers‘ severance pay to the 
same levels as those of white-collar employees. Predictably, the GSEE 
generally argues for the application of a new law on the abolition of 
discriminatory differences between blue-collar and white-collar workers 
and the harmonization of unified employee status under the dismissal 
mechanism. The GSEE believes that this distinction is unfair since ―there is 
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no longer labour which is purely intellectual or purely manual‖ (EIRO, 
2004) and every employee has the same living needs. For example, a white-
collar employee with tenure of more than 28 yrs enjoys more than 7 times 
higher amount of compensation than a blue-collar employee with 
comparable tenure (Tables 2.1 & 2.2). Other European Union countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Italy) similarly have different regulations 
for dismissals of white and blue-collared employees. However, the 
differences in severance pay for Greece are remarkable.  
 
On the other hand, OECD reports call for white collar workers‘ 
severance payments to be reduced and aligned with those of blue collar 
workers. The Economic Survey of Greece (OECD, 2007:94) mentions that 
―this unusual feature of the EPL in Greece impedes labour turnover, and 
this is the main reason why Greek labour market turnover is among the 
lowest in OECD countries‖.  
It is also important to note that according to the OECD Employment 
Outlook (2004) index of dismissals, Greece has one of the highest scores 
(second highest score in notice period for the scale of 20 years tenure; see 
more on Table 2.3, third column) among OECD countries, though the score 
regarding the other time scale categories (9 months and 4 years) follow the 
average OECD level.  
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Table 2.3: EPL for dismissals in Greece & selected OECD countries 
(2008) 
 
Country 
Overall EPL 
Index*  
Length of notice 
period for 20 years 
of tenure 
Spain 3,11 1 
France 3,00 1 
Greece 2,97 4 
Portugal 2,84 1 
Norway 2,65 2 
Germany 2,63 4 
Belgium 2,61 6 
Italy 2,58 1 
Austria 2,41 1 
Poland 2,41 2 
Czech Republic 2,32 1 
Finland 2,29 3 
Netherlands 2,23 1 
Korea 2,13 1 
Slovak Republic 2,13 2 
Hungary 2,11 2 
Sweden 2,06 3 
United Kingdom 1,09 2 
Canada 1,02 1 
United States 0,85 0 
Source: OECD - www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
Notes: * Weighted sum of version including 3 sub-indicators for regular 
contracts, temporary contracts, and collective dismissals (version 2)  
 
 
Since 1989, several modifications have taken place and changed the 
severance payments of blue-collar workers. Many of them, introduced 
between the years 1994-2006, are included as separate articles on National 
General Collective Agreements (NGCAs) and have revised past laws. 
 30 
These changes have narrowed the distinction between dismissal 
compensation for blue and white-collar workers and have generally 
increased EPL for blue collar workers:  
 an increase in compensation (actual amount) for blue-collar employees 
with tenure between 10-20 years  
 an introduction of three new categories of severance payment for 
manual workers with tenure between 20-30 years 
 an escalation in the OECD-EPL sub-index in severance payment in 
Greece. In other words, in the late 80‘s manual workers with 10 years 
tenure and over were given 65 daily wages as severance pay in case of 
dismissal, while nowadays the severance payment is 100 daily wages for 
the same case.  
On the other hand, severance payment for white-collar employees 
remains stable. However, it is worth mentioning that there is still a 
significant difference between the severance of blue and white collared 
workers.  
 
Collective Dismissals 
Restrictions are imposed in individual dismissals as well as in 
collective ones. Procedures on collective dismissals were regulated (by law 
1387) in 1983 and implemented the European Directive in 1975 
(1975/129/EEC), however some modifications were made in 2000 
(2874/2000, article 9, paragraph 2). These laws introduce the right of 
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compulsory prior consultation between employers and employee 
representatives, on the reasons of dismissals and the number of employees 
to be affected (Katsanevas, 1985). In addition, collective redundancies take 
place when enterprises employing 20 or more employees dismiss a specific 
number of employees within the period of one calendar month. In addition, 
employers have to notify (a) the employees' representatives about the 
planned dismissals (b) the local office of the Labour Inspectorate and (c) 
the Head of the Prefecture with a request for approval.  
According to the international standards (OECD sub index for 
employment protection law), Greece‘s regulation for collective dismissals 
is ranked among the top 10 most rigid OECD counties (see more OECD 
Database web page
3
). Admittedly, this law is applied only to enterprises 
with more than 20 employees which represent a small minority on the 
Greek business map, as we already presented. However, a number of these 
firms have been included in our TERS survey (see further in Chapter 4), 
and thus the collective dismissals provisions also have relevance. 
   
Working Hours 
Another aspect of regulation in Greece‘s employment framework is 
the restrictions on working hours. Their relevance to the topic of labour 
flexibility in Greece, because the law has limited both long hours and short 
hours (part-time) work which is important in my empirical work. As can be 
seen from Table 2.4, the average hours worked are in fact longer in Greece 
                                               
3
 http://stats.oecd.org – Dataset: LFS - Strictness of EPL – collective dismissals 
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than the average for the OECD. The implication is that the maximum 
working hours (see below) are not enforced. On the other hand, the low 
proportion of part-timers in Greece (see below) implies that laws limiting 
short and part-time working hours are enforced.  
 
In all countries, hours of work are affected by regulations and 
collective bargaining. However, France, Portugal and Spain are three 
countries in which the influence of legislation is particularly strong; in 
Denmark, Germany, and Italy collective bargaining is considerably more 
important; in Belgium, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands, the system is 
best described as mixed (Pissarides et al., 2009). In the UK and the US and 
similar Anglo-American-influenced economies, freedom of choice is more 
important. 
Historically, working time has generally been regulated by the law 
in Greece which imposes the 8-hour day and the 48-hour week with the 
Presidential Decree of 1932 (Koukiadis, 2009). However, the first 
collective agreement which reduced working time was the National General 
Collective Agreement in 1975, after the fall of the military government. 
Under this agreement (article 3-paragraph 1), weekly working time was 
fixed at 45 hours, without any reduction in pay. An additional modification 
was introduced by the National General Collective Agreement in 1984; it 
extended the 40-hour work week to all employees in the private sector 
(article 6) 
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According to the OECD (http://stats.oecd.org), in the large majority 
of OECD countries, hours worked have fallen over the period from 1994 to 
2007. However, Greece presents the largest number of working hours per 
year with a significant difference from the OECD average.  
Table 2.4: Average annual hours actually worked per worker in 
employment in Greece & selected OECD countries (2009) 
 
Country 
Total  
Employment 
Dependent 
Employment 
Greece 2119 1777 
Hungary 1989 1749 
Poland 1966 1938 
Czech Republic 1942 1879 
Italy 1773 … 
United States 1768 1776 
OECD countries 1739 .. 
Portugal 1719 1664 
Canada 1699 1699 
Spain 1654 1615 
Finland 1652 1555 
United Kingdom 1652  1638* 
Austria 1621 1436 
Sweden 1610 .. 
Denmark 1563 1547 
France 1554 1469 
Belgium 1550 1453 
Ireland 1549 1470 
Norway 1407 .. 
Germany 1390 1309 
Source: OECD.Stat Database - http://stats.oecd.org  
Notes: Data are expressed in number of hours worked per year per  
employed in employment. 
* Data for UK comes from the year 2008. 
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Initially, it seems that Greek employees work far more hours than 
their counterparts in the OECD. However, there are important points which 
have to be taken into account in this measurement: 
(a) the high percentage of self-employed (36 percent of the total civilian 
employment - OECD factbook 2008) in the Greek labour market who do 
not belong to collective bargaining and usually work more hours in all 
countries  
(b) the extremely low percentage of part-time employment, a category 
also estimated in the methodology  
More specifically, according to recent OECD data (see Table 2.4), if 
we take into consideration the number of working hours in dependent 
employment (thus excluding the self- employed), there is no gap between 
Greece and other OECD countries. Moreover, the PAEP (Employment 
Observatory Research Informatics S.A.) report (2006) indicates that 
differences are much smaller if we also exclude part-timers.  
To sum up, Greece presents a picture where working hours are 
regulated, however, in reality the large number of self-employed workers 
(and family workers) do much as they please. At the same time, part-time 
work seems effectively discouraged. The implication is that businesses 
probably cannot vary hours as much as they would like to gain flexibility, 
and have to vary headcount – which in turn means relying on temp labour 
given the strict EPL. In my survey of employers in Thessaly (Chapters 3 
and 4), I will examine strategies adopted by employers in more detail. 
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2.5 The Regulation of Flexible Employment in the Greek Labour 
market  
Apart from restrictions on regular employment, issues relating to 
flexible employment will also be examined in this section, in order to lay 
the basis for my later work with the TERS. What is the reality of flexible 
employment in Greek businesses? Can these forms of employment find 
ways to increase the employment percentages and expand businesses in 
Greece? Can businesses use these ―atypical‖ employment forms without 
prevention of the labour law? 
These questions are of high importance for Greek enterprises taking 
into consideration that international organizations such as OECD, IMF and 
some Greek organizations (Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank) argue with other 
organizations (Institute of Employment of General Confederation of Greek 
Labour) and many academics about the merits of labour flexibility in Greek 
enterprises. Flexible work (otherwise atypical or non-standard forms of 
employment) is a term which covers a wide range of work styles and 
employment practices. Broadly speaking, it is used to describe all kinds of 
employment, which differ from traditional 9-5 full-time work with a 
permanent contract (Avramidou, 2001), including part-time, shift work, 
temporary work, fixed term work, sub-contracting, seasonal work, 
teleworking, home working, and subsidized employment. 
The majority of job openings in the EU in the 1990s have been part-
time positions, rather than full-time (Voudouris, 2004). Thus, it seems that 
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the overall level of flexible work is clearly increasing. However, the pattern 
varies substantially across the EU due to differences in labour regulations, 
resulting in different forms of flexibility in different countries (Voudouris, 
2004). Even though labour regulations may vary from country to country, 
there are certain issues in the EU that stand for all member countries, as 
they share a common goal.  
Flexible forms of employment, however, were introduced to the 
Greek labour market later in an effort for the Greek state to keep up with 
the tendencies that prevailed in the rest of Europe (Gravoglou and Kikilias, 
2001). That happened because the Greek employment protection legislation 
was drafted principally with permanent, full-time employees in mind 
(Michail, 2003). It seems that employment contracts outside regular 
employment were not used extensively or existed mainly in the grey 
market. Furthermore, in the early 90s, additional laws on labour relations 
and regulations made an attempt to provide better protection for atypical 
workers, while at the same time record the size of atypical employment. 
More analytical information about non-standard forms of employment is 
provided below:  
 
Part-Time Employment  
Greece has very few part-time workers, males represent only 4% 
and females 12.9% (OECD Employment Outlook, 2007:261), which is 
quite different from the rest of the EU countries. Thus, while part-time 
employment as a proportion of total employment in the EU-15 has been 
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increasing during the last twenty years, reaching 18% of total employment, 
in Greece it has stagnated at about 7.5 percent (OECD 2007: 262)  
Part-time employment should be possible in Greece based on the 
fundamental principle of freedom to conclude a contract (article 361, Civil 
Code). However, empirically, up until the end of the 1980s part-time 
employment contracts were rare in the labour market (Institute of 
Employment/Greek General Confederation of Labour ( INE/GSEE), 2002). 
In fact, it was only officially recognised in 1990 (under law 1892/1990, 
article 38). Two other additional laws in the late 90s (2639/1998 and 
2874/2000) implemented an institutional framework for part-time work in 
Greece based on the guidelines of the European directive in 1997 (Council 
Directive 97/81/EC). These latter laws were introduced for ―better social 
protection‖ of part-time workers as well as for the obligatory registration of 
this type of employment at the Labour Inspectorate for the better 
monitoring of the system.  
Moreover, employers have to increase the remuneration of this 
category of part-time employees who work less than 4 hours per day (by 
7,5%) and are paid minimum wage (article 6, 2874/2000). In the Bielenski 
et al. (2002) study, the part-time category was divided into marginal (up to 
19 hours per week) and substantial (20 to 34 hours per week) part-time 
work. Based on these categories, it is obvious why Greece presents very 
low percentages in marginal rates. Additionally, when a part-time employee 
is  gives his/her consent to work overtime (following employer's request) 
he/her is entitled to overtime pay increased by 10%. Employers are 
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discouraged from hiring part-timers since part-time work is regulated, 
especially in the marginal part-time category. 
On the other hand it is also interesting to note that according to the 
Labour Force Survey Results (2001), 44 percent of the part-timers in 
Greece would prefer to have full time work but have settled with this type 
of employment because full-time jobs were not available. Thus, even 
though few workers are in part-time employment, those so employed are 
discontented. Finally, in 2003 a new law (3174/2003) allows public sector 
organisations to recruit unemployed people and other groups on a part-time 
basis or fixed-term contracts. The main characteristic of this law is that the 
candidates must be selected from vulnerable groups (long-term 
unemployed, people with disabilities). 
 
Temporary Employment 
Temporary employment is important, because it is almost the only avenue 
of flexibility open to Greek labour market participants and represents 10,9 
percent of the total workforce in Greece (EIRO, 2007). However, there is a 
lack of definition of temporary employment while the institutional 
framework in which it operates is not clearly established. According to the 
OECD (2002), the distinction between temporary and permanent jobs 
differs significantly between countries. This may be the reason why Greece 
does not have a clear legal framework for temporary employment. 
However, OECD (2002) considers as temporary jobs those forms of 
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dependent employment, which, by their nature, do not offer workers the 
prospect of a long-lasting employment relationship.  
These temporary contracts can be separated into two categories: (a) 
fixed-term contracts and (b) temporary work agency employment. 
(a) Fixed-term contracts are the most common form of temporary 
employment. A series of previous laws (law 2112/1920 and clauses in 
Chapter 180, Articles 648-680 of the Civil Code
 
) together with the new 
one 2639/98 define the fixed-term labour agreements. What is characteristic 
of these contracts is that the termination of this kind of job is determined by 
objective conditions. The EU directive (70/1999) was adopted by two 
presidential decrees of the Greek government in 2003 (PD 81/2003) and 
2004 (PD180/2004). According to these, the longest duration of continuing 
contracts is two years or three successive renewals of their initial fixed-
term contract. In any other case (over two years duration) the fixed-term 
contract is meant to be transformed into an indeterminate duration contract. 
Another important issue is that the new regulations lengthen the interval 
between two successive employment contracts to 45 days (EIRO, 2004), 
which in practice is very difficult to monitor. 
A sub-category could be introduced at this point. Seasonal work 
―differs‖ from fixed-term contracts because it includes only the seasonal 
activity of a company in specific time periods of the year. Seasonal 
employment has high proportions in the Greek tourism industry (restaurants 
and hotels) and in the food-processing industry, trying to cover the seasonal 
needs of the workforce. 
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(b) Temporary Agency Work (TAW) is the other category of temporary 
employment in Greece. The state passed a law (2956/2001) in 2001 which 
for the first time laid down specific rules on the establishment, operation 
and obligations of temporary work agencies (EIRO, 2001). However, it 
seems that its development is limited, since as we will see below, TAW is 
clearly a regulated form of employment in Greece. One of the main 
characteristics of this type of employment is the maximum limit of an eight 
month contract with the possibility of only one renewal while the total 
length of the contract cannot exceed sixteen months.  
Furthermore, two ministerial decrees (30342 and 30343/2002) in 
2002 filling in the gaps of the previous legislation (EIRO, 2008) together 
with law (3144/2003) provide a heavier regulatory framework for this type 
of employment. Mainly, issues deal with strict requirements in setting up a 
temporary working agency which has to be in the form of a société 
anonyme with share capital of at least 176.000€. In addition, in order to get 
an operating licence one is required to (a) submit to governmental 
organisations two letters of financial guarantee of 200.000€ which need (b) 
to be authorised by the special Temporary Employment Monitoring 
Committee. 
 
These reforms are a part of a general ―reform‖ strategy which took 
place in many countries of continental Europe between the years 1990-
2003, with the apparent aim of making room for more flexible – while 
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leaving the EPL protection of permanent workers. According to Ochel 
(2008:2) ―governments introduce reforms to the margin of the core labour 
market … while keeping the institutional arrangements for incumbent 
workers virtually intact‖. Greece appears to be no exception here, and so 
we can take it that incumbent workers‘ protection remains quite strict 
currently for the period to which my TERS relates. 
 
Subsidised Employment 
In the field of active labour market policies, the main types of 
intervention continue to be subsidised employment (wage subsidies and 
start-up incentives) and training. Such employment provides another 
avenue of flexibility, and is thus relevant for my inquiry. The management 
and the application of these subsidised employment schemes come from the 
Public Employment Services (OAED) under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Employment and Social Protection. This is characterized by a highly 
centralized structure; however, recently other governmental departments 
have been involved both in the engagement and the delivering of pro-active 
labour market policies (Karantinos, 2006).  
Wage subsidies as a category of subsidised employment which is 
investigated in this TERS survey - was initially applied in 1982 in Greece 
under a programme called Subsidies of the New Posts while in 1998 a new 
measure of employment, the so-called Stage, was introduced (acquisition of 
professional experience for post-secondary and tertiary education 
graduates). Both measures are occasionally offered and announced by the 
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government to the participants (businesses and the unemployed). The goal 
is to try to motivate businesses to hire new employees (under this flexible 
employment) for a specific duration. Thus, unemployed people (especially 
long-term or other members of vulnerable categories) gain work experience 
and become more competitive in the labour market. In addition, Public 
Employment Services (OAED) offers wage subsidies under trainee 
schemes for the work placement or internship of students of technical high 
schools or tertiary education institutes.  
 
Family Employment 
Family workers are important in Greece, as we have seen, and 
provide another method of flexibility for Greek enterprises as we will see in 
Chapter 5‘s empirical work. These include parents, siblings and extended 
family-members working in family businesses (Sardeshmuck, 2005). They 
are mainly females, especially housewives and the workplace in these 
Greek businesses is considered as a kind of extension of the family 
relationship (Vaiou, 1997). These workplaces are mostly micro-enterprises 
with a strong family character.  
According to the law (1846/1951) on ―Social Security‖ - which determines 
the regime of Social Security in Greece - in 1951, family members who 
worked in a family business were not clearly specified as persons to be 
subject to social security tax contributions. However, this tax was 
introduced later, in 1988, (law 1759/1988 – KAMO articles 1-7), when 
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family members, such as spouses or relatives of the first and second degree, 
were obligated to be registered just as any other type of employee under 
depended employment contract. Furthermore, a number of circular 
ministerial letters clarify and enable those businesses with individual legal 
status - and not any other legal type of business - who have hired family 
workers to pay lower labour costs (less employer and employee 
contributions at 8%) and some other conveniences. 
However, this type of employment admittedly is still considered grey. The 
main question arising is whether family workers are paid the legally-
required nationally agreed rates. According to the European Employment 
Observatory Review (EEOR -2004) undeclared work (paid or unpaid) in 
Greece is bound to be higher in activities with a high incidence of family 
workers and the self-employed. Moreover, the same report also mentioned 
that a large number of family workers are also found – apart from 
agricultural activities - in distributive trades, tourism, manufacturing 
activities and construction (EEOR, 2004:89) – exactly the economic sectors 
being investigated in the TERS survey. 
It is important to note, that taxation is more lenient for family 
enterprises, as it was formerly mentioned (which might explain why they 
comprise the majority of businesses in Greece). The controls from IKA 
officers or Labour Inspectors in these family businesses -sole proprietorship 
status - are not as rigidly enforced as with larger businesses. It is common 
not to give a penalty to the employer when officers find a family member 
working in the workplace and s/he is not insured (my interviews with IKA 
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officials – see also OECD, Regulatory Reform in Greece, 2001, p 33). The 
implication is that this favourable tax treatment of the family business 
could itself contribute to unemployment, since large-scale enterprise in 
Greece is discouraged.  
 
2.6 The System of Collective Bargaining & Trade Unions in Greece 
 Collective bargaining is quite centralised in Greece, and is also 
intended to be legally enforceable. Wages are of course an important 
determinant of employment. To the extent that the collective agreements 
are observed (which will be examined in analysis of the TERS in the next 
chapters), it is possible that high wages – suitable for Athens, but too high 
for provincial labour markets – cause businesses not only to resort to temp 
employment, but also to remain small and family-based. Entrepreneurship 
is discouraged. In these ways, centrally-set wages arguably raise Greek 
unemployment. The workings of the Greek collective agreement system are 
therefore clearly important, and we now describe it. 
 
Trade Unions 
Historically, the trade union movement in Greece has followed the 
development of industry in Greece, which has lagged behind industrially 
developed Europe (Robolis, 2008). Based on a recent report (GSEE, 2008), 
Greek Trade Unions appeared in the last quarter of the 19th century (1875 
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and later) with the increasing movement of population from the countryside 
to the urban centres.  
The historical development of Greek Trade Unions is separated into 
five periods by Ioannou (2000). However, since the Greek state faced many 
obstacles (due to wars and military dictatorship) in its development we will 
focus on the last phase (1974 and after) with the fall of the military 
dictatorship and the establishment of parliamentary democracy. After this 
year, Greek trade unions emerged more as a more powerful social labour 
movement (Fakiolas, 1978). In this period, new labour movements such as 
the factory movement in industry and the federations movement in state-
owned companies (public sector utilities) (Ioannou, 2000) were developed.  
 With the election of a socialist government in the early 1980s, a 
new law was launched "regarding the democratisation of the trade union 
movement and the safeguarding of workers' trade union freedoms" (Law 
1264/1982 (Article 7)). This legislation provides the structure of  trade 
unions on three levels (EIRO, 1998):  
- primary organisations are the local organisations of unions with a 
broader coverage, formal enterprise unions, and more informal employees' 
associations in small enterprises;  
- secondary organisations consist of at least two primary 
organisations. They may be labour centres, which are local in nature, or 
union federations, which are mostly sectoral, though may be occupational; 
and  
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- tertiary organisations are made up of at least two secondary 
organisations. The two-non rival tertiary organizations are: (a) the Greek 
General Confederation of Labour (GSEE), which represents the private and 
broader public sector, and (b) the Confederation of Public Servants 
(ADEDY) which represents public administration. 
These two types of tertiary organizations – according to recent data 
– present remarkably different trade union density rates, with unions in the 
public sector representing almost 64 percent of the employees while unions 
in the private sector just 19 percent (Matsaganis, 2007). However, this 
difference has been evident in many countries over the last decades, since 
trade unions have found it easier to organize employees in the public than 
in the private sector (OECD, 1994). 
It is important to note here that trade unions are not financially 
dependent; apart from symbolic yearly members' subscriptions they rely on 
compulsory contributions (since Metaxas dictatorship 1936-1940) from the 
state social welfare system: more particularly the Organisational Council 
House (OCH) (Ioannou, 2005:153, Kritsantonis (1998) and Koukoules, 
1984). This institution is funded - as we will see below - by the social 
security contributions of employers and employees (through the IKA 
organisation). In 2002, the GSEE Congress demanded that the government 
increase the OCH funding from the current level of 25 % of its annual 
budget to 30 percent, to meet increasing costs and falling revenues from 
members (Ioannou, 2005:154). 
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Over the past 30 years, the overall trade union density in Greece has 
dropped from almost 35 percent of the workforce in the early 80s to less 
than 25 percent in late 2000s. This decline is shown in Table 2.5, where 
Greece has followed the OECD trend (OECD, 2004).  
Table 2.5: Trade Union Density (%) in Greece and selected OECD 
countries 
 
Country 1990 2008 
Sweden 80 68,3 
Denmark 75,3 67,6 
Finland 72,5 67,5 
Norway 58,5 53,3 
Belgium 53,9 51,9 
Italy 38,8 33,4 
Ireland 48,5 32,3 
Austria 46,9 28,9 
Canada 34 27,1 
United Kingdom 38,2 27,1 
Greece 34,1 24 
New Zealand 49,5 20,8 
Portugal 28 20,4 
Germany 31,2 19,1 
Netherlands 24,3 18,9 
Australia 40 18,6 
Switzerland 22,7 18,3 
Japan 25,4 18,2 
Poland 54,8 15,6 
Spain 12,5 14,3 
Korea 17,2 10,3 
 
Source: OECD.Stat Database - http://stats.oecd.org 
Notes: Data are expressed in percentages. Density is  
calculated using survey data, wherever possible, and  
administrative data adjusted for non-active and  
self-employed members. 
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This fall in density has also been influenced by a number of 
economic and political factors. For instance, large-scale foreign industries, 
which had helped the expansion of the country during the after-war period, 
left Greece as it became a higher cost location after the mid-80s (Fillipaios, 
2006). Furthermore, Greece‘s family business structure does not contribute 
to unionism. It is important to mention here that for employees to set up 
work council in a firm, 21 employees are needed (Law 1767/1988). 
Because of the small size of businesses in Greece, union activity is 
naturally low since trade unions are favored by large workplaces (Kouzis, 
2005).  
On the other hand, union membership in the public sector is high in 
part due to high employment security (permanent or indeterminate 
contract). In addition, there is a strong link in political and financial terms 
among trade unions and the state as it already noted. Many scholars 
(Zambarloukou, 2006, Kouzis, 2005) argue that the Greek state has 
succeeded in intervening to control union leadership. A further reason for 
union decline is the rise of the flexible workforce. Matsaganis (2007) refers 
to the typical ―active‖ Greek unionist as a Greek national who is a highly-
tenured, middle-aged, male employee (under permanent contract). The 
representative picture of Greek employment is contradictory, since the 
typical worker in Greece is young (many are in the flexible workforce) and 
increasingly female.  
 49 
Basic Characteristics in Collective Bargaining  
Since trade union density is one of the foundations of the wage-
setting process in Greece, the importance of collective bargaining coverage 
in the last decades is certainly important. There are two main concepts in 
bargaining coverage; the unadjusted and the adjusted rate (see on Traxler, 
2001) In the Greek case, it is remarkable that no surveys on collective 
agreements take place, nor are similar questions included on labour force 
surveys, so no reliable data on coverage at a national level are available.. 
 
In the TERS I will consider de facto coverage of collective 
agreements, but given the complexity of the position, it is worth looking at 
the de jure position which is as follows. First, free collective bargaining and 
General National Collective Agreements are regulated by law 1876/90 
(Article 1) which concerns free collective bargaining ―to all those workers 
employed on the basis of a private-law employment contract by any 
domestic or foreign employer, firm, operation or service of the private or 
public sector of the economy‖. In other words, in the collective bargaining 
process (EIRO, 2007), workers who have the right to participate are 
members of any trade union represented at the national level through the 
GSEE structure. An outcome of successful collective bargaining is the 
signing of a National General Collective Agreement (EGSSE) between the 
GSEE on the employee side and Federation of Greek Industries (SEV), 
General Confederation of Greek Small Businesses and Trades (GSEBEE), 
and Federation of Greek Traders (ESEE) on the employer side. This type of 
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agreement sets up the basic minimum wage floor for the whole country – 
affecting primarily unskilled workers.  
 
 Second, there are different levels of agreements and also an 
extension mechanism for collective agreements. These other types of 
agreements -sectoral, industry, company and occupational at the national or 
local/regional level - act as a supplement to the National General Collective 
Agreement. These agreements define minimum wages for more skilled 
workers, taking into consideration tenure, age and occupation (see the 
Chapter Appendix for details of an actual sectoral agreement) At this point 
it is important to note that any enterprise agreement which improves on the 
terms of the Sectoral Wage Agreement applying to the enterprise is 
permissible. Let us also note that sectoral/occupational agreements can be 
extended to all employees in the industry or occupation. An agreement is 
strictly applied to employees who are union-members (in other words the 
number of voting members at the last union elections, as mentioned in the 
previous section).  
Moreover, a sectoral/occupational collective agreement may be 
extended if it represents 50 percent or more of the employees working in 
the particular sector/occupation (OECD, 2004). This extension of 
agreement has to be submitted to the Greek Ministry of Labour by the 
appropriate trade union or employers' organization through an application. 
Following the approval of the Minister, a collective agreement (industrial, 
sectoral) covers all employees who are not members of its signatory parties.  
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c) Collective bargaining in public administration 
Strangely, given the public sector union strength, there is no right to 
bargain in the public sector in Greece - ―all salaried public servants under 
public-law employment relationships, including employees of public 
entities‖ have no right to bargain over pay issues. Even though a new law 
2738/1999 was introduced in 1999 regarding "collective bargaining in 
public administration, permanent status for workers employed under open-
ended contracts and other provisions" public employees are still excluded 
from formal bargaining on pay and pensions. This law however gives 
public servants the statutory right to negotiate their terms and conditions of 
employment (for instance, education and training issues as well as health 
and safety measures and matters related to leave) (EIRO, 1999 & Law 
2738/1999). Based on the Greek Labour Force Survey – unfortunately only 
a few recent years provide us with reliable data – the proportion of public 
employees (under a full public law employment relationship, not temps) is 
approximately 12 percent (NSSG-LFS data, 2001-2007- B‘ quarter). 
 
d) Coverage of collective agreements in atypical employment 
According to the law, part-time work and any kind of temporary 
employment (fixed-term, seasonal etc.) is covered by the National 
Collective Agreement since these employees are under a private-law 
employment contract. Furthermore, there is family employment, a ―grey‖ 
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employment category where employees have the right to bargain, though in 
practice they do not.  
Initially, it seems that all Greek employees are covered in law (if 
not in practice – see below) by collective agreements at some level, since 
the extension mechanism forces the application of any collective agreement 
to all employees in the total economy – and in any case the National 
General Agreement is almost applicable to everyone. By following the 
methodology
4
 which has been used by previous scholars we conclude that 
some employment groups are excluded from our estimation. As I formely 
mentioned above, the public employees ―under public-law employment 
relationships‖ and family members who work in family-run businesses are 
both excluded from the right to wage bargaining.  
 
Table 2.6: Collective Bargaining - "Legal" Coverage (%) in Greece 
and selected OECD countries (2000) 
Country Coverage rate (%) Ranking 
Austria 95+ 1 
Belgium, France, Finland, Sweden, Portugal 90+ 2 
Denmark, Australia, Netherlands, Italy, Spain 80+ 7 
Greece* 70+ 12 
Germany 68 13 
UK, Canada (32) 30+ 14 
New Zealand 25 16 
United States, Japan (15) 14 17 
Source: Employment Outlook -Table 3.3 (OECD, 2004) 
Notes: * Greece‘s rate is calculated by the author (however, this is de jure coverage, 
which does not necessarily hold in practice). 
 
                                               
4 Personal contact has been made with Professor Traxler F. in order to clarify some estimation issues.  
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Table 2.6, shows that according to data from the Labour Force 
Survey (NSSG-LFS, 2001-2007), the overall percentage of employees 
(from the above categories) which are not covered by collective agreements 
is about 25 percent, thus the collective adjusted de jure coverage for Greece 
is just above 70 percent. These figures put Greece at about the middle of 
the 26 OECD member countries, which is still high given the low Greek 
trade union density of under 20% for private sector workers (who are all 
relevant for coverage). In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, there is a 
large difference between de jure and de facto 
 
Collective Bargaining Centralisation & Coordination 
Two other important bargaining indicators are bargaining 
centralisation and coordination (see the classic paper by Calmfors et al., 
1988), which are relevant for my TERS study, since Greece‘s 
comparatively high centralisation (see below) might confer advantages if it 
makes for more ―responsible‖ bargaining. Coordination might be seen as a 
stronger measure of centralisation, since even decentralised systems such as 
Japan‘s might be coordinated (Flanagan, 1999:1159). Admittedly there is 
no consensus as to the effects of either variable (OECD-2004:170). 
However, it is still necessary to acknowledge that collective bargaining 
need not necessarily result in over-high provincial wages – it could help 
both workers and employers, and I will test for this effect later. 
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While official data/surveys have never been conducted, I make an 
indicative attempt to estimate centralisation and coordination in Greece. 
Centralisation is said to describe the ―locus of the formal structure of wage 
bargaining‖ (OECD- Employment Outlook, 1997). The most important 
element which defines the degree of centralisation is the level of 
negotiation which is structured across OECD countries. Three main levels 
have been distinguished; (a) the national level (central wage bargaining), 
(b) the industry or sector level (intermediate wage bargaining) and (c) the 
firm-establishment level (decentralised wage bargaining) (OECD, 1997 & 
Soskice 1990). However, the classification of countries by bargaining level 
is complicated by the fact that in many countries bargaining occurs at 
multiple levels (OECD, 2004).  
 
On the other hand, coordination focuses on ―the degree of 
consensus between the collective bargaining partners‖ (OECD- 
Employment Outlook, 1997). Soskice (1990) initially scored this concept, 
and his scores have been updated
5
. Consequently, the final score version 
was reached and is analysed below.  
 The conventional method is to assign various bargaining 
characteristics a value between 1 and 5 which includes multiple types of 
centralisation and coordination. In terms of centralisation, a score of 1 
indicates the most decentralised bargaining (company and plant level 
predominant) and moves to a score of 5 which indicates the most 
                                               
5 Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard Jackman and more recently Peter Hall and Robert Franzese have 
updated the Soskice scores on wage coordination  
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centralised bargaining (central level agreement of overriding importance). 
Related to coordination, there are also five different levels, according to the 
same methodology; score 1 indicates fragmented bargaining at the 
company/plant level, with little or no coordination by upper-level 
associations up to score 5 which refers to countries with high-coordination 
bargaining (either informal between bargaining partners or by government 
imposition).  
 
Table 2.7:Bargaining Centralisation & Coordination Index
6
          
(1970-2008) 
GREECE 
1970-
74 
1975 
-79 
1980 
-84 
1985 
-89 
1990 
-94 
1995 
-99 
2000 
-04 
2005 
-08 
Centralisation 
3.5 2.5 3 3 3.5 3 
OECD 
average =2 
3 
 
3 
Co-ordination 
4.5 2 4 4 3 4.5 
OECD 
average=2.4 
2.5 2.5 
Source: Employment Outlook -Table 3.5 Wage -setting institutions in OECD countries 
(OECD, 2004) 
 
                                               
6 *Centralisation: 
1 = Company and plant level predominant. 
2 = Combination of industry and company/plant level, with an important share of employees covered by company 
bargains. 
3 = Industry-level predominant. 
4 = Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level agreements. 
5 = Central-level agreements of overriding importance. 
 
** Co-ordination: 
1 = Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no co-ordination by upper-level associations. 
2 = Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting. 
3 = Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate co-ordination among major bargaining 
actors. 
4 = a) informal co-ordination of industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak associations; 
b) co-ordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations (tripartite 
agreements, social pacts), or government imposition of wage schedules; 
c) regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and/or bargaining co-ordination by large firms; 
d) government wage arbitration. 
5 = a) informal co-ordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation; 
b) co-ordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with a 
peace obligation. 
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Applying these methods in Greece, we derive data from personal 
interviews with officers in the Institute of Employment/Greek General 
Confederation of Labour (INE/GSEE) as well as the mediation and 
arbitration organisation (OMED) and the Labour Force Survey.  
Table 2.7 confirms that Greek bargaining centralisation is above 
average. As we can see, during 2000-04, the index is 3 for Greece, 
compared to an OECD average of 2.0. On the other hand, the coordination 
index for Greece is 2.5, which is about equal to the OECD average; thus, 
collective bargaining in Greece appears not to be particularly coordinated. 
At the same time, Greece is more centralised and coordinated than the 
Anglo-American pattern (both countries have coordination and 
centralisation indices of unity, see OECD 2004, Table 3.3). Therefore, 
according to these indices we expect centralised collective bargaining to be 
important in determining Greek wages (at least de jure), but not to be 
particularly coordinated or ―responsible‖ – and will address this issue in the 
empirical work that follows. 
 
2.7 Greek Labour Market Organisations  
Greek labour market organizations – as we mentioned above- are very 
much involved in public policy-making: monitoring hiring/firing and hours 
(eg., part-time) regulations (the Labour Inspectorate), and high labour taxes 
(the Public Employment Service OAED, and the Social Security 
Organisation, IKA).We now describe these organisations in more detail.  
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The Labour Inspectorate (SEPE) 
The evolution of the Labour Inspectorate 
 Labour Inspector numbers are not large relative to the number of 
enterprises, and the question arises of how much power they really have. As 
we will see, they receive considerable information, and can at least exert a 
sort of negative or delaying power. The recent history of the Labour 
Inspectorate has to deal with its ―decentralization‖ issue. The argument - 
between unions and the state - whether the Labour Inspectorate will be 
under local or central government supervision has taken place in the last 
decades. Its ―poor‖ performance and its decreasing power in monitoring 
Greek workplaces on labour issues was the main reason of union complaint.  
It was estimated, in 1985, that labour management organizations 
(Labour Inspectorates, Social Security Organisation and Public 
Employment Services) made 163,374 inspections on employment issues on 
businesses all over Greece, in contrast with 1994 whereby the number of 
inspections had fallen to 85,446. A lot of consultants on labour issues 
claimed that during the decade between 1985 and 1994 there were not 
enough inspections , which were in any case bureaucratic and inefficient 
(Eleftherotypia, 1996). 
During the period of decentralization in Greece in 1994, by law 
(2218/94), Labour Inspectorates were removed from the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security and placed under the control of local 
governments. However, the social partners disagreed with this decision and 
complained, even to the International Labour Office on the grounds that 
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this decentralisation did not uphold the basic principles of Labour 
Inspection Convention 81. 
The General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) also argued 
that Labour Inspectorate offices approached the ‗zero point,‘ referring to its 
poor record in enforcing labour regulations because of the small number of 
Inspectors overall in Greece. Furthermore, the Ministry of Employment 
cannot intervene in the operation of the Inspectorate because of this 
decentralization law. Thus, according to these arguments, the Labour 
Inspectorate was unable to overcome problems created in the framework of 
the operation of the office in local governments.  
However, as we will see below, although there are few inspectors, 
businesses still have to obey them and provide detailed employment 
information. The inspectors have a sort of delaying or ―negative‖ power 
which is likely to increase unemployment. While conducting the TERS, we 
ask questions about firms‘ experience with the Inspectorate and find that no 
less than 50% of firms believe that the hiring and firing laws enforced by 
the Inspectors are an obstacle to recruitment. 
 
 
New Law of Labour Inspectorate – Legal Rules in Enterprises 
In response to this feedback, the Greek government in 1998 brought 
the Labour Inspectorate (SEPE) under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security, through the law 2639/98, on ―Regulation 
of Labour Relations, The establishment of a Labour Inspectorate and other 
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provisions‖. Based on article 1 of this law, the new body would be directly 
accountable to the labour minister. Thus, a monitoring mechanism was 
created whose main task is to monitor the implementation of labour 
legislation in respect to: terms and conditions of employment (such as 
working time limits and pay issues); the legality of employment; the 
investigation of workers' social insurance coverage; and workers' health and 
safety conditions (EIRO, 2001). Additional tasks included monitoring 
workers' social insurance contributions and providing information and 
advice to employers and employees on the statutory provisions in force. 
 
Rules in enterprises 
Once a year, according to the law, each employer must submit 
(from 15
th
 Sept-15
th
 Nov.) at least two copies of the personnel records of its 
enterprise to the local Labour Inspectorate-Dept. of Social Inspection. 
These records include:  
- a list of all the employees personal data 
- the type of labour contract, the occupational specialty of each 
employee, the recruitment date and any previous work experience in the 
specialty 
- the number of recruitment card from the Public Employment Services, 
the registration number of the Social Security Organisation 
- the personal data and working hours of technical safety employee and 
the doctor of workplace (if the enterprise employs more than 50 workers)  
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- the daily working hours (beginning and ending time), the daily break 
time, the weekly day-off (if enterprise operates on Saturdays and Sundays) 
- the number of workers who come from a non- Greek ethnic group 
- the wages and any other bonuses of all employees 
In addition, this document is required to include all the data of the 
company, including the registered name of the company, postal address, 
type of organisation, legal status, and geographical location of the 
enterprise as well s its taxation number. It is the responsibility of the owner 
and the accountant of the enterprise (both of them are signatory to this 
document) for the correctness and reliability of data which is submitted to 
the Labour Inspectorate. The latter seal the document (which means that it 
is valid) and send it back to the enterprise while the other copy remains in 
the Labour Inspectorate records. The Social Security Organisation can have 
easy access and check these documents in any case.  
In addition to all the above, the employer has to pass contract details 
of every new hiring to the Public Employment Services (OAED) within 
eight (8) days. These same details then have to be passed to the Labour 
Inspectorate within fifteen (15
th
) days.  
Some other commitments of the company are that, if there are any 
changes which affect the content of the document, such as legal 
representation of the enterprise, working hours, and of course any new 
hiring, the enterprise has to additionally submit the new data within 15 days 
of any change. Moreover, if an establishment operates shifts, they have to 
submit personnel record documents twice per year (once per six months), 
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while a seasonal establishment has to submit personnel records documents 
one month before the operation of the seasonal period.  
Some other requirements that business have to report to the Labour 
Inspectorate are the following: (a) the employer has to keep a "book" and 
fill in the overtime working hours of each employee (b) before that, the 
employer has to submit the overtime for approval to the Labour 
Inspectorate, in addition to working on a Sunday or public holidays (c) the 
employer has to record employee holidays and records for the weekly days-
off (d) an enterprise which hires employees on a part-time basis must also 
attach personnel records which document the individual contract.  
A further part of the legislation is that employees have the right to 
contact the Labour Inspectorate and find out information about their 
employment rights and commitments. More specifically, the Labour 
Inspectorate can provide information to the employees regarding: 
- wages and salaries (monthly, daily, hourly)  
- holiday entitlements, (holiday bonus) 
- bonuses for Christmas and Easter periods 
- termination of an employment contract – compensation 
- working hours (plus overtime) 
- employment on Sundays and bank holidays 
- night/shift- work 
- benefits (child and spousal, maternity)  
As can be seen, these requirements are extremely detailed, and businesses 
cannot deal with the processes without an accountant or lawyer always on 
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call. These professionals in themselves raise costs, quite apart from the 
delays in decision-making which the laws bring about – and reduce 
numbers that businesses want to hire. There are likely to be pressures to 
employ labour on an unreported ―grey‖ basis, and on a temporary rather 
than a permanent basis – hypotheses that I address in the TERS. 
 
Practical Experience 
Admittedly, the number of Inspectors is low, but, as noted above, their 
presence still raises costs, and causes delay. For efficiency, the Ministry of 
employment ideally requires labour inspectors to have relevant practical 
experience (as I have found during my interviews
7
). Moreover, inspections 
are targeted since Inspectors mainly investigate cases in which there has 
been notification or complaint from employees. Still, for example, in the 
Thessaly region, it is impossible for 22 Social Inspectors to ensure 
compliance from 30,000 enterprises with personnel. It is clear that the law 
cannot be enforced consistently under these conditions – the threat to 
businesses remains, however, since they do not know what will happen. 
There is a debate about these procedures, aiming to, at least, reduce 
the bureaucracy. At the moment, a business can be inspected both by the 
Labour Inspectorate, and the Social Security Organisation (IKA), and 
indeed the Public Employment Services (OAED). A major objective, that 
the Director of the Larissa Labour Inspectorate branch claimed (in my 
interviews), is to codify the labour regulations, so that businesses would not 
confront such difficulties on a daily basis. The next step would be the 
                                               
7 Personal interview with the Director of Labour Inspectorate Office, Larissa branch, at October 26, 2005.  
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creation of a common database of these organizations. In addition, 
enterprises/organizations could have access to this system and more easily 
inform the public organizations about changes (hiring, firing etc.) – 
reducing costs somewhat. However, it is doubtful whether these measures 
would do much to reduce the inspectorate‘s effects, both in delaying 
change, and causing uncertainty. 
 
Statistical Data 
The tables below present data on Labour Inspectorate activities 
during the last years. As can be seen from Table 2.8, there is quite a lot of 
activity, with about 32,000 inspections (remembering that Greece only has 
about 30,000 businesses employing more than 5 workers – NSSG- 2002).  
Table 2.8: Social Labour Inspectorate activity, 2003* - 2008 
Country 2003  2008 
Inspections conducted 31,765 28,540 
Complaints filed by inspectors 10,349 7,720 
Fines levied by inspectors 8,013 5,440 
Total value of fines 6,662,070 € 9,814,000 € 
Labour disputes: 15,781 15,898 
Number of staff lists recorded: 646,344 786,488 
- number of staff entered on lists 2,672,498 2,442,573 
Permits issued to work overtime  
exceeding maximum working hours: 
26,838 18,571 
- total staff involved 369,538 296,711 
- total number of hours of overtime 20,130,172 18,587,905 
Permits issued to work on Sundays:  8,426 9,505 
- total staff involved  122,173 150,987 
Source: Data from Labour Inspectorate (SEPE) 1998 and 2008 annual reports.  
   *Table for the year 2003 based EIRO (2004) document  
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Also, it shows that the Inspectorate probably reaches into every 
business (that has employees, remember the large numbers of micro-
enterprises in Greece), because its database includes nearly 2.5 million 
workers.  
 The Inspectorate also watches working hours closely. As regards 
overtime, Table 2.8 shows that the Inspectorate controls 300,000 workers. 
This control has some effect, because in our survey of businesses in 
Thessaly, we found that the overtime hours worked were 30% lower than in 
the UK‘s WERS for comparably sized firms. Moreover, as regards shift-
work, our survey shows that this is three times higher in the UK‘s WERS 
than in firms of comparable size in Greece. 
 
Public Employment Services (OAED)  
The Public Employment Services (OAED) in Greece is the main 
body of implementation of governmental active/passive employment 
policies in the country.  
Although active/passive employment policies do not directly affect 
employed workers which are my focus in the TERS, there is some scope for 
employers to use subsidised employees as a channel of flexibility, as we 
will see.  
In the mid 80s, under a socialist government, a legal framework of 
active and passive labour market policies (unemployment benefits, 
subsidised employment programmes) was introduced (law 1545/1985). The 
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basic aim was to protect the workers and the unemployed. These policies 
have become quite numerous over the years, with ALMPs amounting to 
about 0.5% of GDP (OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Table H) 
compared to only 0.3% for the UK. In the last decade (since 1998), OAED 
has introduced new subsidised employment programmes (stages) which are 
addressed to enterprises for the employment of different vulnerable groups 
as mentioned before (see more in the subsidised employment section).  
 
Finally, related to the monitoring of businesses, OAED may proceed to 
inspections of those businesses that may benefit from any subsidised 
employment programmes. In addition, as mentioned, all businesses have to 
inform OAED of any hiring or dismissal of employees in order to monitor 
vacancies and inflows into the labour market. OAED seems to be an 
organization which provides national employment polices but its role is 
limited and presents less of a threat (compared to the other labour 
organizations) in creating difficulties for businesses. (take a look of firms‘ 
reaction on TERS). However, since the beaurocratic system of monitoring 
and controlling workplaces on labour issues overlap in their activities; 
sometimes obstacles to businesses are created.  
 
The Social Security Organization (IKA) 
The Social Security Organisation (IKA) comes into my story, 
because it collects the employment taxes which all businesses have to pay. 
According to their web page (http:www.ika.gr), IKA is the largest 
 66 
organisation in Greece and covers 5,530,000 insured members and provides 
830,000 pensioners with retirement pensions. The law (1846/1951, chapter 
3), in 1951, designates the Social Security Entity and the Organisation of 
Social Security (IKA) which constitutes an independent Legal Person 
governed by Public Law. The same chapter also regulates the funds of the 
Institute (article 24), which mainly are consisted of the contributions of 
insured employees, as well as the contributions of employers (labour taxes).  
Moreover, with this law (1846/1951- article 2) family members - as 
it mentioned - who worked in a family business (self-proprietorship) were 
in a mixed status, related to whether they are be subject to social security 
tax contributions till 1988. Even though when these labour taxes launched 
later, in 1988, (law 1759/1988 – KAMO articles 1-7 and ministerial fiat 
93/10.12.96), we have to admit that these family employees still belong to 
the "grey" employment. 
 
These taxes are high, because Greek pension expenditures have 
surged. Currently, they amount to about 13% of GDP, doubling over 20 
years (OECD, Regulatory Reform in Greece, 2001, p 29). The relevance of 
unemployment for the Social Security Organisation is this tax burden which 
might cause difficulties for job creation. Through the appropriate insurance 
scheme, employees are entitled to a range of benefits from both the Social 
Security Organisation and other Organisations. As we see, Table 2.9 gives 
the details, from which we see that the sum of non-labour costs is nearly 
35% of the total wage. 
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Table 2.9: Employee/Employer Contributions (%) to Social Security 
Organisation (IKA) 
Type of Contribution Insured Employer Total 
Medical care in services and payments 2.55 5.1 7.65 
Cumpolsury pension scheme (IKA) 6.67 13.33 20 
Ocupational hazard - 1 1 
Supplementary pension scheme (IKA-
TEAM 
3 3 6 
Total* 12.22 22.43 34.65 
 Source: Web page: www.ika.gr / Approved by IKA Administration, Act 75 / 95 
Notes: If the worker‘s occupation is classified to heavy and health-hazardous 
occupations category an extra fee rate needs to be added (total 5,6%) 
 
Table 2.10: Employee/Employer Contributions (%) to Various 
Organisations 
Type of Contribution Insured Employer Total 
Public Employment Services (OAED) 2.43 5.53 7.65 
Organization Council Houses  
(Ergatiki Katoikia) 
1 0.75 1.75 
Labourer‘s Union (Ergatiki Estia)  0.25 0.25 0.50 
Total 3.68 6.53 10.21 
Source: Web page: www.ika.gr / Approved by IKA Administration, Act 13 / 95 
 
 
Considering contributions to various organizations, such as the 
Public Employment Services (OAED), the Organizational Council Houses 
(Ergatiki Katikia) which also funding the trade unions, as noted earlier and 
Labourer‘s Union (Ergatiki Estia); the total taxes for these organizations in 
fact amounts to about 10% of pay on average (see Table 2.10), receiving 
the employer and employee contributions together (by IKA Administration, 
Act 13 / 95).  
 The total labour tax bill is high in Greece, and breaks down as 
follows. For the employee, Table 2.10 gives a detailed description of the 
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contributions to various organizations, and we see here that the total is 
more 10%. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
At the beginning of the chapter we saw that Greece‘s labour market 
has been regulated almost since its inception following a French legal 
model. A combination of Greek laws and EC directives, plus a number of 
presidential fiats and circular ministerial letters comprise a complicated– 
and also sometimes grey - legal framework for Greek labour relations. We 
see that in regular employment the EPL is strict and businesses find 
flexibility in those forms which are less regulated or where the legal 
framework is not clear. Furthermore, during the last decade, the state has 
also made an attempt to regulate - again based on the European Directives - 
atypical work, employment forms which provide flexibility to businesses, 
though paradoxically these forms have become more important. 
 
The role of government labour organisations in enforcing labour 
law was also examined in this chapter. I have covered the Labour 
inspectorate in most detail, because Greek EPL seems to be higher than in 
most other developed countries. The question that is often raised, for 
example, by trade unions, is whether there are enough inspectors to enforce 
the laws which, as we have seen are quite strict. In particular, the 
requirement to inform the inspectorate of all new staff and of changes in 
staff within 15 days (and the Public Employment Service within 8 days) 
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appears bureaucratic. In fact, the inspectors seem to be quite active, and, in 
any case, they might have a sort of negative ―delaying‖ power which is 
adverse for employment. 
 
 We have also considered the Public Employment Service and the 
Social Security Organisation, looking briefly at their tasks, and how much 
they cost in terms of taxes and management compliance time. The tax costs 
are high, certainly. Whether the ALMPs and job placement services 
mounted by these bodies are effective is again a matter for more research. 
The compliance costs are also high - a consolidated framework is needed 
since employers have a registration number in all three organizations a fact 
which increases red tape. Finally, the collective bargaining system was 
considered, which is quite centralised in European terms. The question is 
whether the centralised bargaining system gives rise to wages that are too 
high for provincial businesses easily to pay – so that they react by hiring on 
a temporary rather than permanent basis. Not much is known about the 
effects of wage setting in Greece, but the results of our survey of business 
in Thessaly are discouraging, as we will see. 
 70 
 
Appendix  
2.1 Sample of the Sectoral Collective Agreement - Outline  
 
Sectoral Collective Agreement for the pay and working conditions of 
workers in commercial enterprises throughout the country, years 2006-
2007 
 
 
In Athens today 7.9.2006,  
the undersigned, on the one hand: the President of the National Confederation of 
Greek Commerce (ESEE), the President and General Secretary of the General 
Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen and Traders (GSEVEE), the President 
of the Association of Greek Supermarkets (SESME), the President of the Retail 
Business Greece (SELPE) and on the other hand: the President and General 
Secretary of the Federation of Greek Private-Sector Employees (OIYE), all duly 
authorized by the organizations they represent, agree as follows:  
 
Article 1  
Scope  
A. This Sectoral Collective Agreement is addressed to workers employed in the 
following commercial businesses across the country:  
a) commercial shops (wholesale and retail)  
b) super markets and food stores 
c) pastry shops and stores with relevant commercial activities;  
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d) businesses selling cigarettes (retail and wholesale)  
 
B. and belong to the following occupational groups:  
1. Salesmen (In personal selling supermarket; includes vendors, sellers of meat 
products, poultry, cheese - sausage, vegetables, fish, clothing, household goods, 
camping goods, etc.).  
2. Executive Secretaries.  
3. Office clerks  
4. Accountants and accountant assistants.  
5. Cleaners.  
6. Guards- night guards - gatekeepers.  
7. Truck Drivers and drivers who transport company personnel.  
8. IT personnel (programmers, analysts, operators).  
Furthermore, in the present sectoral collective agreement the following 
occupational groups are also included:  
1. Manual workers, whose minimum wages are based on the terms of the General 
National Wage Agreement, however, are subject to any increases and allowances 
from the present sectoral agreement.  
2. Decorators 
3. Computer Technicians (Hardware)  
C. This Sectoral Wage Agreement only applies to all employees who are members 
of the primary organizations of unions and belong to the Federation of Greek 
Private-Sector Employees (OIYE). Membership is proven with a certified-letter 
issued by the primary organizations for the OIYE.  
 
Article 2  
Minimum Wages 
 72 
2.1. Minimum wages and salaries which are based on the previous agreement 
(2004) will be raised by 3% starting on 01/01/2006.  
2.2. Then, minimum wages (based on article 2.1) will be further increased by 3% 
since 1.9.2006.  
2.3. Further, another increase will take place in minimum wages and salaries 
(based on article 2.2) by 2.7% since 1.1.2007.  
2.4. Moreover, an additional increase (based on article 2.3) by 3% since 1.9.2007.  
 
Article 3  
Married Couple's allowance for blue-collar workers  
The marriage allowance, 10%, based on the National Collective Agreement, will 
be calculated on the daily salary plus the tenure years of the employees.  
 
Article 4  
"Balance Sheet" Allowance for accountants and assistant accountants  
This allowance is based on previous similar arrangements but starts from 1.1.2006 
to 73% and calculates the total legitimate earnings of the employee.  
 
Article 5  
Bank Holiday Monday ―Koulouma‖ 
 
Article 6  
Special days of Annual Leave for representatives of the Committee Board  
 
Article 7  
Computer Technicians (Hardware) - Recognition from graduates of vocational 
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training organizations (public and private)  
 
Article 8  
Severance Payment for blue-collar workers  
Severance Payment, as initially launched with the law in 1920 and then with the 
modifications of the National General Collective Agreements, 1989 - 2005, is 
increased by five (5) daily wages, where workers belong to the tenure category 
between twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) years and five (5) wages when they have 
completed thirty (30) years or more.  
After these improvements, the severance payment is increased, depending on the 
tenure of the employee, according to the following:  
- 2 months to 1 year: 5 daily wages  
- 1 year to 2 years: 7 daily wages 
- 2 years to 5 years: 15 daily wages 
- 5 years to 10 years: 30 daily wages 
- 10 years to 15 years: 60 daily wages 
- 15 years to 20 years: 100 daily wages 
- 20 years to 25 years: 120 daily wages 
- 25 years to 30 years: 145 daily wages 
- 30 years and over: 165 daily wages 
 
Article 9 
Agreement on Tele-work 
The partners agree to harmonise to the European agreement for the application-
framework of tele-work as European partners have agreed.  
  
Article 10 
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Taxes on Severance Payment 
The partners accept the remission from tax payments in the severance pay when 
the employment contract is terminated.  
 
Article 11 
Support of family life & female participation in the labour market 
 
Article 12 
Future Trends in the Educational and Training Needs of Employees 
 
Article 13 
Educational Leave of Absence for Studies in the Development Centre of 
Educational Policy /Greek General Confederation of Labour  
 
Article 14 
Final Arrangements  
Only wages above the minimum according to the NGCAS are legally valid. 
 
Article 15  
Validity 
The validity of this Sectoral Collective Agreement commences on January 1, 2006 
and lasts for two years.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE LABOUR MARKET REGULATION THEORY  
AND OUTCOMES  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, the causes of labour regulation and their outcomes 
on labour market performance will be presented. The floors to specific 
aspects of labour regulation such as wages and working conditions are of 
great interest. In the first section, characteristics of labour regulation will be 
provided. Then, the historical background and the evolution on labour 
regulation mainly at the European level will be investigated.  
 The debate on the persistence of European unemployment has led 
many authors/organizations to introduce labour market indicators - which 
are presented here - in order to measure the employment performance of 
countries using different methodologies. The question of whether labour 
regulation causes changes in employment, temporary employment and 
unemployment particularly of the unskilled inevitably results. 
  Moreover, another issue of high significance dealt with in this 
chapter is the insider-outsider theory which suggests that instead of helping 
outsiders (mainly unemployed or temporary workers), workers with 
permanent contracts and high job security use their insider market power 
and political influence to underbid the outsiders.  
 Furthermore, the outcomes of labour regulation on the Greek 
employment framework are indicated. A number of tables are provided 
here which deal mainly with "vulnerable" employment groups: the long-
term unemployed, youth and females.  
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 Finally in this chapter, we show that labour market institutions in 
the majority of EU countries affect the unemployment by duration and on 
specific demographic groups, which are more vulnerable to entry to the 
labour market; women, youth and the inexperienced (and the long-term 
unemployed).  
Moreover, the economics of politics play a central role of the 
unemployment persistence in Greece. The inside-outside dichotomy 
together with the strong familialistic welfare regime in Greece make the 
situation more complex increasing the long-run unemployment especially 
in the youth and the women. The members of these groups are perhaps 
protected by strong family ties but harmed by centralised collectively 
bargained wage floors, and by working conditions floors such as 
employment protection laws (EPL).    
 
3.2 Causes and Effects of Labour Regulation 
Labour markets are more or less tightly regulated in all 
industrialized countries (Bertola, 2004). However, it is important to realize 
the degree of regulation and how it affects employers and employees. 
Broadly speaking, the term regulation is defined by Chang (1997) as when 
the government (or the state) directly prescribes and proscribes what private 
sector agents can and cannot do, so that their actions do not contradict the 
'public interest'. Moreover, in economic terms, Boeri et al. (2000) states that 
―economic regulation is broadly defined as the use of coercive power by the 
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government to restrict the decisions of economic agents‖.  
In addition, Cortes et al. (1993:391) argues that the labour market is 
regulated by the state, but also by economic mechanisms (namely, the level 
of unemployment) and social institutions (family, worker and employer 
organisations), cultural norms and ideologies. Thus, here labour regulation 
is defined as a set of political and legal policies intervened by the state 
which address the population and its living standards (Cortes et al., 1993).  
 Another interesting definition comes from scholars Grubb and 
Wells (1993:9) who consider that labour regulation exists ―when an 
individual employer cannot, even by agreement with his or her own 
employees, use particular working arrangements or forms of employment 
contracts, without risking legal sanctions or the invalidity of the relevant 
provisions in the contract‖. In our point of view, regulation is considered as 
the set of rules determined by the government or any other institution which 
significantly affects the decisions of firms in human resource management 
practices.  
 
History and Evolution 
 Bertola (1999) and Hepple (1986) claim that ―regulation and 
legislation aimed at protecting workers from ―unfair‖ labour market shocks 
have had a long history‖ proceeding with the industrial revolution. 
Moreover, as Bertola (1999) also mentions, economic power, once 
concentrated at the family or village level moved to employers and 
informal arrangements were abandoned. As a result, national policymaking 
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authorities introduced many aspects of protection (health, unemployment, 
old-age pensions) to labour legislation and regulation.  
Furthermore, in the second half of the 19th century, a number of 
proposals to promote international regulation of labour matters were made 
in the French and German parliaments (ILO, web page). Then, with the end 
of the Second World War, with its Declaration in 1944, the ILO defined a 
number of specific objectives focusing on (to create conditions for) full 
employment and the raising of living standards. Moreover, Tolda et al. 
(2006), with this goal in mind, argue that the European Union chose a path 
of social protectionism to the point that its labour market is considered 
much more inflexible than that in North America and the UK.  
 This path started with the first steps of the European Community - 
and the signing of the European Social Charter in 1961 - in order to achieve 
social and employment protection. Consequently, most employment 
security provisions were introduced in the 1960s, and reinforced during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, after some years of social unrest (Bentolila and 
Bertola, 1990:394). Siebert (1997) considers that, during those years, 
changes in labour market institutions occurred in the major European 
countries making the labour market more rigid. Moreover, Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) argue that the increase of unemployment in Western Europe 
since the early 1970s is the result of the combined effects of for the most 
part previously introduced labour market regulations and the shocks 
experienced in the 1970s and 1980s.  
However, Emerson (1988) mentions that - during the 80s - some 
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European countries reformed to more liberal employment protection laws 
on fixed-term contracts. Nevertheless, as Addison and Siebert (1991:623) 
claim, the move towards deregulation observed in a number of European 
countries in the early-to-middle 1980s remained only for a short time. They 
also maintain that in the second half of the 1980s things changed and 
Europe entered a ―re-regulation phase‖. This phase was implemented with 
the adoption of the Community Charter for the fundamental social rights of 
workers by the declaration of all EC members (except the UK) in 1989.  
The aforementioned charter ―established the major principles on 
which the European labour law model was based and shaped the 
development of the European Social model in the following decade‖ (see 
more on Eurofound web page). Moreover, this Charter included later in the 
consolidated version of EC Treaty (2006 - articles 136-139), defined the 
minimum requirements with measures on (a) working conditions, (b) social 
security and the social protection of workers, and (c) ordinary basic or 
minimum wages (article 141), issues which will be discussed extensively in 
this chapter.  
In the course of the 1990s, - according to Visser (2000:422) - the 
reassessment of the standards for social and employment protection in 
national labour markets and welfare states became the central element in a 
Europeanized employment and activation strategy. Siebert (2006:3) claims 
that this was born out of a concern that the increased competition resulting 
from the completion of the single market in 1992 would lead to a race to 
the bottom in labour standards.  
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The current framework in the EU 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new "regulation wave" was 
introduced; this time the EU regulating labour framework was extended to 
non-regular forms of employment. Furthermore, according to EIRO (2004), 
the overall thrust of EU regulation was to achieve equal treatment between 
"atypical" and "typical" workers, as far as this was possible. A number of 
Directives, based on social partner agreements regulated the following part-
time work (1997/81/EC), fixed-term work (1999/70/EC), teleworking 
(2002 - framework agreement), temporary and agent workers (proposed in 
2002, and finally agreed in 2008/104/EC). Moreover, the working time 
directive (updated in 2003/88/EC) also created minimum restrictions on the 
working hours per week, holidays and night work. Thus, all member states 
had to legislate the above EU directives at the national level in order to 
harmonize their laws across the common market. Moreover, they had to 
implement and guarantee similar levels of employment and social 
protection, even countries which formerly had no regulation in this area. 
Greece adopted these aspects of employment and social protection 
regulation which were exercised by the EU with significant influence. For 
instance, a new form of work was permitted in 2001, the temporary agency 
workers. However, it was accompanied by the establishment of heavier 
national regulation (ministerial decrees), which in practice made this form 
of employment almost inactive.  
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 Apart from the Directives, the main EU employment policy in the 
last decade (2000-2010) was based on the Lisbon Strategy and the 
European Employment Strategy. Their main objectives until the end of 
2010 were (a) full employment, (b) the raising of employment rates with 
quantified targets (70% on average and 60% for women and (c) an annual 
growth of three percent (Goetschy, 2001). However, the Lisbon Strategy 
was widely criticised; the well-known Kok Report (2004) characterised its 
progress as unsatisfactory and proposed that the EU needed institutional 
reforms and better employment prospects. More specifically, it argues that 
the EU's aim should be to facilitate adjustment into new employment rather 
than the protection of existing jobs (Kok, 2004:49).  
Then the Lisbon Strategy was relaunched (2005), with a focus on 
growth and jobs. An attempt is made through the "Better Regulation 
Agenda
8
" (2005), where strategies directed at simplifying legislation and 
reducing the administrative burdens that businesses face, were also 
proposed in order to create jobs and increase employment. However, no 
institutional reforms took place on labour law issues
9
 such as fixed-term 
work, part-time work and working time. Recently, the European 
Commission has focused on "Consultation on Smart Regulation" as 
instrumental in achieving the ambitious objectives of "Europe strategy 
2020
10
".  
                                               
8 see more on http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-regulation/index_en.htm 
9 see more on http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/screening_2009/empl.pdf 
10 see more on http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/index_en.htm - A strategy which focuses on fostering a high-
employment economy with the first (of five) headline target being that 75% of the population aged 20-64 should 
be employed by 2020. 
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It is clear that the EU guidelines to regulate employment since its 
birth have made the labour market rigid in the majority of the EU member 
states. The regulation has extended the last decades to flexible forms of 
employment. The goals of EU - including those in the employment field - 
were not successful and criticized widely, leading the Lisbon Strategy for 
revision and introducing a number of strategies who focus on less 
regulation; however few significant reforms have been introduced until 
now and unemployment is still high.  
 
Measures and Empirical Evidence of Employment Regulation 
Many scholars claim that the European labour regulation presented 
above coincides with high unemployment rates in European member 
countries. Thus, one of the most controversial issues during the course of 
more than 30 years is to explain why European unemployment is high; 
although, Nickel (1997) has mentioned that differences within Europe are 
much greater than is the difference between the European average and 
North America. However, the typical debate appears here, whether 
differences between continental Europe and the US labour market either in 
terms of institution or in terms of performance are very important (Wasmer, 
2002). Bentolila and Bertola (1990:381) note that generous unemployment 
benefits, restrictions on hiring and firing, and restrained wage competition 
are thought to have led to rigid, "Eurosclerotic"-as dubbed by Giersch 
(1985)-economies, which were not able to cope with the big shocks of the 
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1970s. Moreover, Burgess (1992:75) notes that Eurosclerosis developed as 
a term referring to the mass of rules and regulations governing many 
aspects of behavior in European labour markets and related markets. 
 
This debate has ―forced‖ many researchers and international 
organizations to make an attempt to measure the labour market 
performance worldwide introducing different approaches and 
methodologies or researching the existing ones. As we will see below, 
many researchers have constructed summary indicators to describe the 
employment regulation on aggregate employment and unemployment in 
each country.  
 
To begin with, Emerson (1988) pointed out in his qualitative 
description, the significance of obstacles to the termination of employment 
contracts in European countries in contrast with the United States hiring 
and firing practices which are unregulated by public law. He assessed 
different policy options that refer to employment protection regulations and 
negotiated practices. Emerson used different resources for his research 
based mainly on surveys - from Commission‘s European Community (EC, 
1985) and the International Organization of Employers (IOE, 1985) as well 
as from Eurostat and OECD resources.  
Greece is included in a number of Emerson‘s tables giving some 
comparative outcomes with EU countries in late 80s. In the "dismissals 
indicator", Greece has the 2nd lowest percentage (37%) of dismissals, 
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following Italy. This - according to Emerson – indicates relatively severe 
regulations or practices restraining dismissals. Moreover, he notes that 
Greek firms (67%) face obstacles in employing more staff considering 
insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding labour. Following his 
analysis, Greek employers (75%) also report that rules restrain the 
termination of employment contracts and ranked Greece as the 2nd strictest 
country after Italy. Furthermore, Greece is characterised as one of the top-
three countries where its employers reply that a reduction in its redundancy 
payments would have a positive employment impact. Finally, Emerson 
mentions that Greece is reported by industrialists to have problematic 
regulations from the point of view increasing employment. 
 
Bertola's (1990) empirical analysis of ten countries (Greece not 
included) over the period 1962-1986 is based on Emerson‘s information 
described above. The Bertola index also comes from the IOE/EC surveys 
results together with other institutional details contained in Emerson 
(Addison and Teixeira, 2003). Bertola's evidence finds no effect on 
employment and unemployment. Furthermore, as Bertola concludes 
(1990:877) ―job security provisions neither bias the firm‘s labour demand 
towards lower average employment at given wages, nor bias wage 
determination towards higher wages and lower employment‖.  
 
Moreover, in their model Bentolila and Bertola (1990) use realistic 
parameter values from the industrial production index of the four European 
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countries and also define two distinct ―regimes‖ (durations between 
regimes were the periods of 1961-1973 and 1975-1986). They argue 
(1990:381-382) that high firing costs can rationalize the dynamic behaviour 
of European employment in the 1970s and 1980s, and (given slow wage 
adjustment) can explain the persistence of unemployment in those 
countries. They find that ―firing costs do not have large effects on hiring 
decisions, nor do high firing costs reduce the average level of 
employment‖. In other words, they conclude (p 398) that the magnitude of 
dismissal costs affects the firing policy of the firm much more dramatically 
than its hiring policy or its average employment levels and finally (slightly) 
increase average long-run employment.  
 
One of the pioneering studies comes from Lazear (1990) which 
argued that laws protect workers from unjust termination by employers and 
focused on the effects of dismissals on employment. Lazear studied 22 
developed countries over a 29-year period (1956-1984) and he estimated 
―firing costs as the amount (in multiples of monthly wages) owed to a 
worker who is dismissed after ten years of service‖ (Heckman and Pages, 
2000:8). Lazear notes that severance pay legislation - where employers give 
notice - has no effects in an economy where wages are flexible so that 
parties can ―contract around‖ the laws. Empirically, however, his evidence 
shows that there are significant effects of severance payments on the labour 
market since workers who cannot obtain jobs quickly may be discouraged 
out of the labour force which finally can increase unemployment rates.  
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 Lazear‘s study has been criticised by Addison and Grosso (1996) 
who revised his data and found important differences. Having corrected 
Lazear's job protection measures, Addison and Grosso (1996:598) ―found 
support for the directional influence of severance pay in respect of three of 
the four outcome measures‖; however, there was little evidence to suggest 
that severance payment raised unemployment. Furthermore, Addison et al. 
(2000) re-estimated Lazear‘s model using corrected data. In their more 
detailed analysis they conclude (p. 118) that the adverse labour market 
consequences of more generous severance pay detected by Lazear were not 
confirmed. Moreover, Addison and Teixeira (2005) - based on Lazear‘s 
data - extend his sample period and add a variety of labour market 
institutions provide a comprehensive measure of employment protection. 
Their results indicate that the ―positive effect of severance pay on 
unemployment garners some support‖ (p. 345) , but the outcomes related to 
employment and long-term unemployment are much weaker than in 
Lazear‘s study. 
 
The Grubbs and Wells (1993) methodology developed an 
alternative cross-country index, scoring 11 European countries (including 
Greece) according to the ―strictness‖ of their employment protection 
legislation in the late 80s. In order to show an overall indicator for the 
strictness of different aspects of labour regulation they used the rank-
average-rank procedure. Their index widens the work of Lazear (1990). It 
initially measures ―employers‘ freedom to dismiss‖ dealing with individual 
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workers with regular contracts. In addition, it also takes into account 
regulations related to fixed-term contracts and the supply of labour through 
TWAs. A third point of measurement is the regulation on working time, 
including limits on overtime as well as restrictions applying to weekends 
and night work. Finally, they take into account ―atypical‖ work patterns 
such as part-time employment, self-employment, unpaid family workers 
and workers with multiple job holdings and compared them with typical 
work patterns.  
In fact, Grubbs and Wells (1993:34) found that, although 
employment in southern European countries tends to be strictly regulated 
while employment in the United Kingdom is relatively unregulated, in 
other EC countries the situation is more complex. Thus, Greece belongs to 
the ―Mediterranean‖ group and presents one of the higher rankings related 
to the strictness of protection against dismissal. Moreover, Greece‘s 
regulation on working time scored it as the second strictest country in 
restrictions on overtime, flexible, weekend and night work and also TWA 
since until the early 00s they were illegal
11
. 
In addition – in terms of atypical forms of employment- Greece can 
be seen to be a country with higher percentages in self and family 
employment as well as the lowest percentage in part-time employment (as 
are other southern EC countries). These forms of employment can also be 
seen as ―escape routes‖, and consequently will be thoroughly investigated 
in the TERS in later chapters.  
                                               
11 Table 2.3: Regulation of Temporary Employment, OECD Employment Outlook, 1999 
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The OECD then extended the Grubbs and Wells‘ methodology, but 
emphasising the EPL indicator (The OECD Jobs Study - 1994). EPL 
measurements related to regular employment focus on (a) the regular 
procedural inconveniences faced by employers, (b) the three different 
durations of notice periods and severance payments and (c) the difficulty of 
dismissal. Moreover, they also use the same methodology for temporary 
employment with (a) fixed-term contracts and (b) TWA employment. 
However, Addison and Texeira (2003) indicate three basic differences 
between these measurements: (a) the OECD extended the rankings to 
EFTA countries (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) in the 
late 80s (OECD 1994:70), (b) even though the TWA employment indicator 
is taken into account, in the end it is not measured on the overall 
assessment (OECD 1994:73, Table 6.7), and (c) the indicator on restrictions 
of working hours is not included in the OECD index. Finally, in the late 
90s, the indicators of collective dismissal were incorporated and provide 
the most comprehensive measure of EPL, version 2 (OECD, 1999) which is 
used extensively by scholars. 
 
 
Some Contemporary Developments 
Let us turn now to the more recent measurements, beginning with 
Botero et al. (2004) who - as mentioned in chapter 2 - claim that nearly all 
governments intervene in their labour markets, since they are considered as 
imperfect, with an aim to protect workers from employers. They measured 
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labour regulation considering three broad areas: (a) employment laws (b) 
collective relations laws and (c) social security laws. Their indices refer to 
85 countries and they conclude that ―a country‘s approach to regulation is 
shaped by its legal tradition‖. Greece in fact belongs to the group of 
countries with extensive regulation following its French legal origin as 
mentioned in chapter 2.  
 
 Another measurement is provided by the World Bank's latest 
"Doing Business Report" (World Bank 2010) which is based on Botero's 
work (see above). In this report, 11 indicators are provided in order to rank 
the countries on their ease of doing business. In other words, countries are 
ranked on whether the regulatory environment is more conducive to the 
starting and operation of a local firm. Among others, the employment index 
of rigidity is also provided, where Greece is ranked as the 147
th
 strictest 
country among 183 countries with regard to the employing workers 
indicator. This indicator focuses on difficulties in (a) hiring and (b) 
redundancy indexes, rigidities of (c) working hours and (d) employment 
indexes and (e) redundancy costs.  
 A weakness of this ―leximetric‖ (Deakin et al., 2007) approach is 
that the indicators are based on the laws and regulations in each country, 
and therefore might suffer from the fact that the laws are not enforced. 
Moreover, the survey was completed by local lawyers and public officials, 
thus primary data are not collected from employers. Another weakness 
observed is that data refer to enterprises over 60 employees . However, as 
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mentioned, since the majority of Greek businesses have less than 10 
employees, the sample is not representative.  
 
 On the other hand, the Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 - 
by the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2010) - collected a sample of 13000 
surveys from 133 countries based on business executives' views (100 
responses per country). Survey data comes from an Executive Opinion 
Survey; however, international hard data sources are also used here. This 
report provides a comprehensive assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of national economies by measuring their competitiveness. The 
7th out of the total 12 pillars (indicators) focuses on labour market 
efficiency which is categorised by 9 sub-indices. In reference to Greece, for 
5 sub-indices which deal mainly with the rigidity of employment, hiring 
and firing practices, pay and production and wage flexibility, Greece 
performed very badly (ranked among the 20 worst positions). For this 
reason, ―restrictive labour regulations‖ is considered the second highest 
problematic factor of doing business in Greece.  
  
 Two other organizations, the Fraser Institute‘s Economic Freedom 
of the World index (Gwartney et al., 2010) as well as the Heritage 
Foundation‘s Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage, 2010) provide some 
aspects of labour regulation. Both sources mainly use secondary data, but 
might add further value through their associated indicators.  
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Feldmann (2009) examines five types of labour market regulation: 
statutory minimum wages; hiring and firing regulations; collective 
bargaining; unemployment benefits; military conscription. His 
measurement is based on the component ―labour market regulations‖ of the 
Economic Freedom of the World Index. The indicators were calculated 
using the results from the WEF Survey (2010:519) in order to measure the 
impact of labour market regulations in 70 countries through senior 
management.  
 
Our survey (TERS) - which is based on the British WERS, analysed 
in chapters 4 and 5 focuses on Greek employers‘ responses and investigates 
whether labour regulation creates constraints on enterprise flexibility. 
Taking into consideration the majority of the measurements mentioned 
above we make a first attempt at the Greek level to measure its labour 
regulation. As we will see, the main form of flexibility comes from 
temporary and family employment. The effects of working conditions 
(employment protection, labour regulation in general) and wages (types of 
collective agreements, minimum wages,) in Greek businesses are studied. 
Therefore, the extent to which Labour Market Organizations enforce labour 
regulation and constrain enterprises to become more flexible is investigated 
as is employment performance.  
 
 To sum up, many authors study the labour regulation and 
investigate its relation with unemployment especially in the European 
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countries. Scholars and international organizations introduced - or revised 
the existing - methodologies in order to measure the level of labour rigidity 
per country. The main labour aspects which investigated here, are the wage 
setting institutions (including taxation), and employment protection.  
  
Effects of Labour Regulation 
After having presented the measurements on labour regulation and 
the ensuing methodologies by authors/organisations, this section will now 
focus on their impact on employment practices. In practice, scholars 
disagree on the extent to which there is an impact of labour market 
institutions on unemployment.  
To begin with, Edwards (1996) argues that labour regulations 
should ideally exist to facilitate voluntary agreements between employers 
and workers, helping to reduce transaction costs. But, most often, labour 
regulations do exactly the opposite, discouraging the creation of jobs. 
Furthermore, Siebert (2006) contends that labour regulation obviously 
helps the workers ―but at the expense of reduced job opportunities for 
outsider groups: the young, the old and the inexperienced‖. Nickel and 
Layard (1999:3079) on the other hand claim that there is no evidence that 
stricter labour standards or employment protection lead to higher 
unemployment. However, they agree that employment protection raises 
long-term unemployment and lowers short-term unemployment.  
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000:c13) also find disemployment effects. 
They construct a good dataset based on a time-series of EPL strictness for 
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OECD countries since 1960, based on OECD (1999) and Lazear (1990) 
data. They find that employment protection both decreases the flow of 
workers through the labour market and increases the duration of 
unemployment. Finally, they conclude that countries with high 
unemployment rates typically have less employment-friendly institutions.  
Siebert (1997) also states that labour market rigidities are the root of 
high unemployment. He further argues that institutional arrangements have 
negatively affected Europe‘s labour markets over the last 25 years and this 
has ultimately resulted in Europe‘s poor labour market performance. He 
also stresses that the combination of competition in a global economy and 
of labour-saving technical progress requires flexibility in wages; however 
this flexibility is prevented by institutional conditions. These institutional 
phenomena, he claims, have led to a dual labour market in most European 
countries.  
 
An important point is made by Dickens (2004) who argues that 
strict regulations on standard workers encourage employers to use certain 
forms of flexibility such as temporary workers. Thus, firms create jobs 
outside the regulated area, either in forms such as temporary work or self 
employment, which do not enjoy the same level of protection as standard 
work, or resort to the informal, unregulated sector. In fact, Addison and 
Teixeira (2003) note that Grubb and Wells first used simple correlations to 
establish a link between temporary work prevalence and EPL, but note that 
multivariate work by the OECD (1999) does not support the link. In fact, 
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more recent work by Kahn (2007) using cross-sectional data for 7 OECD 
countries does find a link. For example, Kahn (2007, F347) finds that 
raising regular worker EPL from US to Netherlands levels raises the 
permanent employment gap between 46-55 year olds and 26-25 year olds 
by 12.6 percentage points, which is 95% of the actual US-Dutch gap (and 
effects are larger with high collective bargaining coverage). This temporary 
worker vs. EPL hypothesis is important for the Greek situation, where 
temporary work and family-owned company work appear to provide the 
means for achieving flexibility, as we will test in the empirical work on the 
TERS in later chapters. 
 Finally, empirical evidence show us that labour rigidities affect 
unemployment but mainly in the long run and also create severe obstacles 
on specific demographic groups to entry to the labour; the women, the 
youth and the inexperienced who have less skilled. The question is why 
these groups are suffering more than others and considered as outsider 
groups analysed in the next section of inside-outside dichotomy.  
 
3.3 Insiders versus Outsiders 
Insider-outsider theory argues that ―insiders‖ often enjoy more 
favourable employment opportunities than ―outsiders‖. More specifically, 
the main difference is that insiders have protected jobs while outsiders have 
temporary positions in formal or informal employment or are unemployed. 
Hence, insiders have bargaining power and demand high wages while there 
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are unemployed outsiders queuing for jobs (Gottfries et al., 1999). Many 
researchers examine the distinction between insiders and outsiders and its 
effect on employment, unemployment and other macroeconomic activities. 
This section will investigate whether the insider-outsider model can be 
applied to the Greek labour market reality? Does labour regulation help 
insiders at the expense of outsiders and encourage temporary and family 
employment because these types of employment are not effectively 
protected?  
 
The Significance of Inside Market Power  
One of the main characteristics which plays a vital role on the 
inside-outside model is the inside market power which comes from being 
an incumbent worker. Blanchard and Summers (1986) explore the 
implications of inside power in employment dynamics. They consider that 
membership in the ‗insiders‘ group influences bargaining strategy and helps 
raise the insiders‘ wages; however, insider power is not crucially dependent 
on the presence of unions. Similarly, Lindbeck and Snower (2002: 39) 
argue, that any employee may take advantage of inside market power – 
though admittedly unions may give extra leverage.  
  
 Another issue which is of significant importance in the insider-
outsider distinction has to deal with political economic implications. Saint-
Paul (1996) notes that many of the rigidities are a direct result of the power 
political influences exerted by the people who have jobs, which is described 
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as the political insider-outsider model. His main idea states that: since the 
employed are more numerous and better organized than the unemployed, 
labour market institutions are determined by the interests of the former 
(1996:266) which is similar to the insider-outsider dichotomy. 
 
 Moreover, one view of Elmeskov et al. (1998) claims that the policy 
settings that influence unemployment are determined by political-economy 
considerations. This may explain why it is so difficult to introduce policy 
reforms that will reduce unemployment (1998:230). According to their 
argument, insiders may oppose reforms that lead to an increase in outsider 
employment. In other words, the incumbents are interested in raising labour 
rigidities in order to boost their bargaining power in wage negotiations. 
Consequently, insiders who benefit from strict EPL may exert pressure for 
an administrative extension of wage agreements as a protection against the 
underbidding of their wages by outsiders 
 
 
The Greek Case  
 Based on the arguments of the inside-outside model presented 
above, the Greek reality will be investigated. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
Greece's labour market is characterised as dualistic. Tsakloglou et al. 
(2005) argue that, this duality consists of two groups: (a) the low-skilled, 
self-employed or those employed in small firms, who receive low wages, 
work in unstable and precarious conditions, and face a highly competitive 
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environment; and (b) those who work either in the highly unionised public 
sector or in large private sector firms, and who receive relatively high 
wages and enjoy far better working conditions. Moreover, other Greek 
scholars agree with the inside-outside dichotomy in Greece's labour market 
(Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001; Iosifidis, 2001; Matsagannis, 2007; 
Kouzis, 2008; Lyberaki; 2009). Within this framework, the aforementioned 
authors also characterise females, youth and the long-term unemployed as 
the main disadvantaged groups which suffer more from unemployment as 
an outsider group. This is compatible with this section of the inside-outside 
dichotomy. 
 
 An interesting analysis on different sources of Greek unemployment 
persistence comes from Miaouli (1998). She emphasizes the crucial role of 
labour adjustment costs. Regulations (hiring and firing practices), 
government intervention and union pressure are the most obvious reasons 
for high adjustment costs (Miaouli, 1998:107). She argues that the Greek 
labour market will improve its efficiency and the speed of adjustment when 
institutional changes take place.  
 Furthermore, Koutsorgeopoulou (1994) proceeds to an empirical 
investigation (primary data from Social Security Organisation) of the 
impact of minimum wages on industrial employment over the period 1962-
87. Koutsorgeopoulou (1994:90) believes that the relatively high value of 
the minimum wage in Greece as set by the National General Collective 
Agreement (NGCA), its frequent revision, its automatic uprating since 
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1982 and its extensive coverage, seem of crucial importance in light of the 
increasing rates of unemployment in those years. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
NGCA has very high de jure coverage. In fact, I analyse the NGCA 
extensively in Chapters 4 and 5 below, and find that contrary to the de jure 
position, de facto coverage is low, particularly for outsider groups. 
However, while Greek minimum wage-setting may be widely ignored, it 
can still create a ―fear factor‖ which leads to expansion of the outsider 
group which is less likely to complain. Another issue for discussion 
regarding the Greek dual labour market arises from high "rent-related" 
costs. These costs arise when there is a significant connection at the 
political and financial levels among trade unions and the state (see more in 
chapter 2: Zamparloukou, Ioannou, Kouzis analysis). Moreover, as 
Matsagannis (2007) argues, the process of selecting union leaders further 
distorts representation. He considers that the primary and sectoral 
determinant of most congress delegates‘ vote is party-political affiliation. 
On account of that bias, Greek unions are incapable of pursuing 
encompassing interests; therefore, they are prone to defending the status 
quo and the acquired rights of a shrinking minority of over-protected 
insider employees (Matsagannis, 2007:551). 
   
 The situation in Greece seems to conform quite well with the 
political insider-outsider approach since several authors attribute the failure 
of reforms in Greece to the political-economy level. In surveying the 
literature, Monastiriotis et al. (2009) identify the failure of Greece's 
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reforms: those who highlight the lack of political will, the fragmentation of 
organised interests, the extent of rent-seeking and the absence of positive-
sum exchanges between the interested parties (Ioannou, 2000; Featherstone 
et al., 2001; Pagoulatos, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004); and those focusing 
more on socio-cultural and socio-political characteristics such as the history 
of clientelism, corruption and ‗inefficient bureaucracy‘, and low social 
capital (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002; Lavdas, 2005; Zambarloukou, 
2006; Featherstone, 2008). Focusing on labour reform, Spanou (2008) 
argues that the Greek state does not have a comprehensive reform vision 
and labour flexibility has not increased because of systematic weaknesses 
and corporatist reactions by labour unions.  
 
3.4 Employment and Unemployment Outcomes – Comparisons with 
OECD countries 
 In this section I present the Greece's labour market performance 
based on the effects of labour regulation which analysed above. The picture 
of Greece‘s labour market is poor; naturally the labour rigidities affect 
mainly outsiders): the youth, the females and the long-term unemployed as 
we see below. Based on available data
12
 (1983-2006), we provide a number 
of employment/unemployment figures in order to give a factual, 
                                               
12 Data are available in unemployment/employment rates since 1960s, however comparability of the data with 
that since 1982 has been questioned. For instance, the OECD (Economic Survey of Greece 1981/1982, pp: 19-20) 
notes that the Greek unemployment rate is difficult to assess. Moreover, Katsanevas (1984 - Economikos 
Taxydromos, issue 49, 6/12/1984, pp. 27-28) argues that comparisons before and after the year of 1982 are not 
valid. In 1982, measurement of labour force statistics was changed in order to harmonize the methodology 
according to European measurement and the ILO definitions. Additionally, treatment of unemployment in rural 
areas was changed. Censequently, we decided to provide Greek data and comparisons with other OECD countries 
after the year of 1983.  
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comparative basis to the Greek employment framework which is analysed 
in more detail in later chapters.  
 Greece has suffered from high unemployment during the last 25 
years – especially long-term unemployment which is analysed further 
below – while its overall rate during this period never fell below 7.0 
percent. More specifically, in the beginning of 1990 - when the re-
regulation phase in EU started (Addison and Siebert: 1991) - 
unemployment increased to a rate higher than that of the OECD average 
which situation has persisted. In most OECD countries, unemployment 
rates that rose in the early part of the 1990s but have been falling since. 
Greece, on the other hand, seems to follow a different path than the OECD 
average, and employment rates for youth (aged 15-24) in particular are 
remarkably low compared with the OECD average.  
 
Gender 
 Let us begin with the Greek employment rate for women, which is 
low (50 percent) compared to the EU target (based on the Lisbon Strategy, 
see on EWCO, 2010) which aims to achieve an average female 
employment rate of 60 percent by 2010. By contrast, the rate for men 
performs as well as the OECD average with a 75 percent employment rate 
(Figure 3.1).  
 
As far as the unemployment rate is concerned, the male unemployment rate 
has gradually decreased over the last decade as shown in Figure 3.2. This is 
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an exception to its overall unemployment picture and vis-à-vis other OECD 
countries. Moreover, the male unemployment rate in Greece is slightly 
below the OECD average. Greece nowadays has rates similar to the UK 
(less than 6 percent) and seems to perform well in this unemployment 
category if we take into consideration that it does not follow the group of 
countries with high unemployment, such as Germany (almost double rates) 
and France. 
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Figure 3.1: Employment rates (%) by sex 
in Greece & selected OECD countries (1983-2006)
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13 Source Data for Greece and selected OECD countries based on http://stats.oecd.org - Labour Force Statistics 
by Sex and Age / Twenty OECD countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States have been selected, based on earlier work on CEP-OECD Institutions Dataset- 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0759.pdf 
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Figure 3.2: Unemployment rates (%) by sex 
in Greece & selected OECD countries (1983-2006)
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14 Source: Data for Greece and selected OECD countries based on http://stats.oecd.org - Labour Force Statistics 
by Sex and Age 
 104 
 On the other hand, the unemployment rate for women indicates a 
completely different view and presents much higher rates than that of males 
(around 13 percent). Greek women represent one of the highest 
disadvantaged groups in unemployment since their rate is almost double the 
OECD average. The situation is worse if we take into consideration the 
subgroup aged 15-24. Only 25 percent of young females participate in the 
labour market.  
The female labour-force participation is much lower than that of 
males in many countries due to culture and social norms but also by  reason 
of economic incentives (OECD, 2004). In the last decades, however, as can 
be seen, adult female participation rates have increased due to increased 
availability of consumer durables, developments in medicine and shifts in 
technology and social attitudes (Pissarides et al., 2003:15).  
 
In the Greek labour market, the structure of small and family run 
businesses, which are headed by males, play a significant role in women‘s 
participation. Women have usually had a secondary role as a family unpaid 
member, an issue which is also considered in our TERS survey (more in 
Chapter 5). In the framework of technological and social changes, together 
with the EU directives, the Greek state introduced a number of gender-
specific anti-discrimination reforms in the early 1980's. Lyberaki (2010) 
argues that even though patriarchal family law was abolished during this 
period, equality is still viewed through a patriarchal ‗lens‘. Moreover, she 
also points out that labour balance is constrained by labour market 
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rigidities, the insider/outsider dichotomy and the problem of non-
implementation of legislation.  
 
Youth  
In addition, unemployed youth are also susceptible to social and 
occupational exclusion. Youth workers – according to Siebert (2002) - are a 
typical outsider group, and have been the subject of other studies, as we see 
below. Their incorporation in the labour market is affected by their 
insufficient work experience, their young age and their lack of specialized 
knowledge. Youth unemployment in Greece is a long-standing social 
phenomenon and remains a chronic problem. The youth unemployment rate 
in Greece started to increase dramatically in the late 1980s (Figure 3.3). In 
the early 1990s it reached one of the highest levels among EU member 
states (Lazaridis et al., 2001). Its rise continued till the end of 1990s (almost 
32 percent) but lately has fallen to somewhat under 25 percent. Young 
Greeks are twice as likely to suffer long term unemployment as their peers 
in most OECD countries and less likely to be in work (OECD, 2010).  
Moreover, employment rates for youth (aged 15-24) are remarkably low 
compared with the OECD average. These are three times lower for the 25-
54 age group; focusing on young and females together, we will see that 
their employment rates are less than 20 percent. 
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Figure 3.3: Unemployment rates (%) aged 15-24 
in Greece & selected OECD countries (1983-2006) 
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Source: See Figure 3.2 
 
 
  
Long-Term Unemployment  
 As mentioned above, long-term unemployment is one of the major 
unemployment problems in Greece. Generally, the long-term 
unemployment rate in Greece has behaved differently from OECD 
countries. During the last 25 years the incidence of Greek long- term 
unemployment rate for men has increased rapidly especially after the 
1990s, lowering the gap between the two sexes. On the other hand, long-
term unemployment rates in OECD counntries have been moving together 
for both sexes (the gap between the two is not as large as in Greece) since 
the 1980s. Interestingly, the age group with the largest percentage of long-
term unemployed is the 25-44 year olds an age group encomassing the most 
productive years of individuals (Krikeli et al., 2009). 
 Many authors (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickel and Layard, 1999; Nickel et 
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al., 2005; Siebert 2003 and 2005; Feldmann 2009) argue that labour 
regulation drives up long-term unemployment in particular. Countries like 
Britain, which have managed to reduce its incidence, have better-
performing labour markets than those of Germany and Greece, where the 
share of the long-term unemployed has risen over the past decade (The 
Economist, 2007). In fact, Greece‘s long-term unemployment performance 
has been particularly poor, with around half of the unemployed in Greece 
over the last 20 years being categorised as long-term unemployed (OECD, 
Factbook 2010).  
 
 While Greek unemployment benefits started to develop towards the 
end of the 1980s, ―converging towards the norms for other EU countries‖ 
(OECD, 2003), generous benefits cannot explain high long-term 
unemployment. Rather, strong family ties are the explanation. Greece is 
characterised as a familialistic welfare regime ( Esping-Andersen, 1999). In 
addition, Kotsadam (2009) indicates that the strong family care model 
(existing in Greece and also in Portugal, Spain and Italy) is characterised by 
a limited supply of social care services. It is clear that family will continue 
to play its role as the key provider of welfare support to its members 
(Papadopoulos, 2006) and it functions - in many cases - as a public 
employment service for the children. In other words, sometimes young 
people ―enjoy‖ the family protection and other facilities and become 
inactive in terms of employment. These ―family benefits‖ on the other 
hand, are known to the state and this may be the reason that Greece – as 
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noted before – has one of the lowest unemployment compensation benefits 
in the EU.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 In this chapter the theoretical underpinnings for analysing how the 
constraints of labour regulation might affect employment outcomes were 
provided. Moreover, we show that the EU Directives have promoted labour 
regulation. A number of studies presented here argue that such regulation 
causes poor employment outcomes (Kahn 2007) and more temporary 
employment in European member countries (e.g. as regards temporary 
workers, the OECD 1999) deny this conclusion. Others, however resist this 
interpretation. 
 A number of methods have been developed by many authors and 
international organizations to measure the coerciveness of labour market 
institutions. Examples include the centralisation of wage-setting 
institutions, the extent of employment protection and of welfare regimes 
which allegedly underpin long-term unemployment. 
 Then we turned to insider-outsider theory, which provides a clear 
explanation of how the rent-seeking activities provide inside market power 
to incumbent workers. We also investigated the Greek case which fits very 
well with the political insider-outsider theory. Greece - as a country which 
followed the French legal tradition - introduced several labour laws which 
reflected the interests of unions or sectoral groups (e.g. in the public sector) 
without taking into consideration other demographic groups which suffered  
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unemployment. "Real" reforms did not take place over the past 30 years 
because the Greek politicians could not oppose the median voter (the 
insider).  
 Finally, we considered the employment and unemployment 
experience of vulnerable groups which are affected most by the insider 
outsider dichotomy as well as the familialistic welfare regime. We found 
that the Greek experience for these groups, including females and young 
workers was even worse than the average for other OECD countries. In the 
next chapters, we aim to cast some light on the causes of this poor 
performance, surveying the reaction of 200 Greek firms to the wage and 
working conditions floors imposed by labour regulation. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE THESSALY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
SURVEY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The present chapter focuses on the survey structure with a detailed 
description of the sampling procedures and weighting. In addition, a 
thorough analysis of the descriptive statistics of the survey is investigated. 
This survey, called the Thessaly Employment Relations Survey (TERS) 
based on the U.K. Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) was 
conducted in four prefectures of Thessaly, central Greece, between the 
years 2006-2007. 226 enterprises belonging to 10 major economic groups 
were interviewed. It was mainly conducted in the four major cities of 
Thessaly; however a significant number of interviews took place in 
industrial areas and provincial towns. As mentioned, the aim of the thesis is 
to discover the current situation of flexible employment in Thessaly in 
order to understand why employment creation in Greece is so low. A 
number of research issues need to be identified– before moving to the 
survey process – in order to provide a better understanding of the primary 
data analysis. Since the Greek labour market is investigated in this thesis, 
some related issues are important at this stage: (a) a summary of the prior 
empirical studies in the state (b) the relation and the importance of the 
Greek SME's to the survey. Moreover, due to the fact that the survey was 
conducted in a provincial labour market, (c) more information pertaining to 
the economic and business context is also introduced here (section 4.2).  
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Next, in section 4.3 issues focusing on the design of the survey are 
addressed. These include: (a) the specification of the body/organisation, 
considered as the provider of our dataset (b) the reconciliation of the 
population to the official statistical classification system, (c) the selection 
of the sample as well as the weighting and sampling procedures.  
Section 4.4 has to do with the development and the conduct of the 
survey. A questionnaire was designed based on the UK WERS 
questionnaire. A number of issues such as training the interviewers and 
conducting a pilot-survey were considered in the preparation of the survey. 
The questionnaire consists of fourteen parts, mainly focusing on labour 
market flexibility and regulation issues. The next part of this section 
involves the fieldwork in which almost 300 businesses were contacted. The 
last section (4.5) of the chapter examines the preliminary findings of the 
survey while a thorough analysis of the descriptive statistics is also 
presented in this chapter.  
 
Greek features related to the Survey 
Prior empirical studies on Greek employment relations 
The methodology used in earlier studies on employment relations 
and human resource practices in Greece will be examined before describing 
the survey process. It is known that studies on Greek employment relations 
based on empirical data are very limited (see Mihail (2003) and Karamesini 
et al. (2007)). However, an attempt to examine previous surveys or studies 
on the above subjects has been made in the last decade.  
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Table 4.1: List of Surveys dealing with Human Resources Practices in 
Greek workplaces during the last fifteen years (1999-2009) 
 
Organisation Author Year 
Sample 
Size 
Comments 
University of 
Macedonia- 
Dept of Business 
Kufidu 
& Mihail 
1999 22 
Manufacturing firms 
(more than 200 
employees) 
Athens 
University 
of Economics & 
Business 
(Cranet Survey) 
Papalexandris 
et al, 
1993 
1996 
1999 
156 
(overall) 
Private & semi-state firms 
(more than 150 
employees) 
Institute of 
Employment 
GSEE, Metron 
Analysis 
Institute of 
Employment 
/GSEE 
2002 2016 
All main sectors 
employing at least 1 
person 
University of 
Macedonia- 
Dept of Business 
Mihail 2003 30 
Organisations from main 
sectors 
(more than 200 
employees) 
University of 
Macedonia-Dept 
of Business 
Mihail 2004 16 
Manufacturing & service 
SME's 
(fewer than 100 
employees) 
Athens 
University 
of Economics & 
Business 
Voudouris 
2004 
2007 
75 
4 Manufacturing sectors 
(no restriction on 
workforce size) 
 
Table 4.1 provides a list of earlier significant research studies on 
employment relations such as Kufidu and Mihail (1999) investigating 
twenty two manufacturing firms employing 200 or more persons. In 
addition, the Cranfield project (Cranfield Network on Comparative Human 
Resource Management (Cranet)) organised a study by Papalexandris et al. 
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(2000) which derived data studying flexible working practices from 156 
large scale establishments which employed more than 150 workers. The 
Cranet project is one of the most representative independent surveys of 
HRM policies and practices in the world and Greece participated in 1993, 
1996 and 1999. Furthermore, Mihail (2003) also surveyed – based on ICAP 
business database - thirty large-scale firms with more than 200 employees 
regarding atypical forms of employment through telephone interviews. 
Moreover, Mihail (2004) studied labour flexibility in sixteen SME's 
companies (manufacturing and services sector) that employ fewer than 100 
employees. Finally, one of the recent studies, Voudouris (2004) was based 
on a random sampling from four manufacturing sectors drawn from the 
ICAP business database. She examined the use of temporary employees, 
independent contractors and subcontractors as forms of flexible 
employment and analysed data from 75 companies. She also studied the 
same firms in 2007 (Voudouris, 2007) in specific business sectors and 
focused on the flexibility in different employee classes.  
Apart from academics, research bodies have also examined labour 
regulation and flexibility in the last decades. More specifically, the ―labour 
market yearbooks‖ including both national and provincial surveys in 
Greece were created by the Research Employment Observatory - Public 
Employment Services. However, these yearbooks have a different 
orientation, trying to better understand the needs of the workforce as well 
as the lack of workforce skills in businesses. Finally, one of the most 
noteworthy studies on employment and industrial relations in Greece was 
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the nationwide survey conducted in 2002 by the Institute of Employment/ 
Greek General Confederation of Labour, along with the private market 
research company Metron Analysis. The sampling of this survey consisted 
of over than 2000 companies from private sector which employ at least one 
person (EIRO, 2002).  
However, some weak points are evident on the methodologies of the 
studies in Table 4.1: (a) the number of workplaces interviewed is generally 
small, (b) the samples deal mainly with medium and large-scale enterprises, 
and (c) the range of economic sectors is limited (mostly manufacturing and 
service sectors). It seems as though scholars have preferred to investigate 
large scale enterprises in order to obtain a high volume of employees for 
their research instead of interviewing a large number of (more 
representative) micro-enterprises. Thus, in this case, the business samples 
were mainly derived by the largest Greek private financial directory (ICAP) 
which according to their web page ―contains more than 20,000 companies 
(SAs, LTDs and others) which encompass the entire Greek state and all 
activity fields‖. It is obvious that this number is not representative since this 
database includes mainly large scale companies.  
 Finally, the Cranet longitudinal survey uses standardised 
questionnaires across different countries and over different years. 
Consequently, comparative outcomes between years in the same country as 
well as between different countries are very obtainable. But while this 
comparative aspect is to be welcomed, it clearly limits the depth possible 
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for the questionnaire. The TERS is likely to mark a great improvement 
here, as will be seen. 
 
The Study region: Thessaly periphery 
The region of Thessaly is situated in the central eastern part of 
Greek mainland and has more than 750.000 inhabitants (Census, 2001). Its 
population represents almost 7 percent of the total population of the country 
and remains the third largest region in Greece in population size, following 
Attica (Athens area) and Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki area). The 
population of Thessaly enterprises contains about 6 percent of the total 
number of enterprises in the country. The regional economy is concentrated 
in the four major cities of Thessaly but generally we can differentiate 
between  the western and eastern parts of Thessaly. Western Thessaly is the 
most agricultural part of the region, while in the eastern prefectures 
secondary sectors produce 80 percent of the industrial product of the whole 
region. The tertiary sector also displays a dynamic development and the 
most important economic activity is commerce, especially wholesale and 
retail trade activities. The commercial activity is dominated by the 
existence of family-owned businesses having either no additional personnel 
or employing less than 5 employees. Around 40 percent of the businesses 
are ―one-person-enterprises‖ and constitute almost 9 percent of the total 
employment in Thessaly.  
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Contribution of Greek TERS – Relation with WERS  
Until recently, it was not common for researchers to study 
employment relations in SMEs (Forth et al., 2006). This lack of research in 
Greek micro-enterprises, which as mentioned represent the vast majority of 
overall Greek businesses, creates the potential for my further research in 
this field. These thoughts led me to seek a methodological tool on 
employment relations from the employer‘s perspective as used in other 
OECD countries in order (a) to get new information and (b) to apply to 
smaller firms in Greece. Thus, in order to fill this gap we tried to construct 
a questionnaire which could be compared with comprehensive research on 
employment relations in other European countries or worldwide. I realized 
that similar questionnaires have been available in several countries of the 
European Union such as the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium as well as in some Anglo-Saxon countries (US, Canada, Australia) 
mainly since 1990s. In fact, the UK was the first country to create an 
inquiry, initially called ―The Workplace Industrial Relations Survey‖ 
(WIRS), starting in 1980. Another four surveys took place in following 
years (1984, 1990, 1998, 2004) An issue worth mentioning here is that 
WERS - the largest survey of its kind conducted in the world (Cully et al., 
1999) - used to apply only to larger-scale workplaces employing more than 
50. However, it began to offer new opportunities in 1998 when the fourth 
survey ―expanded its scope to include workplaces with 10-24 employees 
 117 
for the first time‖ (Forth et al., 2006) and the fifth survey - in 2004 - 
expanded even more and included workplaces with 5-9 employees. 
The fact that the international research community investigates 
employment in micro-enterprises is of significant importance. Such a tool 
drawn from the 2004 WERS, which as we have seen is also applied to 
small workplaces would provide a major contribution and better fit in our 
case. Thus, since a similar questionnaire and survey has not been carried 
out in Greece, I obtained funds jointly provided by the Greek Ministry of 
Education and the European Social Fund to create a similar questionnaire 
for Greece.  
Taking these points into consideration, our research is substantial by 
Greek standards. The strong point of our study is the inclusion of micro-
enterprises in the sample in contrast with almost all other Greek surveys 
which mainly focus on larger enterprises. Another strong characteristic is 
that our methodology is based on international standards and makes this 
survey unique since almost all Greek empirical studies have different 
methodologies. In addition, the idea of researching family workers (paid or 
not) with data mainly from our face-to-face interviews with micro-
enterprises, is another strong point. Within this framework we succeeded in 
having a better overall image of the attitudes and conceptions of micro and 
family-run such enterprises, as 98% of businesses in the Thessaly region 
are made up of such enterprises. 
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4.2 The Design of the Survey 
Sources of Data 
It is known that the first step for the implementation of any primary 
research is to identify the population group, which in our survey is 
represented by the total number of workplaces in the geographical area of 
investigation, the Thessaly region. A workplace was defined as the physical 
location of an establishment. This meant that all types of workplaces were 
surveyed: those which were large or small-scale business as well as those 
which were the head offices or branches of the establishment. We needed to 
generate a statistically representative random sample of Thessaly‘s 
workplaces.  
The second step was the specification of the body/organisation, 
considered as the sampling frame for our data. In the UK, the WERS 
sponsors guarantee a ready-made sample of workplaces through the 
Departmental Business Register (IBDR) held by the Office for National 
Statistics. In our case respectively, a full list of the population of 
workplaces in Thessaly was needed. Based on research team knowledge, 
there are five organisations (four governmental and one private) which can 
contribute –see Appendix 4.1– to the estimation of the population of 
enterprises:  
(a) National Statistical Services of Greece, 
(b) Labour Inspectorate,  
(c) Social Security Organisation 
(d) Chamber of Commerce and Industry,  
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(e) ICAP business database –the largest private database in the whole 
country. 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry seemed to be the most suitable 
source of data for this study, even though there was a constraint in deriving 
the sample. The disadvantage was that multinational companies might not 
be included in their database, since these companies have to register in the 
first geographical place established, which is usually is in the greater area 
of Athens. Thus, it is not obligatory for every enterprise to re-register in 
every geographical place it has activities. However, considering that these 
companies play a significant role in the regional economy studied due to 
the fact that a large number of employees work there, an additional 
representative number of businesses are included in this study. To 
overcome this constraint, an additional sample was derived from the ICAP 
database which includes all the types of businesses. 
 Another point which we had to take into account, at this phase, is 
that the business dataset from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
exclude a group of businesses that have to register at their local sectoral-
occupational associations. These businesses - such as 
economists/accountants, engineers/architects, lawyers /advocates, doctors 
/dentists, etc. - have a self proprietorship type and mainly refer to one-
person enterprises. The fact that a number of enterprises are excluded from 
our sample is positive since the majority of these enterprises have no 
employees. It helps our sample to exclude businesses without personnel. 
Another advantage of using the Chambers" database is the requirement that 
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every business is registered when it starts-up and deregistered when it 
closes. That means that the dataset is up to date. 
 
Selection of the Enterprise Sample  
When conducting a survey, having a representative sample of the 
population is of significant importance. The sampling frame - as mentioned 
above – was to be drawn from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 
the four prefectures of the region. A first step was to ensure that the 
sampled workplace‘s economic activity could be compared with overall 
Greek national data. This objective required us to change the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry‘s system to the Greek official statistical 
classification, called STAKOD-2003, which is similar to the NACE 
classification (NSSG, 2002). Our interest focuses on one digit 
classification, which in the STAKOD system compromises 17 categories of 
activities which are characterised by letters (one digit). Although a similar 
classification has been defined by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
dataset, recoding according the STAKOD classification was undertaken.  
The Thessaly enterprise sample was thus based on the STAKOD 17 
categories of economic activities. However, workplaces in sector A 
(Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry), sector B (Fishing), sector E 
(Electricity, Gas and Water Supply), sector L (Public Administration), P 
(Private Households with Employed Persons) and Q (Extra-Territorial 
Organisations and Bodies) were excluded. Sectors E and L were also 
excluded since public organisations and utilities were explicitly excluded 
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from this study. Consequently, the TERS sampling frame was initially 
divided into 10 broad sectors (one digit), as shown in Table 4.2. 
Procedures for determining the appropriate industrial stratification 
are quite similar to the UK experience. WERS 2004 encompassed activities 
from Sections D (Manufacturing) to O (Other Community, Social and 
Personal Services) of the Standard Industrial Classification where the 
remaining sections were also excluded. (Forth et al., 2006). The UK 
Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (UK SIC(92)) is 
used to classify business establishments and other statistical units by the 
type of economic activities in which they are engaged in. Even though the 
UK uses the SIC-2003, it should be noted that ―both classification systems, 
the SIC and NACE, are based on the United Nations International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC), and are identical at the two-digit level‖ 
(Hughes, 2008). 
All Thessalian enterprises in the sampling frame were divided into 
strata based on STAKOD major sectors and within group strata, by 
geographical location (the four prefectures of Thessaly region). Admittedly, 
the WERS sample was stratified by workplace size (divided into seven 
strata employee categories) as well as major industry.  
However, in our case, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
database has no estimation for workforce size per enterprise, consequently 
strata on workplace size was not possible in this phase. However, following 
extensive research, the workplace size variable was estimated by auxiliary 
resources. 
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Table 4.2: Number of Enterprises per Prefecture & Group Economic 
Activity 
N
A
C
E
 
Economic Activity 
K
ar
d
it
sa
 
T
ri
k
al
a 
L
ar
is
sa
 
M
ag
n
es
ia
 
T
h
es
sa
ly
 
D Manufacturing 983 1,186 4,839 2,445 9,453 
F Construction 90 84 1,350 1,262 2,786 
G 
Wholesale &  
Retail Trade 
3,291 3,371 5,400 6,345 18,407 
H 
Hotels &  
Restaurants 
1,102 1,341 2,250 2,956 7,649 
I 
Transportations  
& Carriers 
398 423 458 596 1,875 
J 
Financial  
Intermediation 
30 37 82 49 198 
K 
Real estate &  
Business Activities 
978 870 967 1,133 3,948 
M Education 371 294 1,125 307 2,097 
N 
Health &  
Social Work 
9 25 43 49 126 
O 
Other Community,  
Social & Personal  
Services 
398 489 375 459 1,721 
 Total 7,650 8,120 16,889 15,601 48,260 
Source: Thessalian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Databases & ICAP business 
database 
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of Thessaly Workplaces per Employment Size 
Employment 
Size 
Greek 
Workplaces 
(%) 
Thessaly 
Workplaces 
(%) 
Thessaly 
Workplaces 
Population 
Thessaly 
Workplaces 
with personnel 
Thessaly 
Workplaces 
with personnel 
(%) 
0-5 90,3 92,8 44,730 -  
0 - 42,7 20,600
2
 -  
1-5 - 50,2 24,130 24,130 87,3% 
6-10 5,9 5,8 2,800 2,800 10,1 
11-50 3,4 1,2 580 580 2,1 
50+ 0,3 0,1 50 50 0,2 
Total 100 100 48,260
3
 27,600 100 
Notes: 
1
Workplace Distribution per Employment Size is based on Employment 
Observatory and National Statistical Services data 
2 
Workplaces without employees is based on Labour Inspectorates Offices data  
3
 Total numbers of Thessalian enterprises comes from Thessalian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
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Since workplace size was not fully under our control in the 
sampling process, we then constructed weights to ensure that the sample 
was representative. Our objective was to replicate the distribution of 
workplace sizes shown in Table 3 Employment Observatory-Research 
Informatics (PEAP) survey (2003). Thus, based on this distribution in Table 
3, four workforce size categories were determined in this table; (a) up to 5 
employees (b) 6-10 employees (c) 11-50 employees and (d) 50 and over 
employees. Then, the research team faced another obstacle at the category 
(a) up to five employees; enterprises with no employees (called one-person-
enterprises) were also estimated. In order to avoid including enterprises 
with no personnel, the local offices of the Labour Inspectorate were 
contacted. This time, fortunately, the LI officers were willing to help and 
provided to us with the number of businesses with personnel in every 
prefecture.  
Finally, as can be seen from the final column of Table 4.3, data 
from all the above resources indicate that workplaces (a) with 1-5 
employees account for 87.3 percent (24.1/27.6 with employees) of 
workplaces in Thessaly, (b) 6-10 employees account for 10.1 percent (c) 
11-50 employees account for 1.2 percent and (d) 50 and over employees 
account for 0.1 percent. It is noted, that the Thessaly periphery presents 
similarities with the Greece as a whole in regards to the employment size of 
its businesses. Thus, almost 98 percent are defined as micro-enterprises (up 
to 10 employees) in Thessaly, while overall Greece has a little more than 96 
percent. Differences were noted in the small-enterprises category (11-50 
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employees) where the national average has a percentage three times higher 
(3.4 percent) than the Thessaly region (1.2). It is clear that the presence of 
medium (50-250 employees) and large (250 and over) enterprises is very 
low in Greece as a country and also in the Thessaly region.  
 
Weighting the Cross-Section TERS Survey 
Before moving on to the next step, weighting the survey, another 
feature of importance needs to be mentioned. This concerns the sponsorship 
of the survey. The TERS sponsors are the Greek Ministry of Education, the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the TEI of Larissa, (Higher Education 
Institute). Thus, the funding determines restrictions on both the 
geographical location of the research as well as the number of visits to the 
enterprises. In other words, conducting fieldwork in almost 300 enterprises 
in the Thessaly region was ―determined‖ by the budget of the survey.  
The first 200 enterprises were chosen randomly based on the 
sampling frame provided by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry as 
noted above. An additional sample of 100 enterprises was collected from 
the private database of the ICAP group which mainly consists of businesses 
with more than 10 employees. This method resulted in an over-sampling of 
large workplaces relative to small ones which was expected.  
It is common in business surveys to over sample larger firms. 
According to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007:271) 
in enterprise surveys ―because the distribution of establishments in most 
countries is overwhelmingly populated by small and medium-sized 
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enterprises, surveys generally over-sample large establishments‖. It has also 
been noted, (Purdon et al., 2001) that when designing the WERS (1998 & 
2004) a similar issue arose. In that case, the oversampling of larger 
workplaces was also selected in order ―to improve the precision of 
estimates of employees within establishments‖. In addition, they claimed 
that ―it allows for separate reporting and analysis by size and economic 
activity‖ which is welcomed by policy makers. 
Once the data was collected from the workplaces, we computed the 
weights, using a post stratification weighting method. Thus, a sample of 
293 workplaces out of almost 27600 workplaces in Thessaly was selected, 
and of these, data were collected from 206 workplaces with employees, as 
shown in Table 4.4. The population of sampling units (workplaces) was 
divided by strata (workforce size). Consequently, a separate sample per 
strata was introduced. Since - as mentioned above – some sub-groups were 
over-sampled a methodology of disproportionate sampling was selected and 
differential sampling fractions were used according to the number of 
employees (workplace size). Therefore, the sampling fraction for the 1-5 
employees" stratum was 331 (because 331*73=24,130), the fraction for the 
6-10 employees stratum was 53, the 11-49 employees stratum was 8 and 
the category of 50 and over stratum was 5. 
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4.3 The Development and the Conduct of the Survey  
Design of the Questionnaire 
Our questionnaire for the TERS survey was based on the 
questionnaire used for the fifth WERS survey. In fact, the TERS Cross-
Section Survey could be characterised as a mini-WERS since it has one 
main component, the Survey of Managers. In contrast, the UK WERS 
Survey (2004) consists of another three components: (a) the Survey of 
Employee Representatives, (b) the Survey of Employees and (c) the 
Financial Performance Questionnaire. This being an initial approach, a 
survey of employees was not included due to budget restrictions. 
The research members of the design team participated in six 
meetings between April and May of 2006. The main point of the 
discussions focused on certain questions that could not be adapted to Greek 
standards. Initially, the first version of the questionnaire was written in 
English and then translated into Greek. We translated it and gave both the 
Greek and English versions to a team of academic and research staff of 
Higher Educational Institutes: the TEI of Larissa, Greece and the 
University of Birmingham, Britain for comments. It was very important to 
take into consideration that Greece has different labour market regulations 
than Britain or other countries which use similar questionnaires. In order to 
succeed in this area, some modifications were made in questions which 
could not be applied to Greek businesses for flexible employment. The final 
version of the questionnaire (see Appendix 4.4) was divided into fourteen 
sections: The first two (1 & 2) sections could be characterized as 
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introductory with background and general data of the company (economic 
activity, legal status, period of operation, employer union activity). Section 
three (3) examined the labour force data of each company that is, the 
number of employees, basic classification per form of employment, 
occupational group, age, sex, trade union density, etc. Section four (4) 
studied the recruitment and personnel selection policies of the last five 
years and analysed the needs in the workforce according to the type of 
employment and occupational group. Questions on equality (male and 
female) in the workforce arose in this section. Our next area (section 5) 
focused on pay determination. We asked employers according to which 
bargaining arrangement (national, sectoral, enterprises or individual) 
employees were paid: Sections six (6) to eleven (11) incorporated questions 
dealing with the types of employment and an analysis was made with 
careful consideration given to businesses with part-time, short time and 
temporary time. Family employees are also a vital area in our research. The 
main question here was to define their number, since a great number of 
family businesses were observed.  
In addition, we covered any other form of employment such as sub-
contractors, family members and home workers. Another section of high 
interest was that of subsidized employment. Overtime employment, 
working time arrangement and the reduction of employees (reasons and 
methods used) were also looked at our research. The latter is related to the 
performance of the company. Finally, section fourteen (14) was more 
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general, trying to get feedback on businesses, perspectives and attitudes 
towards labour flexibility. 
 
Fieldwork 
Fieldwork was conducted between August 2006 and February 2007. 
However, preparatory activities and pilot survey has taken into 
consideration (see Appendix 4.2 and Appendix 4.3). The research team 
decided to divide the fieldwork geographically into western and eastern 
Thessaly. West Thessaly consists of Karditsa and Trikala prefectures and 
survey took place in mid August and September of 2006. As mentioned, 
both of these regions are mainly agricultural and are considered less 
developed compared with the eastern part of Thessaly. Finally the whole 
survey was completed in February of 2007 (with a two-month delay), with 
a total of 226 questionnaires collected from businesses employing 3519 
people.  
 The respondent-representative was a senior person, typically the 
owner of the enterprise, or the general manager responsible for the day-to-
day responsibilities of the business (who has control and is probably a 
relative of the owner of the business) or the accountant who in most cases 
takes the place of the HR person. In large workplaces the respondent – as in 
many cases in WERS - was a senior employee dealing with the HR, 
employee relations or personnel matters. However, in the TERS survey, the 
majority of the respondents were the owners.  
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4.4 Descriptive Analysis of the Survey 
 This section presents the descriptive statistics of the survey 
providing tables which refer to the main issues of the sample. A number of 
variables were analysed in order to present the employment situation in 
Thessaly. Survey weights as mentioned have been used to calculate all 
percentages. The main variable which is used in almost all the tables is the 
workplace size. Significant differences were presented between small (less 
than 10 employees) and ―large‖ (more than 10 employees) workplaces  are 
reported below. Topics such as business legal entity, ownership and 
economic activity play a significant role in Greek employment relations, 
thus are reported here. Workforce data with demographic tables in the 
survey period are also studied; moreover a distribution of gender, age and 
ethnicity are included in this section.  
 
 Workplace Profiles 
 Details of the sample by workplace size are given in Table 4.4. The 
distribution of workplaces according to population is given in the first 
column, and the sample achieved in the second column. As the second 
column shows, a large majority of private sector workplaces in Thessaly 
population of firms are very small, 97% being under 10 employees in size.  
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Table 4.4: Distribution of the Survey Sample by Workplace Size and 
Family Interest 
 
How many employees  
are there in this workplace? 
Weighted  
base*(%) 
Sample(%) 
Employs  
family members 
No Yes 
1-5 179 (87) 73 (35) 36 64 
6-10 21 (10) 53 (25) 51 49 
11-19 2 (1) 34 (16) 56 44 
20-49 2 (1) 37 (18) 62 38 
50-99 0.2 (..) 3 (1) 33 67 
100+ 0.2 (..) 6 (3) 67 33 
Total 206 206 37 62 
Source: Figures are from the Thessaly Employment Relations Survey (TERS).  
Notes: Survey weights have been used to calculate the percentages of workplaces 
employing family members. The oversampling of larger workplaces in the TERS can be 
seen clearly here (e.g., workplaces of size 50+ form about 5% of the sample but only 0.4% 
of the provincial population). 
 
In the third column, 126 sampled workplaces are micro firms with 1-10 
workers; however, due to the large number of this business size it has been 
divided into two categories: (a) those up to five employees (1-5) in 73 
workplaces, and (b) those with fewer than 10 employees (6-10) in 53 
workplaces. The small-sized firms include 34 workplaces (11-19), while 37 
are medium-sized firms (20-49). Finally nine (9) workplaces with 50 or 
more employees are considered as ―large‖ scale firms. 
A further aspect of Table 4.4 is the glimpse it provides into another 
important Greek institution, the family firm. Our questionnaire has a 
question on family ownership as well as a section on ―family members‖ 
who are regularly employed. In Greece, when referring to family businesses 
most are SME‘s. The family firm is treated leniently by the Social Security 
authorities – as are small firms generally (since there is a backlog of tax 
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audits, the government permits small firms to pay lower taxes in order to 
speed up the process (OECD, 2001:33). As can be seen, the employment of 
family members is common in all workplaces, only falling off in the very 
largest, 100+, category of employees. 
      Turning next to Table 4.5, this depicts the ownership of the 
surveyed enterprises. Ownership is said to be a particularly important 
element in determining the nature of the employment relationship in SMEs 
(Marlow et al., 2002; and Forth et al., 2006). The WERS survey separates 
ownership into private or the public sector. However, as mentioned, in our 
case all businesses are private and almost all of them belong to the SMEs 
category.  
Table 4.5: Distribution of the Survey Sample by Formal Status and 
Workplace Size and Family Ownership 
Formal Status 
Percentage of  
Workplace Size 
Family 
Ownership (%) 
Small, < 11 11 or more All Firms 
Self-proprietorship  56 13 92 
General Partnership (OE) 27 23 95 
Special Partnership (EE) 6 5 49 
Societe Anonyme SA 9 49 62 
Limited by shares (Ltd-EPE) ** 4 93 
Other 2 6 94 
Total 126 203 87 
Sources: TERS 2006 -  
Notes: * Survey weights have been used to calculate all percentages.  
 
 
Table 4.5 also analyses the relationship between legal status and 
workplace size. It is obvious that the preferred legal form for small 
workplaces is self-proprietorship (56 percent of the workplaces) followed 
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by partnerships of which a significant number of these types of enterprises 
are owned by a family or relatives. The self-proprietorship, as a single 
business entity, is mainly owned and operated by a married couple and has 
a strong family character. The main features of the self proprietorship are 
(a) a less regulated set up procedure and (b) an informal structure since the 
owner is able to control every aspect of the business and act fast and 
effectively.  
 Moreover, in Greece there are some other characteristics that make 
self proprietorship so ―popular‖. These mainly relate to the centralized 
character of business owner behavior. Low levels of trust as well as an 
extensive desire for autonomy and control are the main behavior elements 
of a typical Greek sole proprietor. Makridakis et al. (1997) state that the 
Greek business owner ―wants to be involved in practically all decisions 
from the most important to the most trivial‖ adding that ―he does not trust 
his or her executives whom he believes cannot match his own abilities and 
knowledge of his firm and industry‖. In addition, family-owned and 
managed enterprises lag considerably behind in terms of professional 
management (Spanos et al., 2001; Georgas, 1993) which also indicates a 
centralised character with a strict hierarchy.  
 An important factor is weak state control mechanism in this type of 
businesses. Sole proprietors have realized their ―power‖ and take advantage 
of the disorganized and ineffective monitoring system noted earlier. Recall 
for example that 6 Labour Inspectors in the Larissa region are responsible 
for 6,000-7,000 workplaces. Within this framework, very small businesses 
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can ―avoid‖ taxes at any level. As a result, a strange phenomenon is 
observed in the Greek economy where the average income in 2008 for the 
self-employed (almost 10,000€) was lower than for wage employees and 
the retired (14,000€). (Kathimerini news, 2009). 
Table 4.6: Comparison of Industry Composition and Number of 
Employees 
Industry 
Weighted 
Percentages* 
Percentage of 
Employees 
Manufacturing 9 % 28  
Construction  6  11  
Wholesale and Retail  50  23  
Hotels and Restaurants  20 13  
Transport and Communication  2  0.01 
Financial and Other Business Services  3  0.5  
Education and Health 1  11 
Other Community and Personal 
Services  
10  7  
Total 100 100  
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: See Table 4.5 
Table 4.6 contains information about the identity of the composition 
of the industries in Thessaly as well as the number of employees per 
economic activity as implied by the survey. As can be seen, only about 9% 
of Thessaly's workplaces are categorised as manufacturing. However, they 
represent a significant percentage of the total workforce (28%). It is also 
obvious that the main characteristics are (a) the great representation of 
retail sector and hotels in Thessaly (70% of workplaces) with almost 23 
percent of the total employees, and (b) the smaller representation of 
financial and other business services (3% of workplaces)  
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Demographics and Equality Topics 
 The demographics of the workers in this survey are summarised . 
Initially Table 4.7 indicates the main types of employment by gender. 
Under full-time contracts - in the first three rows – we see remarkable 
differences between small and large workplaces. As mentioned in the 
context of the previous table, micro-enterprises enjoy high flexibility in 
their workplaces since only 46 % of their workforce are full-timers (under 
permanent contract).  
Table 4.7: Distribution of Employment Type and Gender 
Employment Category Small, < 11 11 or more 
Percentage of  
Workers in the  
Average Workplace: 
Full-time 46 66 
Full-time Male  22 38 
Full-time Female 23 28 
Part-time Male 3 5 
Part-time Female 2 6 
Temp-time Male 5 9 
Temp-time Female 1.5 3 
Sample numbers 126 80 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: See Table 4.5 
Table 4.8: Equal opportunity practices in workplaces 
Employee Group Small, < 11 11 or more 
Young (aged 20 or under) 3 2 
Young Male 3 1 
Young Female ** ** 
Old (aged 51 or over) 9 6 
Old Male 7 4 
Old Female 2 2 
Disabled ** ** 
EU Employees ** ** 
Non-EU Employees 3 3 
Sample Numbers 80 126 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: See Table 4.5 
**Figures were smaller than 1%. 
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Regarding gender in flexible employment types observe the low 
proportions of females in part-time and temporary work related to the 
European norm. Moreover, labour flexibility in Thessaly seems to be an 
issue for males. Generally, the most important factor that plays a significant 
role even in gender participation in the Greek labour market is the size of a 
company and the family ownership. 
Table 4.8 provides data on equal opportunity practices in the survey. 
We see the issue of poor youth employment opportunities starkly reflected 
in the first three rows in the percentage of young employed workers. It is 
clear that the figure is very low (less than 3 percent) in our survey. Even 
more, a combination of young and female seems to be a major problem in 
the Greek labour market because females present an extremely low 
percentage. This is one of the main puzzles of the overall performance of 
the Greek labour market. Greece still has one of the lowest female rates of 
employment among EU countries (Kanellopoulos et al., 2002) and also 
presents the third worst female unemployment rate out of 33 OECD 
countries.  
In the next rows, employees aged over 50 have a better performance 
(three times higher) compared with the young. However, their rates are still 
considered low. People aged over 50 face similar obstacles to the young 
remaining into the labour market, as another outsider group. In addition, 
female participation in the older-aged category is once again very low. 
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Micro enterprises employ higher percentages of older employees 
than the large enterprises while large businesses prefer prime age workers. 
In micro-enterprises employees have a personal relationship with the 
owner. Apart from family members, the other employees are considered 
―skillful‖ and trustworthy and thus end up continuing to work for the same 
owner until retirement.. Employees with disabilities are very few and not 
considered in this study. 
The employment of foreign employees in the Thessaly region is 
relatively low with only 2.6 percent, a rate lower than the official statistical 
data on Thessaly (LFS, 2007 and Kritikidis, 2008) with 3.9 percent. This 
difference in figures probably comes from a significant number of foreign 
employees who work in the agricultural sector which is excluded from our 
sample, as mentioned above. These non-EU workers mainly employed in 
the following economic activities: (a) manufacturing (including 
construction), (b) hotels and restaurants, and (c) wholesale and retail trade.  
Finally, Table 4.9 explores gender discrimination in Thessaly 
workplaces. A few employers (in the first row) consider that individual 
wage agreements are a privilege of males. Moreover, in the second row, the 
majority of respondents believe that females are capable of filling all the 
job positions in the firm.  
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Table 4.9: Gender Discrimination Topics 
Management Perceptions Small, < 11 11 or more 
Percentage 
Of workplaces: 
Individual wage agreements  
are privilege to male 
9 18 
Females can meet all the job  
positions in the firm 
62 69 
Obstacles to hiring females 59 58 
Main reasons 
mitigating 
against the  
female hiring 
High familial needs 29 23 
Maternity leave 6 1 
Both reasons 13 13 
Sample numbers 126 80 
 Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: See Table 4.5 
 
A contradiction is observed however, since in the next row, a high 
rate of businesses (almost 60 percent) admits that there are reasons that 
threaten the hiring of women. Atkinson (2000) argues that women‘s access 
to employment is significantly inhibited by the poor fit between 
arrangements for childcare and the way is work is organized. Indeed, high 
familial responsibilities stemming from their role as mothers constitute the 
main obstacle in their being hired. Moreover, Anagnostopoulos et al. 
(2003) having based a Greek business survey (700 enterprises) on 
vulnerable employment groups, noted that only 5 percent of employers 
have positive attitudes towards hiring reintegrated women into the labour 
market. Moreover, employers rated their lack of skills and their outdated 
knowledge due to their lengthy absence from the labour market, as well as 
age as secondary obstacles in the hiring of these people. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Topics related to the survey area as well as features which deal with 
the Greek business context are analysed. The Thessaly region is the third 
region in Greece - based on its population - with a high rate of its 
agricultural workforce transferring to the services sector in the last decade. 
A detailed description of the design and the conduct of the survey in this 
region are reported here. The TERS survey is based on the WERS 
methodology of the UK, and comparisons between them have been 
reported in detail. 
 A number of descriptive tables are also produced in this chapter in 
order to provide the backdrop to the current overall situation of 
employment in Thessaly. Topics related  to the business context, such 
as formal status, ownership, management and the economic activity of a 
business are of substantial importance in Greek employment relations. The 
family ownership of business and its operation dominate the structure of a 
typical Greek business. Demographics on the age, gender and ethnicity of 
the Thessaly labour force indicate low participation rates of females and 
poor performance of young people who constitute the outsiders in the 
Greek labour market.  
It is immediately apparent that workplace size plays a significant 
role in labour market regulation and flexibility issues. Different views 
between small and large businesses are observed in a number of contexts: 
(a) recruitment and dismissal procedures, (b) obligations related to 
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employment (working hours, collective agreements and minimum wages) 
and (c) atypical employment. 
More specifically, small businesses achieve flexibility through their 
family members. On the other hand, large businesses use temporary 
employment as the only source of flexibility. This is the main issue in the 
next chapter where regression analysis is provided with the basic argument 
being that strict labour regulation leads business owners to choose temp 
workers, which are less of a risk, and on which the laws might not be 
enforced. 
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Appendix 
 
4.1 Contacting Organisations for Permission of Population 
Below, we describe the steps followed on contacting organisations to obtain 
permission for the data in order to conduct the survey in the four 
prefectures:  
- Having access to the official national statistical database is always a 
reliable source of information. Consequently, our first visit was to the 
headquarters of the National Statistical Services of Greece (NSSG) in 
Athens. During our meetings, the officers provided information on the 
business dataset first. The registration of enterprises by the NSSG last 
took place in 2002 and the dataset includes the number of businesses 
per main activity and prefecture, the number of employees, 
employment by field and place of employment. Then, detailed 
information on the TERS needed to be discussed since ―no information 
related to individuals or companies are published or provided to any 
organisation or person by the NSSG‖ (law 2392/96). However in some 
cases for research purposes, public organisations have easier access to 
the statistical records with low rates or no rates at all. An attempt to 
take advantage of this process was made, since the TEI (University 
Polytechnic) of Larissa is a public higher educational institute. Two 
months after the meeting access to data was granted. However, the cost 
of retrieving this information was prohibitive.  
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- In the meantime, another attempt was made to collect data for our 
research by contacting the local offices of the Labour Inspectorate 
(SEPE) in every prefecture. After all, as we have seen, according to the 
law, each employer must submit annual copies of its personnel records 
to the local Labour Inspectorate-Dept. of Social Inspection. In addition, 
documents include all the data of the company, including the registered 
name of the company, postal address, type of organization, legal status, 
and geographical place of the enterprise as well as its taxation number. 
Thus, this body could provide data on all workplaces in Thessaly, with 
the advantage of focusing on enterprises with personnel, avoiding those 
without a workforce. Unfortunately, the officers informed us that there 
was no electronic database which could be provided to us - the process 
of implementing it was taking place at that time-. We had more success 
with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. By law (N2081/92), the 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the capitals of the prefectures 
are defined as public sector entities, membership of which is required 
by all engaged in ―commercial activities‖ whose central business 
address is within the region. During our first visit to the Larissa branch, 
officers informed us that their electronic database includes all the 
registered members-businesses (self proprietorship, general and private 
partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, foreign 
companies, etc.). The issue of rate and data confidentiality was also 
discussed in the meeting. In some cases access to confidential data files 
may be granted for research purposes. After 3 weeks a positive reply 
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was given. Two important facts played a significant role in their 
decision: (a) the survey was organised by a Higher Education Institute 
(TEI of Larissa) of the region and (b) employment is definitely an issue 
of high importance for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  
 
Finally, the last resource we considered was the ICAP database. This is 
the largest private consulting company which contains reliable data 
from its Greek directory of businesses. It covers the entire Greek 
domain (including our geographical area of our interest, Thessaly) for 
all sectors of economic activity. However, its main disadvantage was 
that the majority of businesses that had enrolled in this database had 
mainly more than 10 employees. However, as we will see below a 
supplementary sample was needed from this dataset. 
4.2 Preparation of Interview part 
 Once the questionnaire was finalized, the data collection could 
begin. However, a number of preparatory activities were advised prior to 
the commencement of fieldwork. Thus, in order to conduct the TERS 
survey, one of the main tasks was to recruit interviewers who were 
motivated and able to assist us. Finally, since the fieldwork would be 
conducted in the Thessaly region, it was decided that interviewers 
(graduates or masters students) would be selected from the two Higher 
Education Institutes of the region, the TEI of Larissa and the University of 
Thessaly. In total, 10 interviewers were selected out of 23 candidates. Next, 
a three-day training seminar was organised. The seminar was divided into 3 
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sessions: (a) the first session dealt with the theoretical part of flexible forms 
of employment: (b) the next explained the questionnaire; and (c) and the 
third the interview methodology.  
Sampling and weighting procedures and budget restrictions 
described for the TERS survey led us to the selection of an initial sample of 
293 companies, each of which obtained a unique workplace identifier from 
W1 to W293. The workplace identifier was used to ensure the anonymity of 
these businesses. In addition, a letter was included after the number in each 
code. The letter implied the initial letter of the four cities that the 
questionnaire came from. Moreover, the use of the reserve sample, took 
place, when a company from the initial sample was no longer in operation, 
had changed economic activity or if an owner had refused to fill in a 
questionnaire. In these cases, a corresponding business from the reserve 
sample was chosen to replace in a questionnaire. These businesses were 
identified as R1 to R293 while the coding kept the same characteristics. To 
keep both samples random number generators were used. In the case that 
the use of the reserve sample was not used to replace a random 
questionnaire then this questionnaire was considered as a casualty of the 
sampling. 
4.3 Pilot Survey 
One of the main preparatory activities prior to conducting the 
fieldwork was to conduct a pilot survey and test the questionnaire. 20 pilot 
face-to-face interviews took place for one week in July 2006. The 
businesses were chosen randomly. However, they covered all the economic 
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sectors mentioned above. After summarizing the results of the interviews 
and discussing them with some respondents, we decided to further modify 
certain questions in order to get the necessary information from the 
businesses. Once these modifications we made, the main survey could 
begin. 
Following these interviews the questionnaire was evaluated. An 
important issue to be addressed was avoiding the distortion of data. The 
most common cause is the collection of data from a person who is not the 
most suitable person to be interviewed. For example, a person who is just 
an employee and not the owner or one of the managers of the enterprise is 
interviewed mainly because the owner/manager has no available time and 
has someone else interviewed. In this case, a partly mistaken picture of 
reality may be presented.  
 Moreover, questions including the Likert scale seemed difficult to 
reply to. Furthermore, some respondents did not have enough knowledge 
on certain flexible forms of employment. For instance, some did not know 
what short time was, thus an effort to be less formal by providing a formal 
definition of terms. Other employers could not separate, for example fixed 
term contracts from subcontracting in temporary employment. Furthermore, 
questions in section (5) concerning pay determination and wage agreements 
were difficult for respondents to reply to or were not received in a welcome 
manner.  
 The ignorance of employers/managers about the different categories 
of wage agreements may exist for two reasons. First of all, the owner of the 
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company has no knowledge of the labour legislation and an external 
consultant (accountant or lawyer) advises him or, secondly, the owner of 
the company does not keep him/herself updated on labour law and is afraid 
of getting involved with these issues.  
 In addition some practical concerns arose from the pilot interviews. 
These included:  
(a) Proper attention did not seem to be given to the questions and answers 
provided when correspondents received a blank questionnaire to fill out. 
Some thought they were helping the interviewer by not asking for 
clarification while others simply moved to other questions without giving 
proper attention to their answers  
(b) An interview was more likely to be successful (questionnaire was 
completed) when there was contact in advance and the interview with the 
owner/manager/accountant of the businesses had been arranged before 
visiting the company. Trying to conduct the interview without arranging 
ahead of time resulted in an increased possibility of refusal.  
(c) A negative factor was that some employers were suspicious and hesitant 
to provide information in the interviews that they thought would be spread 
to the local community. This possibly created obstacles in collecting 
questionnaires and resulted in an increase in the number of non-
respondents. 
(d) Finally the size of the workplace seemed to be a barrier in conducting 
interviews. It was difficult for employers of small workplaces to answering 
questionnaires due to the pressures of work. On the other hand, in large 
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workplaces, we had difficulties reaching the respondent (mainly HR person 
or accountant) due to procedures with secretaries preventing direct contact. 
 Finally, after determining the sample, the last task was to set up the 
steps of communication with these companies. The fact that the telephone 
number was provided by the database from the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry was very helpful. In some cases telephone directories were also 
used where telephone numbers were not available from the sample. Thus, 
the majority of enterprises selected (sample) were screened through 
telephone communication by the interviewers (a) to check whether the firm 
was in existence, (b) to identify the name of the appropriate management 
respondent and (c) to arrange an appointment for the interview. 
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4.4 Questionnaire (Annotated) 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TEMPORARY AND 
FAMILY EMPLOYMENT  
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Greek labour market is performing badly, as observed in 
previous chapters, which gives urgency to the search for causes. A 
comparative picture for labour market indicators among OECD countries is 
also given in a number of figures in Chapter 3. Here, based on my TERS 
survey introduced in Chapter 4, I will try to examine whether the rigidities 
in the Greek labour market create obstacles for employment. The aim of 
this chapter is to cast light on the issues using multivariate analysis. 
The role of labour regulation in protecting insiders at the expense of 
outsiders is our main topic in this chapter since Greece provides a good 
case of heavy regulation. Section 5.2 will discuss determinants of 
temporary work among the firms in Thessaly. Temporary work is 
important, as we will see, because it – together with family employment – 
is the main avenue of labour flexibility open to Greek businesses. In 
concentrating on temporary work in Greece, I follow in the footsteps of 
Voudouris (2004:136) who studied temporary and subcontracting work in 
75 large mainly manufacturing companies and Mihail (2003:473) who 
studied 30 large organisations, including the public sector. My focus will 
be on the legal constraints – particularly the national wage agreements and 
the employment protection legislation (EPL) – that businesses face, and I 
hypothesise that temporary work is resorted to when these regulatory 
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constraints bite, other things being equal. In other words, ―poor‖ firms, 
which cannot afford the national wage rates or the EPL standards, attempt 
to escape these standards by employing temps. Alternatively, such firms 
may aim to employ more family workers, and I will test this hypothesis as 
well. 
Then, I move to the section 5.3 which provides some descriptive 
statistics on temp, family and other forms of flexible work, as well as the 
regulatory environment which will be examined in the regressions later. 
Then, the main section (5.4) of the chapter focuses, first, on the empirical 
analysis of temporary employment. Then, second, we analyse family 
employment which is of significant importance since this is the other main 
escape route in Greece. No studies on this type of employment have been 
made; consequently mine is a first attempt to provide a realistic view of 
family employment in Greece.  
 
5.2 Determinants of Temporary and Family Worker Hiring  
The labour market regulation floors and the temporary/family 
employment 
 Labour regulation can be thought of as putting floors under wages 
and working conditions. These floors take many forms (Addison and 
Teixeira, 2003, and Siebert 2007, reviews; see also Feldmann 2009, 
Mufells and Luijkx 2008 and Kahn, 2010), but, in brief, the main floor 
under wages is provided by corporatist extended collective agreements. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2, Greece has had this type of system since the 
dictator Metaxas in the 1930s subsidised and subordinated the trade unions 
(Kritsantonis 1998:514; on recent ―neo-corporatism see Sotiropoulos, 
2004:273). The system takes the form of a national general agreement 
which is supplemented by sectoral (industry) extended collective 
agreements.  
This type of centralised minimum wage-setting is important 
because it can act to prevent wages for low skilled workers – the unskilled 
and the long-term unemployed - flexing downwards if and when working 
conditions floors are raised. Therefore, one aim of this chapter is to 
ascertain to what proportion of workers in our sample of companies are 
paid the national and/or sectoral minimum wages. (In addition to objective 
information on pay rates, I also surveyed business views on the importance 
of national and sectoral agreements, but there were problems of missing 
values here due to difficulties of defining importance). 
 As regards floors under working conditions, these are many, 
including rules for compensation for individual and collective dismissals 
(EPL), for licensing overtime and shift-work, and for approving temporary 
and part-time contracts. The monitor of these rules is intended to be the 
local officials of the three labour management organisations; Labour 
Inspectorate, Social Security Organisation and the Public Employment 
Service, as discussed in Chapter 2. Below, we will test for the effects of the 
Labour Inspectorate in pushing up working conditions floors.  
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The idea of the link between firms‘ temporary contract decisions and 
labour regulation in the form of EPL can be gained from international data 
as shown in Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1: The Strong Link between Temporary Work and EPL 
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Here, we plot OECD countries‘ temporary worker proportions against the 
OECD indicator of their strictness of EPL. As can be seen, there is a strong 
positive correlation, 0.677. This picture is a simple one, and as noted by 
Addison and Teixeira (2003), it is not so clear when a multivariate analysis 
is applied (e.g., by the OECD 1999). However, in recent work by Kahn 
(2007, 2010b), the link re-appears (though it is not so clear when country-
specific time-trends are included). However, the picture remains useful as a 
motivator for my hypothesis. 
 This correlation exactly fits Voudouris‘s explanation for the high 
incidence of temp work in Greece, namely, that it is a way to avoid EPL 
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floors. It should be noted that the majority of temps are unskilled in the 
Thessaly case where of the 64 firms using temps in our sample of 206, only 
8 use professional/managerial/technical workers in this role. For the 
unskilled worker, a temporary job is a precarious job, but this route into 
work is likely to be all that is available to the young workers, and the long-
term unemployed. At the aggregate level, therefore, Greece indicates 
clearly the possibility that laws designed to improve employment security, 
when combined with wage rigidity, in fact do the reverse for unskilled 
outsider groups. Let us now consider whether our detailed survey results 
provide any basis for this gloomy view. 
 
 
The Model and the Hypothesis 
 We now consider the determinants of temporary work and family 
work among our sample, since, as we have seen, these avenues of 
flexibility are the major ones open to labour market participants. For 
temporary work, our measure is the percentage of the workplace‘s 
workforce covered by fixed-term, subsidised and agency-work contracts. 
For family work, our measure is the proportion of family workers 
employed. A problem is that many firms do not employ temps or family 
workers at all. To circumvent this censoring problem, the estimation is 
carried out by means of a Tobit procedure (Enami and Mullahy 2008, 
review; see Batt 2002 for an application). A less demanding method which 
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we use is to construct a dummy for whether an organisation employs any 
temps (or family workers) or not, and use a probit method. 
 Our hypothesis is that temporary and family work is resorted to 
when regulatory constraints concerning wage and working conditions 
floors bite (see Kahn 2007), other things being equal. The legal aspect is 
analysed informally in Mihail (2003:484), whose questionnaire study of 30 
large employers finds that employers do not feel particularly constrained 
by the laws, nor helped by them. Voudouris (2004), for her part, does not 
consider this aspect. We therefore provide here a first formal treatment for 
Greece. Basically, our test is based on the idea that if a firm feels 
constrained by EPL, or by national wage agreements, it is more likely to 
adopt flexible forms of employment which provide an escape route. 
 Our legal variables under the heading of wage floors are, first, a 
dummy (minimum) for whether the firm pays a majority below the 
minimum wage as set by the National General Collective Agreement 
(NGCA). While paying below is strictly speaking illegal, it is evident that 
―grey‖ economy businesses (see Table 5.10) do avoid the law. This 
variable (see Table 5.9) indicates a ―poor‖ firm, and should be positively 
linked to temp and family worker employment since such marginal firms 
are always at the risk of changes in circumstance, for example, declines in 
product demand, or increases in legal requirements. A sensible way to 
reduce this risk is to employ workers who can be easily dismissed, that is, 
temps or family workers. 
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 An alternative, second, variable is a dummy (cbmaj) for whether 
the business claims to pay a majority of its workers according to the 
National or Sectoral collective agreements. This variable appears to work 
in the opposite direction to the minimum wage variable (in fact, the 
correlation between the two is negative), perhaps since ―rich‖ firms are 
able to pay a majority of their workers according to the collective 
agreements. To the extent that rich firms are less at risk if market 
conditions deteriorate, they will be under less pressure to employ temps 
and/or family workers. We therefore include both minimum and cbmaj as 
alternative wage floor determinants, leaving their sign to be empirically 
determined. 
 Under the heading of working conditions floors we have three 
variables. First, whether the management has taken legal employment 
relations advice. We predict a positive sign for temporary employment 
here, on the argument that taking legal advice is a necessary prerequisite 
for clearing the way for drawing up and/or renewing temp contracts. (This 
influence should presumably be less strong for employment of family 
workers which come outside the power of the Labour Inspectorate.) A 
second variable is the manager‘s opinion of the Labour Inspectorate, 
specifically whether he/she considers the Labour Inspectorate no obstacle 
for employing temps, which should drive up the demand for temps, and 
hence enter positively in the equation. A third variable is whether the 
manager considers that temps have low EPL, which we expect to have a 
positive link with temp employment, since this variable should directly 
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pick up whether temps are being hired to provide the flexibility which EPL 
denies. We include all these variables in the family worker equation as 
well, even though the Labour Inspectorate has no direct interest in whether 
a business uses family workers. My reasoning here is that a business which 
feels constrained by the Labour Inspectorate might nevertheless feel it is 
safer to employ family workers. 
 
 Our estimating equation is then as follows: 
 temp = α + legal.β + controls.γ + ε 
where temp is the measure of temporary worker employment; legal is a 
vector of the five our legal variables, two relating to wage floors, and three 
to working conditions as discussed above; controls is a vector of controls 
which we discuss next; ε is the error term. A similar equation can be drawn 
up for family worker employment: 
family = α + legal.β + controls.γ + ε 
where family is the measure of family worker employment. 
 
The Controls  
 Turning to the controls, here we will follow mainly Voudrouris 
(2004), who builds on the classic Abraham and Taylor (1996) 
specification. Our controls will be as follows:  
- Controls for variability of demand which obviously increases the use of 
temps. This aspect relates to the ―buffering‖ role of temps (and perhaps 
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family workers). Our variables under this heading will include an 
industry dummy for retailing/services, a sector which faces large 
changes both annually and weekly and changes which must be hard to 
cater for without a buffer. A counteracting factor here might be capital 
intensity which could link positively with the demand for temps – as a 
way of preventing capital being idle (Voudouris‘s (2004) Hypothesis 
5). Retailing is not capital-intensive. Hires and redundancies over the 
period (we measure the past two years) might also indicate demand 
variability. Hence we include both these controls as well 
- Controls for the specific training requirements of the job. The payoff to 
specific training of temps and family workers is low, so high training 
requirements should mean fewer such workers. Training requirements 
can be picked up by variables for the use of part-timers, and young and 
old workers, all of whom presumably have less training. On this 
argument, high proportions of young, old and part-time workers should 
all link positively to temp and family worker use. On the other hand, 
these groups, particularly part-timers, are to some extent substitutes for 
temps and family workers, which could give rise to a negative 
coefficient – we will see. Low paid workers are also likely to have less 
training, which gives an additional reason for the majority low-paid 
dummy (minimum) linking positively with temps. 
- Controls for difficulties monitoring the job, for ―know-how‖, and for 
complex interactions with other people doing the work. These variables 
have been put forward by Voudouris (2004) as reducing the demand for 
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temps. To some extent these considerations conflict with the training 
variable for old workers – while older workers are not likely to be 
trained, many obviously have know-how. Hence the old worker 
variable could indicate task/monitoring complexity and be negatively 
associated with the demand for temps. Low-paid workers should also 
have less complex and easy-to-monitor tasks, reinforcing the positive 
link between this variable and temp demand. A further variable that 
comes under this heading is the commitment of the workforce, for 
which we have the manager‘s assessment. We would expect a highly 
committed workforce to go with fewer temps (see below for a related 
argument about manager trust in the workforce). 
- A control for specific, non-routine tasks, for example, the technical 
worker on a special project. Our variable here is whether the firm uses 
any non-routine sub-contracting ―(routine‖ being defined as cleaning, 
security, catering and maintenance). 
- We also control for firm size on the argument that larger firms will face a 
greater variety of problems, and thus will need more solutions, of 
which temporary workers will be one. For family workers, large firms 
must necessarily employ a smaller proportion, since families are of a 
limited size. Hence we would expect large firms automatically to 
employ a smaller family worker proportion. - Manager attitudes might 
also be important. For example, managers offering employees long-
term employment might be less likely to need flexible employees such 
as temps. Alternatively, they might be more likely to take on temps so 
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as to shield their core employees. Managers‘ trust in their workforce, as 
shown be beliefs about worker commitment should perhaps be linked 
to superior management abilities, and hence a richer firm with less need 
to worry about the consequences of the business cycle, and less need to 
hire temps/family workers to give flexibility. 
- A final control we add is whether the firm has increased part-time or non-
routine sub-contract work over the past 5 years. This variable can be 
thought of as indicating a management desire for change, or else a 
change in the firm‘s circumstances, both of which might link to 
employing more temps, and so should reasonably be held constant 
when judging the legal environment variables. 
Other Determinants 
 
In addition to the main regressions explaining temporary and family work, 
it is worth considering the determinants of other important variables, 
including whether firms pay wages at or below the minimum, and whether 
they observe the national and sectoral collective agreements. We have 
argued above that these variables indicate whether a firm is rich or poor, 
and so it is important to assess this argument. In particular, we would 
expect the richer firms to be larger and expanding (more hires, fewer 
redundancies) 
 Further regressions concern our working conditions floors 
variables, specifically, whether a manager has taken ER advice, whether 
he/she believes the Labour Inspectorate to be an obstacle to temp 
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employment, and whether he/she appreciates the advantages of temp 
workers having low EPL rights. Since we believe these legal variables have 
a part to play in the type of flexibility a business takes up, it is worth 
considering their determinants. In particular, we would expect the poorer 
firms (e.g., with a majority paid below the minimum) both to be nervous 
about the Labour Inspectorate, and to need temps to avoid EPL. Auxiliary 
regressions exploring these dimensions in detail are given in the Appendix, 
but in the text we will comment on these underlying results. Below, we test 
whether these expectations are borne out.  
5.3 The Business Environment 
 This section presents basic descriptive statistics from the TERS 
survey for the variables which will be used in the regressions later. Survey 
weights have been also used to calculate all percentages. Factors such as 
legal advice, wage agreements, minimum wages as well as labour 
management organisations (Labour Inspectorate, Public Employment 
Services) which enforce these laws and contribute to the strictness of 
Greek labour framework are examined.  
 
Management Perceptions of Employees 
 We start our analysis with the managers‘ perceptions/expectations 
as revealed by the TERS. Greek managers have been accused 
(Krtisantonis, 1998, 511) of having an ―autocratic and authoritarian‖ style, 
and our Table 5.1 bears on this question by drawing a comparison with the 
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same question for the small workplaces in the 1998 WERS. As can be 
seen, Greek managers, particularly in small firms, tend to be suspicious of 
their workers. No less than 30% of managers in small firms in Thessaly 
strongly believe that their workers will sometimes take unfair advantage of 
them. The corresponding UK figure is only 5%, and so many Greek 
managers do appear to feel concerned about the employment ―atmosphere‖ 
in their businesses. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 perform a similar exercise with two other 
important aspects of manager perceptions. Table 5.2 considers beliefs 
regarding employment security, an area which definitely relates to EPL 
legislation. Managers in Thessaly are more likely than in the UK to 
consider that their organisation offers long-term employment. The strict 
Greek EPL laws -analysed in chapter 2 - can be regarded as a success, then, 
in that they have been internalised by managers. Table 5.3 takes up the 
issue of worker commitment to the organisation, which might be thought of 
as indicative of modern ―high commitment‖ management. Here we see that 
almost one third of the Greek managers (29%) do not believe in the 
commitment of their workers in firm‘s values, compared to only 17% in 
the UK. This result indicates once again some signs of manager‘s 
suspiciousness. These tables in general suggest that the environment of 
Greek business is not a happy one. 
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Table 5.1: Management perceptions – workers take advantage? 
(Percent of Workplaces) 
 
Given the chance, employees at  
our workplace sometimes take  
unfair advantage of management 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
WERS, small 
workplaces, 
< 20 
Strongly agree 30% 18% 5% 
Agree 14 21 25 
Neither agree nor disagree 19 26 11 
Disagree 16 26 45 
Strongly disagree 20 9 14 
Total 100 100 100 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are calculated all percentages. 
The WERS 1998 provides a comparable question to the TERS, but only covers 
workplaces down to size 10, so the small category covers the 10-20 employee group.  
Table 5.2: Management belief that organization offers long-term 
employment?  (Percent of Workplaces) 
 
Employees are led to expect  
long-term employment  
in this organization 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
WERS, small 
workplaces, 
< 20 
Strongly agree 51 44 25 
Agree 23 40 56 
Neither agree nor disagree 13 12 10 
Disagree 4 3 7 
Strongly disagree 8 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: See Table 5.1.  
Table 5.3: Management perception-workers committed to the 
organization’s values?  (Percent of Workplaces) 
 
Employees here are fully 
committed to the values 
of the organization 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
WERS, small 
workplaces, 
< 20 
Strongly agree 45 26 23 
Agree 30 45 60 
Neither agree nor disagree 24 28 13 
Disagree 1 1 4 
Strongly disagree 1 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: See Table 5.1.  
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Flexible Employment 
Table 5.4 sets out basic data on various aspects of flexible work, 
focusing on numerical flexibility. This type of flexibility is achieved with 
working arrangements such as part-time, short-time, temporary time (fixed-
term contracts, seasonal, etc.), outsourcing, homework, telework (Michie et 
al., 2001), all of which are covered in the TERS. 
Table 5.4: Flexible employment 
 
 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
WERS 
Small, 
< 20 
20 or 
more 
Percentage  
of workers in 
the average 
workplace: 
Part-time employment ‡ 5 11 33 31 
Temporary (seasonal,  
fixed-term, agency)  
employment 
7 12 6.2 7.6 
Family employment 34 5 NA NA 
Working any overtime‡‡ 10 17 12 28 
Percentage 
of 
workplaces: 
Family-owned* 88 71 54* 53* 
with any shift-work 3 9 14 34 
changing to temps  
from perms 
4 8 2.9 8.0 
Increasing part-timers  
over last 5 yrs 
4 11 21.9 37.8 
Sample numbers 126 80   
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are calculated all percentages. 
‡ Part-time is defined when employees work shorter than the normal hours (40 hrs) per 
week  
‡‡ The overtime figures are approximate, interpolated from categorical answers. 
Note the WERS 1998 figures refer to a sample which excluded public limited companies 
which were not asked the family ownership question (whether a single individual or  
family has a controlling interest over 51% ownership over this company) 
 
When looking at the Table 5.4 it is evident that the part-time 
percentage is low in Thessaly – comparable figures for the UK are over 
30%. This is a general trend overall in Greece since it has one of the lowest 
proportions of part time workers in the European Union. This reflects the 
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―illegality‖ of part-time work in Greece as mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.5). The next row shows the temporary/agency category which, will be 
analysed extensively below. Note that the agency worker component of 
this group is near-zero, since agency workers are strongly criticised by 
Greek unions as also noted in Chapter 2 (sec 2.5) 
Family employment is considered in two rows of the Table 5.4. The 
third row gives family workers as a proportion of the total, and this figure 
is high, 34%, for the small Greek businesses, but only 5% for the larger 
ones. We analyse this variable below. The row below gives the figure for 
the proportion of family-owned businesses in the sample, and this figure is 
high as can be seen – 88% (71%) for the businesses employing < 11 (11 or 
more). The corresponding UK figure is lower, 53-54% (though family 
businesses are important in the UK too). 
The next rows give further flexibility avenues. Starting with 
overtime and shift work, we see that employers in small Greek firms tend 
to work some overtime and shift-work, but less than in the more flexible 
UK. (Official figures for overtime and shift-work would be lower since 
both need Labour Inspectorate approval – see Chapter 2). The final rows 
give a view of changes, firstly to temporary from permanent contracts. 
Here we see similar trends to the UK, with larger workplaces more 
interested in this move. Secondly, we see some move towards part-time 
work in but this move is much smaller than has occurred in the UK, as 
might be expected given the greater importance of part-time work in the 
UK. 
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The general impression we would carry away from above table is 
that Greece has flexibility in temporary and family work. Due to obstacles 
put in place by Greek law on most aspects of flexibility – even temporary 
worker categories such as agency work - the temporary and family worker 
avenue seems the only one open. It is true that, enterprises with more than 
10 employees have a low percentage of family members (5%). However, 
this figure is twice as high in percentages in part-time and temporary 
contracts. It seems that micro-enterprises use labour flexibility through the 
―hiring‖ of family members. On the other hand, large workplaces do not 
have the luxury of having many family members and introduce flexibility 
through part/temporary employment. 
Table 5.5: Subcontracting 
 
 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
Percentage 
of workplaces 
with 
subcontracting 
 
Legal subcontracting  
(accountant + lawyer) 
75 74 
Basic subcontracting  
(cleaning, security,  
catering, maintenance) 
29 55 
Non-routine subcontracting 
(printing, payroll, training,  
recruitment etc.)  
37 70 
Total subcontracting 47 76 
Reasons for 
contracted out 
these services 
Cost savings 26 28 
Improved service 56 58 
Greater flexibility 15 32 
Needs that 
subcontracting 
covers in the 
enterprise 
Permanent 52 38 
Temporary 6 8 
Both permanent and  
temporary 
20 33 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: See Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.5 indicates on the extent of subcontracting which is 
relevant to investigation of flexibility, since buying in services is an 
alternative to hiring workers. ―Legal‖ subcontracting is of significant 
importance to the majority of businesses (75% even of small companies 
hire an accountant or lawyer) and this will also be analysed in table 5.6. As 
expected, basic and non-routine forms of subcontracting in rows 2 and 3 
have less importance for small businesses since these businesses have a 
simple structure. At the same time, non-routine subcontracting is extensive 
(37% of small companies and 70% of large). As can be seen, the most 
popular reason (56-58%) for contracting out was because the 
subcontractors offered a better service. However, a substantial minority 
(15-32%) explicitly used subcontractors for greater flexibility. Moreover, 
high proportions of employers (between 38 and 52%) believe that 
permanent workers would be hired if subcontracting was not used in their 
workplaces. In our regressions for temp/family worker hiring below, we 
make allowance for such subcontracting. 
 
Legal Issues 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present the sources of advice, and employee relations 
issues covered, giving some idea of the pressure of labour regulation. From 
table 5.6 we can say that, in general, a high percentage of Thessaly 
workplaces seek advice on employee relations, particularly from external 
lawyers and accountants. Businesses feel under pressure since, apart from 
labour laws, ministerial decisions, decrees and fiats are continually being 
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issued. Under these circumstances, a highly regulated labour framework is 
made more complicated, and businesses face obstacles in following all 
these legal rules. As noted above in Chapter 2, the owner of a typical Greek 
business has to spend many working hours in order to collect information 
related to employee relations to meet the requirements of the law applied 
and to deal with the labour management organisations (Labour 
Inspectorate, Public Employment Services, Social Security Organisation). 
In an effort to categorize the sources of advice– following our referral to 
external private resources above - we focus now on public labour 
management organisations. It is basically through these bodies, the Labour 
Inspectorate, Public Employment Services (PES) and the Social Insurance 
Institute the labour laws are enforced in all businesses. We see that few 
companies from the small enterprise group deal with labour management 
organisations; this difference however is to be expected. Larger workplaces 
are especially likely to consult the Labour Inspector (58%) the main body 
which conducts monitoring and control activities with regard to labour 
issues. 
 Table 5.6 suggests that micro-enterprises (<11 workers) try to avoid 
or limit any ―collaboration‖ with Public Labour Management 
Organizations while on the other hand, small and medium enterprises 
present much higher rates of communication. More specifically, if we rate 
these organizations according to business ―fear‖, we could say that the 
Labour Inspectorate is the most feared body since it can apply a variety of 
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penalties. Following, the Social Insurance Institute is less fearsome since it 
is only the collector of tax contributions.  
Table 5.6: Sources of Advice on Employee Relations 
(Percent of Workplaces)  
 
Sources on Advice on 
Employee Relations 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
WERS 1998- advice 
over past 12 months‡ 
   
Small, 
< 20 
20 or 
more 
Accountant 62 69 9 8 
Lawyer 27 52 17 34 
Management Consultants 4 17 2 6 
Labour Inspectorate 20 58 NA NA 
Public Employment Services  37 49 NA NA 
Social Insurance Institute 24 44 NA NA 
Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry 
21 19 NA NA 
Employers‘ Association 5 12 2 6 
Advisory and Conciliation 
Service 
* * 12 24 
No advice 21 15 58 41 
Sample numbers 126 80 252 1454 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are calculated all percentages.  
Columns can sum to over 100%, since more than one source of advice may be 
used.  
‡ The WERS 1998 provides a comparable question to the TERS, but only covers 
workplaces down to size 10, so the small category covers the 10-20 employee 
group.  
 
 Finally the PES is least feared since its services are limited to that 
of a controlling and monitoring mechanism body. Micro-enterprise 
respondents replies are consistent with this view, since they present very 
low rates of contact with the Labour Inspectorate and the Social Security 
Organisation (between 20 and 24 percent) while the larger-scaled 
businesses have much higher rates. To generalize the table we see that very 
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few companies have not sought labour advice and this indicates that an 
employer is constrained by the labour law.  
 
Table 5.7: Employee Relations Issues for which Advice Given 
(Percent of Workplaces) 
 
Issues for which 
advice sought 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
WERS 1998- issues 
raised with ACAS‡ 
   
Small, 
< 20 
20 
or more 
National & Sectoral  
Agreements 
26 53 
Does not  
apply 
Does  
not apply 
Disciplinary action 7 19 30 11 
Dismissal/redundancy 
compensation 
20 54 49 32 
Labour Taxes 34 56   
Temp Worker 
Employment 
23 30 
Does  
not apply 
Does  
not apply 
Overtime working hrs 11 26 
Does  
not apply 
Does  
not apply 
Sample numbers 126 80 19 437 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are calculated all percentages.  
Columns can sum to over 100%, since more than one issue may be considered. 
‡ The WERS 1998 considers only the sub-sample of issues raised with the 
Advisory and conciliation service (ACAS).  
 
 As for the issues raised, Table 5.7 shows that significant 
percentages of larger workplaces seek advice on a wide range of legal 
issues, such as labour taxes (56% of workplaces), national/sectoral 
collective agreement (53%) and dismissals/redundancies (54%). The 
pictures in the above tables show that bigger businesses are more interested 
in getting the necessary information on these issues, apparently in order to 
obey the law. In general, as can be seen, workplaces in Thessaly take far 
more advice than those in the WERS, particularly from lawyers and 
accountants. This difference is to be expected if Greek laws bite. We will 
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test whether variables constructed from these data have any effects in the 
regressions below.  
 
The pictures in the above tables show that bigger businesses are 
more interested in getting the necessary information on these issues, 
apparently in order to obey the law. In general, as can be seen, workplaces 
in Thessaly take far more advice than those in the WERS, particularly from 
lawyers and accountants. This difference is to be expected if Greek laws 
bite. We will test whether variables constructed from these data have any 
effects in the regressions below.  
 
Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 focus on the two main legal areas, the 
national/sectoral wage agreement system, and the Labour Inspectorate 
system. These areas correspond broadly to the wage floors – maintained by 
the national wage agreement(s) - and the working conditions floors – 
maintained by the Labour Inspectorate, referred to above. From Table 5.8 
we see that national/sectoral wage agreements are apparently important for 
Thessaly workplaces, and manager-set or individual wage agreements are 
correspondingly less important. As can be seen from the top row, the 
workplaces claim a high coverage (59% to 82%) of collective bargaining 
via the sectoral wage agreements and the nationally set minimum wage.  
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Table 5.8: Pay determination 
(Percent of Workplaces) 
 
 
Small, < 
11 
11 or 
more 
WERS 
2004, 
private 
sector‡ 
Most important 
level of pay 
determination  
for largest  
occupational group: 
Mainly national  
sectoral wage  
agreements‡‡ 
59 82 11 
Mainly manager-set/ 
individual wage 
agreements 
38 18 89 
Rarely pays more than sectoral wage  
agreement to largest occupational group  
23 27 NA 
Pay of majority at or below nationally  
agreed minimum wage†† 
64 31 17 
Managers support unions† 7 11 16 
Union Density Approximately 
zero 
8 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are calculated all percentages.  
‡ Two-way classification of level of pay determination in WERS is based on Kersley 
et al., 2006, p 20. 
‡‡ More than 50% of workers covered by national or sectoral wage agreements 
† Strongly agree or agree that unions help improve workplace performance.  
†† For the TERS the figure is €11,000/year (= minimum wage + employer taxes); for 
the WERS it is £5/hour (the adult minimum was £4.50 until Oct 2004 when it 
changed to £4.85). 
 
Table 5.9: Wage Distribution of Employees (in percentages) 
Gross wage categories‡ 
(in 2006 Euros per year) 
Small, < 11 11 or more 
11,000 (paid at or below the  
nationally agreed minimum wage) 
64% 36% 
11,001 – 13,500  25 42 
13,501 – 18,000 7 17 
18,001 – 23,000 * 1.5 
23,001 – 30,000 1.3 1.5 
More than 30,000 1.5 * 
Sample numbers 112 78 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are calculated all percentages. 
‡Figures are in Euros per year including employee social security  
contributions (16%)  
*Figures were smaller than 1%. 
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However, contradicting this picture is the high proportion of 
businesses which pay at or below the collectively agreed wage. More detail 
is given in Table 5.9, which tabulates the answers of managers in the 
sample to what proportion of their workforce falls in different pay 
categories. The table shows that on average 64% of workers in small 
businesses were paid at or below 11,000€ annually which is the lowest rate 
set by the national agreement in 2006. The figure was lower, 36%, in larger 
workplaces as might be expected. The rest of the distribution is close to 
11,000€, with 90% (78%) of workers in small firms (11 or more) earning 
less than 13,500€. Thus, the minimum wage in Greece seems very high, 
and can only be possible for this system to continue because the minimum 
is not in fact paid, at least in provincial labour markets such as Thessaly. 
The Greek minimum wage thus seems to be widely ignored in practice. 
 
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, the employees‘ social security 
contribution (16%) plus the employers‘ (28%) comes to 4,800€ (or 44% of 
11,000€) on a minimum wage worker. This burden acts as an incentive for 
employers to avoid tax, either by hiring a family worker, or paying illegally 
below the minimum – which is easier to do if the worker is a temp or 
family worker, since these workers are less likely to complain. The large 
percentage of workers shown at or below the minimum in Table 5.9 points 
to underpayment especially among the smaller businesses.  
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Table 5.10: Finding “Grey” Employers 
 
 
Majority covered 
by NGCA or NSCA 
 No Yes Total 
Paying all workers 
 <= 11,000€ 
45 94 139 
Paying some workers 
over 11,000€ 
16 51 67 
Total 61 145 206 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Note: Unweighted data are presented, for simplicity. The 
―grey‖ category comprises the 45 workplaces in the top left corner who state that the 
majority of their workforce is not covered by the NGCA or NSCA, which is only 
lawful in general if the uncovered workers have individual agreements paying more 
than the NGCA or NSCA – yet these firms also state that all their workers are paid at 
or less than 11,000€ (the normal NGCA/NSCA minimum). 
 
More light on this ―grey market‖ issue is given in Table 5.10 which 
cross-tabulates collective bargaining coverage by whether or not the 
workplace has all workers at or below the minimum (these are two 
different questions 5.1 and 5.6, see more on the annotated questionnaire). 
We see that 139 businesses have all workers at or below the minimum, and 
of these, 94 have a majority covered by collective agreements. Rationally, I 
expect businesses who state that they pay all workers at or below the 
minimum wages (11.000€) to also agree that the same workers are 
paid/covered according to the national or sectoral wage agreements. In 
practice, however, is seems that only 94 out of the 139 businesses pay the 
minimum in compliance with the collective agreement. The other 45 
businesses state that they do not pay their workers according to the 
agreements. It is not possible for these businesses legally to pay their 
workers based on individual agreements
15
 if they pay less than the 
                                               
15 Individual agreements are always above national/sectoral wage agreements which define the minimum wages 
in Greece. During the period of the survey the minimum wage was 11,000€ (for a single person who entry for the 
first time into the labour market) 
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collectively agreed minimum wage. Consequently, these 45 businesses 
seem  to be in a ―grey‖ category, paying below the minimum. In the 
regressions explaining temp and family work below, we will include 
variables picking up whether a workplace is paying many workers near the 
minimum, whether or not it is majority covered by collective agreements, 
and whether it falls into the ―grey‖ category which is most likely to need 
temp and family worker flexibility. 
 
Table 5.11: The Labour Inspector 
Percent of Workplaces 
 
 
Small, < 
11 
11 or 
more 
Workplace consulted with Labour Inspector  
before workforce reduction (% of workplaces  
with reductions) 
24 52 
Hiring/firing laws are an obstacle to recruitment 
 (% strongly agreeing/agreeing) 
52 45 
Labour Inspectorate easily gives permission to  
employ temps (% strongly agreeing or agreeing) 
33 39 
Given advice on Dismissals (% of workplaces  
asking advice from LI) 
31 70 
Given advice on Temps (% of workplaces asking  
advice from LI) 
29 38 
Sample numbers 126 80 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are calculated all percentages.  
Details of the sample by workplace size are given in Table 5.1. The distribution of 
workplaces according to the population is given in the first column,  
and the sample achieved in the second column. As the first column shows, the large  
majority of private sector workplaces in Thessaly‘s population of firms (and in  
Greece generally) are very small, 98% being under 10 employees in size. Indeed, 
 in the whole of Greece, only 0.3% of private workplaces employ more than 50 
workers!  
 
 Turning to the Labour Inspectorate, Table 5.11 suggests that the 
Labour Inspectorate is influential – despite its small size as noted already. 
(Note that the Labour Inspectorate is not concerned with wage payment, or 
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tax contributions, which are the province of the IKA offices.). As can be 
seen, a high percentage of workplaces, particularly those employing 11 or 
more consult the Labour Inspectorate when making workforce reductions. 
Also, many (45 to 52%) see the hiring and firing laws (which are regulated 
by the Inspectorate) as negative for recruitment, and only a minority (33 to 
39%) finds it easy to gain permission to employ temps. As might be 
expected, family workplaces (not shown) tend to be less affected by the 
Labour Inspectorate, though 50% even of these workplaces see the hiring 
and firing laws as problematic. Cross-tabulations (not shown) give the 
expected positive associations between seeking the Labour Inspectorate for 
advice (Table 5.6), asking about dismissal or fixed-term employment 
issues (Table 5.7), and - perhaps more unexpectedly - agreeing that it is 
easy to gain Labour Inspectorate permission to employ temps (this table). 
 
Means and standard deviations in the regression analysis 
 Table 5.12 refers to the means and standard deviations of important 
variables. Mainly in this table variables have to deal with dummies which 
have been constructed and will be analysed in the regressions results later. 
Initially, we see the high percentage of temporary employment (12%) and 
very high percentage of family employment (62%). Both variables will be 
used as dependent variables in the next section‘s regressions. The two 
wage floor variables discussed above are also shown: first, whether a firm 
is paying the majority of its workers at or below the minimum wage (64%) 
and second, whether the majority of workers are paid according to a 
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collective agreement (53%). The unconditional, simple, correlation 
between these wage floor variables is negative, so that a workplace which 
pays low wages is also less likely to state that it pays according to the 
collective agreements
16. In addition, we have the ―grey‖ variable, which 
picks out the workplaces (38%) where all workers are low paid, and which 
state they are not covered by a collective agreement.  
 
                                               
16
  Admittedly,  the conditional correlation (see Tables 5.15 and 5.16)  is positive, holding 
constant variables indicative of a business‘s prosperity, in particular, its size, and whether 
it has had redundancies over the past 2 years. However, for our argument in the text , 
business prosperity should not be held constant, since we are considering the wage floor 
variables as alternative measures of prosperity. 
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Table 5.12: Means and Standard Deviations for Variables used in the 
Regression Analysis 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Variables used in the Regression Analysis 
 
Thessaly - TERS 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Percent of workers temporary including  
fixed term contract and agency workers 
12% 25 
Percent of family employees 62% 33 
majority paid at or below the collectively  
agreed minimum wage (11,000€) .64 .48 
majority covered by national & sectoral  
wage agreement  .53 .50 
―grey‖ category – all workers paid at or  
below the minimum, and majority  
uncovered by national or sectoral agreement .38 .49 
firm taking ER advice from both acc and  
law in last 2 yrs  .25 .43 
dummy for managers feeling li  
no obstacle for temps  .33 .47 
dummy for feeling temps have low epl  
and perms have high epl .10 .29 
any non-routine subcontracting .38 .49 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs .19 .39 
any hires in last 2 yrs .45 .50 
any part-time workers .16 .36 
percent old workers, >51  .09 .20 
percent young workers, <21  .03 .13 
dummy for increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers over past 5 yrs  .06 .24 
dummy for expecting increase in  
subcontract or part-time over next 2 yrs .34 .48 
managers considers workers committed  .72 .45 
Industry dummy 
Manufacture .09 .29 
Wholesale & retail .49 .50 
Hotels & 
restaurants .20 
.40 
Transport .02 .13 
small financial 
business .01 
.12 
real estate .01 .11 
Education .01 .09 
Health .. .05 
Culture .09 .29 
Construction .. .23 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: All statistics are calculated using survey weights.  
‡ Low wage means at or below minimum wage plus employer taxes (11,000€/yr) 
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 Table 5.12 also shows a number of legal variables we constructed; 
starting with a dummy for whether a manager felt the Labour Inspectorate 
easily gives permission to employ temporary workers. Another variable we 
constructed indicates that 25 percent of firms approached both a lawyer 
and accountant for employment relations advice in the past 2 years. We 
focus only on this legal advice from external resources for which 
specialised knowledge is needed and this is a sign that firms are likely to 
believe that EPL is an obstacle to employment. The last ―legal‖ variable 
signifies whether ―the firm prefers temps because they have low EPL‖ 
which directly links employment of temps to EPL legislation.  
 Two other dummy variables presented in Table 5.12 have to deal 
with flexibility in the workplace either in the past or the future. As noted 
above, these variables can be thought of as indicating a management desire 
for change, or else a change in the firm‘s circumstances, both of which 
might link to employing more temps, and so should reasonably be held 
constant when judging the legal environment variables. We see that 
managers state that only 6% of the workplaces increased their subcontract 
or part-time workers over the past 5 years. On the other hand, 35% of the 
firms expect that flexibility in part-time or subcontracting will increase in 
Thessaly firms over the next 2 yrs, so a substantial minority of businesses 
expect change in the future, which might lead them to employ more temps.  
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5.4 Regression Results 
Let us turn to the regression results, which are given in Tables 5.13-5.19. 
We mainly focus on explaining two dependent variables which deal with 
temporary work as well as the family employment. As regards weights, 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010, 113) advise that so long as the model has 
sufficient controls, and in particular includes determinants of the sampling 
frame, the most efficient estimator does not use weights. My sampling 
frame indicates over-sampling of larger workplaces, as discussed, but all 
my regressions control for workplace size, so it is reasonable to use 
unweighted regression. However, for completeness, I report both weighted 
and unweighted results, and as we will see, the weighted results are in fact 
somewhat stronger. Let us now look at the role of wage and working 
condition floors (e.g., the national wage agreements, and the labour 
inspectorate) in determining employment first of temporary workers, then 
of family workers. Finally, we will make various dimensions of the wage 
and working conditions floors themselves the dependent variable, and 
consider the characteristics of workplaces which are most affected.  
 
Results for Temporary Workers 
We start analysing our results in Table 5.13 using equation (1) for 
temporary employment. This dependent variable includes all temporary 
employees including trainees and subsidised workers, and also seasonal 
workers. This broad definition captures all the temp-category including the 
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important seasonal category. For this reason we do not control for seasonal 
labour on the right hand side of the equation. However, even this broad 
definition still leaves many firms at zero, that is, employing no temp 
workers of any sort. The effect is that we observe only part of the normal 
distribution, the rest being censored. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is this 
case (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, chapter 16) would produce biased 
estimates. To produce consistent estimates of the parameters, it is 
necessary to use a Tobit model, as given in the second and third columns. 
To estimate effect sizes of coefficients here (for an example, see Batt, 
2002), we then multiply the tobit coefficients by the proportion of positive 
observations - in Table 5.13‘s case, we multiply by 0.32 (=59/187) 
 Taking the Tobit results (weighted and unweighted) (Table 5.13) 
and going down the rows, we start with the important wage floor variables, 
coverage by the 11,000€ minimum wage (which, as we have seen, is 
probably often not observed), and coverage by collective agreement.  
 As discussed above, the variable indicating that a majority of the 
workplace‘s workers is paid at or below 11,000€ can be taken to indicate a 
low-wage, ―poor‖ firm. The tobit regression results show that if this 
variable changes from 1 to 0 (in other words comparing a low paying to a 
high paying business) the proportion temp increases by 6 (=0.32×19) 
percentage points; the effect is somewhat larger, about 9 points 
((=0.32×27) if we take the weighted result. This result fits with the 
argument that if a firm feels pressured by the minimum wage agreements, 
it employs on a temporary basis. 
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Table 5.13: Regressions for Temporary Worker Employment 
 
Dependent variable: 
Percent of temporary 
workers including 
seasonal workers 
 
 
 
Independent variable 
Weighted 
Marginal 
Effects 
Weighted 
Marginal 
Effects 
Unweighted  
Coefficient 
Unweighted 
Coefficient 
Majority paid at or below  
11,000€ per year 
.27***  .19** .. 
Majority covered by 
national & sectoral wage 
agreement  
-.25***  -.21** .. 
―Grey‖ category – all 
workers  
paid at or below 11,000€,  
and majority not covered by 
national/sectoral agreement 
 .39***  .37*** 
firm taking ER advice from  
acc and law in last 2 yrs  
-.03 .04 .09 .14* 
dummy for managers 
feeling labour inspector  
no obstacle for temps  
.22** .09 .05 .02 
dummy for feeling temps 
have low epl and 
perms have high epl 
.33** .19 .27** .23* 
any non-routine 
subcontracting 
-.07 -.02 -.01 -.03 
any redundancies in last 2 
yrs 
-.08 .01 -.19* -.14 
any hires in last 2 yrs 
.23** .25** .32*** .34*** 
any family employees .08 .05 .08 .03 
any part-time workers -.39*** -.40*** -.20* -.22** 
percent old workers, >51  
-.26 -.59* -.25 -.44 
percent young workers, <21  
.37 .54* .28 .37 
any increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers  
over past 5 yrs  
.13 .24 .02 .07 
Any planned increase in  
subcontract or part-time  
workers over next 2 yrs 
.01 -.11 .15* .12 
Managers considers  
workers committed  
-.19* -.17* .01 .06 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES YES YES 
number workers  
employed x 10 
-.02 -.02 .02** .02** 
Constant 
-.39 -.57 -.17 -.36 
Observations 
 
187, 
125 left 
censored at 
0 
187, 
125 left 
censored at 0 
187, 
125 left  
censored at 0 
187 
125 left 
censored at 0 
pseudo R2 .22 22 .30     .29 
 
Notes: Tobit regression is required here to allow for the fact that many workplaces have zero temp 
work. Tobit coefficients have to be multiplied by the proportion of non-zero observations 
(0.32=59/187) to give effects conditional on being observed.  
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 The next row might seem to be contradictory. We see that if the 
manager reports that the majority of workers are paid according to a 
collective agreement (and is thus directly subject to national wage 
agreements) the temp proportion decreases. In fact, if this variable changes 
from 1 to 0 (in other words comparing a business which pays a majority of 
its workers according to an agreement with one which does not) the 
proportion of temporary workers decreases by 7 (=.32×21) percentage 
points (8 points using the weighted results). As noted above, a possible 
explanation for this result is that high collective bargaining coverage 
indicates a law-abiding and rich firm, which is not driven to employ temps.  
In regressions, shown in the Appendix below (Table 5.15) 
explaining wages, we find that if a firm pays a majority at the minimum 
11,000€, this is associated with decline (ie, not hiring) and also with small 
size. These results support our argument that low wage firms are also weak 
firms. At the same time, for the collective bargaining coverage variable 
(Table 5.16), we find the opposite result, implying stronger firms, as we 
would expect. We also find that paying the majority at the minimum is 
linked with firms having difficulties with Labour Inspectorate (feeling that 
the Labour Inspectorate is an obstacle to hiring temps) – while firms 
having high collective bargaining coverage are less likely to have 
difficulties. In sum, the variable for paying the majority at the minimum 
11,000€, appears to indicates poor firms and these kinds of businesses need 
to hire employees under temporary contracts, while the variable for high 
 185 
collective bargaining coverage indicates law-abiding and more prosperous 
firms which do not need to hire temps. 
As a test of this interpretation, we use the ―grey‖ workplace 
category variable constructed in Table 5.10 above. This variable is meant 
to indicate the workplaces which are (illegally) paying their workers below 
the legal minimum, and which are therefore the least prosperous. 
(Essentially, it picks up the cross-product between paying workers the 
minimum, and being covered by collective agreements.) We expect these 
workplaces to feel most pressure from wage floors, and therefore to 
employ temps who are both easier to dismiss and less likely to complain 
about low wages. Results are given in the third column which gives a 
highly significant effect. A firm in the ―grey‖ category has 11 (=.32×.37) 
percentage points (12 points using the weighted result) higher temp 
employment. 
We continue our analysis with our three variables relating to 
working conditions floors as monitored by the Labour Inspectorate. The 
first variable indicates legal difficulties with employment relations, that is, 
―whether the firm has approached a lawyer and accountant for employment 
relations advice in the past 2 years‖ (Table 5.17 in the Appendix gives 
detailed results for determinants of this variable.). This variable gains 
significance in the final column indicating that firms with legal difficulties 
with employment relations are more likely to employ temps. Admittedly, 
this result is not confirmed in the weighted regressions, but we do see signs  
that temporary workers are indeed a way of avoiding legal difficulties.  
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The second variable indicates that ―the firm does not have 
difficulties with the Labour Inspectorate over hiring temps‖. It is 
significantly positive in the first column. In other words, firms which feel 
that the LI is no obstacle to employing temps do so. This finding suggests 
that the LI does indeed form an obstacle to temp employment for some 
businesses. Moreover, in the Appendix (Table 5.18) we show that this 
variable is correlated with taking legal advice from accountant and lawyer 
which we have already seen is positively linked with hiring temps. Thus, it 
seems that legal advice is necessary for negotiating with the Labour 
Inspectorate and then employing temps, which is plausible. 
The last ―legal‖ variable signifies whether ―the firm prefers temps 
because they have low employment protection legislation‖. This variable is 
significantly linked (0.33) with employing temporary workers in the first 
column‘s specification, though is smaller and does not quite attain 
significance in the second column (0.19) with the ―grey‖ variable. Overall, 
these results suggest that temps are indeed employed because they are easy 
to fire.  
 The variable which indicates any hires that took place in the last 
two years indicates that firms which are hiring new employees are more 
likely to employ temps. The picture here is one of expanding firms using 
temp rather than permanent labour which is depressing and shows the 
uncertainty that the average Greek business feels these days (note that 
Greek businesses did not in the past employ many temps, because only 
33% currently employ any temps, but the position is changing). 
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 We turn next to variables linked to labour flexibility in the 
workplace. These are (a) the part-time variable, (b) the family employment 
variable and (c) the variable which investigates the possibility of the future 
flexibility in the workplace. The part-time variable indicates ―whether the 
firm employs any part-timers‖. We see that it is negatively related to the 
percentage of temporary workers, suggesting that part-timers and temps are 
substitutes or an alternative form of flexibility to temp workers, which is 
plausible. In other words, a business which has managed, with difficulty, to 
secure some part-time workers might not wish or need to go to the trouble 
of securing permission for temp worker contracts as well. 
 The family variable is based on ―whether the firm employs any 
family members‖ (about half the firms do). We might expect family 
members to provide an alternative source of flexibility- rather as part-
timers do. In fact, the family variable is insignificant. Nevertheless, in a 
regression in the Appendix (Table 5.16) explaining coverage by the 
national or sectoral wage agreements (NGCA/NSCA), family members are 
significantly linked negatively with coverage by the collective agreements 
which we have already seen impacts on temps. In other words, we may 
have already picked up the family worker effect via the collective 
bargaining coverage (or grey market) variables.  
The last workplace flexibility variable indicates ―the firm‘s 
expectations for the future about increases in part-time, temp and 
subcontracting employment‖. We see that expected future use of flexible 
forms of employment is only significantly linked with temporary work in 
 188 
the unweighted regression (the third column). In other words, there are 
signs, but these are not strong, that current temporary employment 
indicates future temporary employment.  
 We also include other variables such percentages of young and old 
employees. As we noted above, older workers might be associated with 
skilled work, which is more difficult for temps to do, and younger workers 
are the converse (young workers are also a typical outsider group, likely to 
be more associated with temps). In fact, we find some confirmation of this 
reasoning, which attain significance in the second column‘s specification. 
As can be seen, higher percentages of older workers negatively linked with 
temp work and conversely for younger workers. 
In addition, we include industry dummies to control for variability 
of labour demand (which increases the demand for temps) and, capital 
intensity (capital-intensive firms might need to prevent capital from being 
idle and therefore hire more temps). Finally, we include a variable for 
whether the manager believes the workforce is committed on the grounds 
that belief in worker commitment is perhaps more likely to mean 
investment in workers and therefore fewer temps. Indeed, this variable is 
significant in the expected direction in the weighted regressions (-0.19 in 
the first column, -0.17 in the second). 
A final important variable to examine is the workplace size variable 
(number of employees). Here, the unweighted regressions in the third and 
fourth columns indicate that larger firms employ more temps (second and 
third column) which seems strange since, as we have already noted, large 
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firms are less likely to be low paying (see also Appendix Table 5.15), and 
more likely to observe collective agreements (Table 5.16) – both of which 
factors should promote a strategy of reducing temporary work. Fortunately, 
the weighted regressions in the first two columns overturn this result, and 
show signs of the expected negative link between firm size and temp 
employment. In fact, we prefer the weighted results which are more robust 
to the TERS over-sampling of large workplaces. Therefore we conclude 
that there are indications that larger, richer, firms indeed need temps less, 
as our insurance hypothesis predicts.  
 
Analysis of Family Employment 
We now use equation (2) with family employment as the dependent 
variable, based on the percentage of family workers employed in the 
workplace. On the right hand side, we use most of the same variables used 
in the temp worker regression. Of course, we control for firm size, which 
we expect to be important since larger firms will run out of family 
members to employ, necessarily causing the family percentage employed 
to decline.  
Starting with the two wage floor variables, we see that family 
employment is not significantly linked to the majority on low pay variable, 
but is strongly negatively linked to the variable indicating coverage by 
national or sectoral wage agreements. This finding is in line with the temp 
worker finding that prosperous firms (which follow national agreements) 
are less likely to employ temps. Family workers are also a form of flexible 
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employment and richer firms which are less at the mercy of changes in the 
market consequently are less in need of family and temporary workers.  
Backing up this argument, the ―grey‖ category variable is strongly 
positive. Workplaces in the grey category, paying low wages probably 
below nationally agreed rates, are much more likely to employ a high 
percentage of family workers, other things equal. As was the case for temp 
workers, we conclude that family workers are favoured because they are 
easy to layoff, and less likely to complain about low wages. 
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Table 5.14: Regressions on Family Worker Employment 
 
Notes: Survey weights have been used to calculate all percentages. Tobit coefficients have to be 
multiplied by the proportion of non-zero observations (approximately 0.5) to give effects conditional 
on being observed.  
Dependent variable: 
Percent of family workers 
    
Independent variable 
Unweighted, 
Coefficient 
Weighted, 
Marginal 
Effects 
Unweighted, 
Coefficient 
Weighted, 
Marginal 
Effects 
Majority paid at or below  
11,000€ per year 
.00 .07 .. .. 
majority covered by 
national & sectoral wage 
agreement  
-.23*** -.14** .. .. 
―Grey‖ category – all 
workers paid at or below 
11,000€, and majority not 
covered by national/sectoral 
agreements 
.. .. .35*** .29*** 
firm taking ER advice from  
acc and law in last 2 yrs  
.02 .08* .01 .01 
dummy for managers 
feeling labour inspector no 
obstacle  for temps 
.06 .11* .08 .13 
dummy for feeling temps  
have low epl and perms  
have high epl 
.15* .28** .14 .16 
any non-routine 
subcontracting 
-.01 .10 -.04 .06 
any redundancies in last 2 
yrs 
.06 .04 .08 .05 
any hires in last 2 yrs 
-.06 -.08 -.11* -.15** 
percent of temps (excluding 
seasonals) 
-.06 -.11 -.17 -.26* 
any part-time workers -.08 -.09 -.12* -.13 
percent old workers, >51  
-.01 -.26 .03 -.03 
percent young workers, <21  
-.81** -.82** -.76 -.83** 
any increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers  
over past 5 yrs  
.05 .15 -.08 .15 
Any planned increase in  
subcontract or part-time 
 workers over next 2 yrs 
-.07 -.17** -.03 -.09 
managers considers workers 
committed  
-.07 -.19 -.09 -.14** 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES YES YES 
number workers  
employed x 10 
-.04** -.19*** -0.4** -.23*** 
Constant 
.21 -.33 .21 -.16 
Observations 
 
187,  
92 left 
censored at 0 
 
187,  
92 left 
censored at 0 
187,  
92 left 
censored at 0 
187,  
92 left 
censored at 0 
pseudo R2 .32 .28 .37 .31 
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 Turning next to variables which relate to employment regulation 
and labour inspectorate issues, we see some quite strong effects in the 
weighted regression in the first column. Thus, the dummies for taking ER 
advice (0.08), and for feeling that the Labour Inspectorate is no obstacle 
(0.11) are both positively linked to employing more family workers. 
Moreover, there is a strongly dummy (0.28) for feeling temps have low 
EPL. In other words, firms employing family workers certainly appear to 
be conscious of EPL, which could thus be a factor in their sticking to 
family workers for whom EPL does not apply.  
Regarding variables which deal with hiring, and redundancy, we 
see that the hiring variable tends to be negative (and is significant in some 
specifications). This result indicates that firms that employ family workers 
are less likely to hire – they do not grow. Additionally, it is worth noting 
the large negative coefficient (-0.82 in the first column) on the percentage 
of young workers, which goes along with the conservative, non-growing 
nature of family firms in Greece. 
As regards variables with a flexibility character, part-time 
employment and temporary employment, we see that both these variable 
have negative signs indicating substitutability, though significance depends 
somewhat on specification. We expect substitutability since temps, family 
workers and part-time workers appear to be alternative pathways to 
flexibility.  
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 A final interesting point is that the variable for whether the manager 
believes the workforce is committed tends to be negative, and is significant 
(-0.14) in the second column. This finding goes along with the argument 
raised above, that belief in worker commitment is more likely to mean 
investment in workers. We have found above that this variable is negative 
and significant in Table 5.13, for temps. The indication of a similar result 
also for family workers in Table 5.14, suggests less investment in workers 
in these workplaces as well. 
 
 5.5 Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to assess whether the Greek legal 
labour framework creates obstacles to employment creation. In other 
words, we are interested in whether firms feel particularly constrained by 
labour law. The main issue focuses on the legal aspects which develop a 
rigid labour market environment and create barriers to employers 
introducing flexibility in their workplaces.  
 
We have seen in Chapter 3 that the Greek labour market is 
performing badly, being third last in the OECD both for its high proportion 
of long-term unemployment (over 50%), and for its high youth 
unemployment (around 25%). We have seen that the Greek labour market 
is also highly regulated, with high wage and working conditions floors. It is 
hard not to conclude that these two facts are related. Indeed, at the 
aggregate level, comparing OECD countries (Figure 5.1) we see a good 
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link between precarious employment, as indexed by the proportion of 
workers on temporary contracts, and the strictness of EPL. While this 
simple picture can be disputed (Addison and Teixeira 2003), recent 
multivariate analysis (Kahn 2007) bears it out. My results using the TERS 
also bear it out. 
 
This chapter has used a mini-WERS constructed for Greek 
conditions (the TERS), to show with greater precision how the legal 
constraints might affect firm decisions. The focus has been on temporary 
and family employment, because these types of employment are the main 
sources of numerical flexibility open to Greek business, given that EPL is 
strict and the part-time market not developed. The basic hypothesis is that 
firms resort to temporary and family work when they feel pressurised by 
the law. Temporary and family work are thus forms of insurance for the 
poorer firms which cannot cope with the wage and working conditions 
floors enforced by strict labour regulation.  
 
As regards the determinants of the demand for temps, we have two 
important results. First, there is the significant positive sign of the 
minimum wage variable – or the ―grey‖ category variable. This sign fits 
our hypothesis in that where firms have many workers on the minimum 
they are likely to worry about the possibility of a rise in the minimum, and 
hence will employ on a more temporary basis. Our second important result 
is the importance of labour regulation variables. We see positive 
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coefficients on the variables for feeling the Labour Inspector is no obstacle 
for employing temps, and for feeling that temps have low EPL. We take 
this result to signal both that employing temps is not easy (hence the need 
for knowledge about the Labour Inspector), and that their advantage is low 
EPL. Our results therefore suggest that labour law matters. 
Findings for family worker employment are similar to temp worker 
employment in that the ―grey‖ category variable is strongly positive. 
Workplaces in the grey category, paying low wages probably below 
nationally agreed rates, are much more likely to employ a high percentage 
of family workers, other things equal. As was the case for temp workers, 
we conclude that family workers are favoured because they are easy to 
layoff, and less likely to complain about low wages. At the same time, we 
also find (in the weighted regressions, which are more robust) significant 
effects for the labour regulation variables. In particular, we find a large 
positive coefficient on the dummy for feeling temps have low EPL, 
indicating that firms that employ family workers are very conscious of 
EPL. In general, we find substitutability between temps, family workers 
and part-time workers, which is reasonable, since these groups represent 
alternative pathways to flexibility. In sum, therefore, our results support the 
hypothesis stated at the outset, namely, that ―poor‖ firms, which cannot 
afford the national wage rates or the EPL standards, attempt to escape these 
standards by employing temps and/or family workers. 
 196 
Appendix 
 
5.1 Analysis of Other Legal Variables 
 
Low Pay The first variable we research has to deal with low pay, in Table 
5.15. Note that variable is a dummy where 1 indicates that a firm is paying 
the majority of its workers at or below the minimum wage (that is, 64% of 
small < 11 workplaces and 31% of large – Table 5.8). As we have 
explained, this variable therefore indicates a low wage, or ―poor‖ firm, and 
it is interesting to look at the correlates of such low pay. 
The first point from Table 5.15 is that the variable for whether the 
firm has a majority covered by the collective NGCA/NSCAs is 
insignificant in the unweighted regression, yet significant when weighted 
(the second column). Thus, firms can be poor (low paying) and also 
observe the national/sectoral collective agreements. In fact, as we have 
seen from Table 5.10, ―poor‖ firms can be split into those which are more 
and those which are less likely to state that they are observing the 
collective agreements. It is primarily the group which states that it is less 
likely to pay the collective agreements (and hence falls into the ―grey‖ 
category), which uses temporary and family work. 
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Table 5.15: Determinants of Low Pay - Probit 
 
Dependent variable: majority of  
workers paid at or below 11,000 € 
  
Independent variable 
Unweighted, 
Coefficient 
Weighted, 
Marginal 
Effects 
majority covered by national &  
sectoral wage agreement  .20 0.25** 
firm taking ER advice from acc  
and law in last 2 yrs  -.25 -.08 
dummy for managers feeling  
li no obstacle for temps -.38* -.16* 
dummy for feeling temps have  
low epl and perms have high epl .36 .07 
percent family members -.27 .08 
any non-routine subcontracting -.10 -.17* 
percent of temps (excluding seasonals) 1.4*** .69* 
any seasonal workers -.29 .24** 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs -.45 -.28** 
any hires in last 2 yrs -.69** -.23** 
any part-time workers .08 .14 
percent old workers, >51  -.15 .78** 
percent young workers, <21  -.59 -0.39 
any increase in subcontract or  
part-time workers over past 5 yrs  -.02 -0.19 
Any planned increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers over next 2 yrs -.07 .010 
managers considers workers committed  -.09 -0.19** 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES 
number workers employed x 100 -.01*** -.02** 
Constant .69 -- 
Observations 
 183 183 
pseudo R
2
 .15 .256 
 
 
  
 
Notes: In the second column, survey weights are used to calculate all percentages. 
Standard errors and t-values (denoted by the stars, ***, **, * for significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels) in the second column are calculated numerically using Stata‘s mfx 
command (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, 343 ff) 
  
Other interesting variables include whether the manager feels the 
labour inspector is no obstacle for employing temps, which can be taken as 
a dimension of being integrated into the legal system. In fact, low-paying 
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firms are more likely to feel the labour inspector is an obstacle, which 
displays low integration, as might be expected. We also see that hiring of 
temps is positively linked with low pay, as already noted in Table 5.13. 
Further interesting variables are hiring and redundancies, both of which are 
negatively linked with low pay. This result indicates that firms that are 
static (neither hiring nor firing) hiring are more likely to pay low wages, as 
might be expected. Finally the variable for firm size (workers employed) 
indicates that large firms do not pay low wages. This result is to be 
expected since large firms are generally law-abiding and more prosperous 
and can afford to pay more. 
 
Collective agreements Another important variable which has to take into 
consideration is whether the firm believes that the majority of its workers 
are paid according to the NGCA/NSCAs, which we believe is linked to the 
firm‘s prosperity. This variable is analysed in Table 5.16.  
On the right-hand side of the equation is the low pay variable which has 
already noted bears some linkage with collective bargaining coverage. 
However we see that family employment is negatively linked with 
coverage, indicating that family firms are less likely to observe collective 
agreements. This result is to be expected as family firms tend to be 
involved in the grey market. Next, the temporary employment variable is 
negatively related to coverage, indicating that firms with many temps are 
less likely to observe collective agreements, again suggesting that temps 
are part of the grey market. 
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Table 5.16: Determinants of Observance of National/Sectoral 
Collective Agreements - probit 
 
Dependent variable: Majority covered 
by national or sectoral wage agreement 
 
 
Independent variable 
Unweighted, 
Coefficient 
Weighted, 
Marginal 
effects 
majority paid at or below  
the minimum wage .18 .25** 
firm taking ER advice from acc  
and law in last 2 yrs  .37 .09 
dummy for managers feeling  
li no obstacle for temps .39 .11 
dummy for feeling temps have 
 low epl and perms have high epl .66 -.19 
percent family members -.54 -.18* 
any non-routine subcontracting .22 0.36*** 
percent of temps (excluding seasonals) -1.2 -.70* 
any seasonal workers -.39 -0.05 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs .34 .28** 
any hires in last 2 yrs .67 .21* 
any part-time workers .05 -.22 
percent old workers, >51  -1.6 -1.95** 
percent young workers, <21  -3.2 -1.05* 
any increase in subcontract or  
part-time workers over past 5 yrs  .20 0.26** 
Any planned increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers over next 2 yrs -.04 -.11 
managers considers workers committed  -.28 -.33*** 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES 
number workers employed x 100 .01 .02 
Constant -.05 -- 
Observations 
 171 171 
pseudo R
2
 .24 0.40 
 
 
 
   
Notes: As for Table 5.14. 
 
 Interestingly, firms making hires and redundancies in the last two 
years (growing firms, in other words) are significantly positively linked 
with observance of national agreements, which supports our view that 
observance is associated with prosperity and growth. Moving on down the 
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table, we also see that firms with higher percentages of both young and old 
workers are less likely to observe the agreements. In other words, firms 
which observe agreements employ mainly prime-age workers, which may 
go along with a career structure indicating size and relative prosperity. 
A puzzling result is that the variable for whether the manager 
believes the workforce is committed tends to be negative and significant (-
0.33 in the weighted column). Belief in worker commitment should be 
associated with investment in workers and firm prosperity – and 
presumably observance of collective agreements. That this correlation is 
strongly negative shows we need to be cautious about interpreting both the 
belief in worker commitment variable, and the observance of collective 
agreements variable. We will rely on the overall picture, rather than 
specific results.  
Labour regulation: Dimensions of this area are considered in Tables 
5.17, 5.18, 5.19. Table 5.17 takes the employment relations advice 
variable, which we see has the low pay and collective bargaining coverage 
variables taking opposite signs, as we have seen above for the temp 
workers variable. The ―grey‖ variable (see table notes) also works well 
(negatively) here, denoting that ―grey‖ workplaces work outside the legal 
employment relations system, as is to be expected. Other significant 
variables include whether the manager feels the labour inspector is no 
obstacle for employing temps, which can be taken as another dimension of 
being integrated into the legal system, in which case employment relations 
advice is worthwhile, and taken. Also, planning an increase in part-time or 
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subcontractor work clearly necessitates taking legal advice, hence the 
positive coefficient (.47 marginal effect). 
 
Table 5.17: Determinants of Employment Relations Advice - probit 
 
 
Notes: As for Table 5.14. 
a
 Replacing the minimum wage and collective bargaining variables with the "grey" 
variable gives a coefficient of -0.74, and t-value -2.22** 
 
Dependent variable: Firm taking ER 
advice from accountant and lawyer in 
last 2 yrs 
 
Independent variable 
Unweighted, 
Coefficient 
Weighted, 
Marginal 
effects 
majority paid at or below  
the minimum wage
a 
-.31 -.14* 
majority covered by national  
& sectoral wage agreement
a
  .39 .12* 
dummy for managers feeling  
li no obstacle for temps .54** .04 
dummy for feeling temps have  
low epl and perms have high epl .09 -.11* 
percent family members .15 .08 
any non-routine subcontracting -.37* -.15** 
percent of temps (excluding seasonals) 1.2** .38 
any seasonal workers -.61 -.19*** 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs -.42 -.19*** 
any hires in last 2 yrs .32 -.05 
any part-time workers .16 -.002 
percent old workers, >51  .97 .23 
percent young workers, <21  .25 .40 
any increase in subcontract or  
part-time workers over past 5 yrs  -.46 -.15*** 
Any planned increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers over next 2 yrs .67*** .47*** 
managers considers workers committed  -.17 -.06 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES 
number workers employed x 100 -.00 .003 
Constant -.82 -- 
Observations 
 187 187 
pseudo R
2
 .18 .429 
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Table 5.18: Determinants of Opinion about Labour Inspector and 
Temporary Employment - probit 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy for 
managers feeling LI no obstacle for 
temps 
 
Independent variable 
Unweighted, 
Coefficient 
Weighted, 
Marginal 
effects 
majority paid at or below  
the minimum wage -.36 -.15* 
Majority covered by national  
& sectoral wage agreement  .36 .12 
Firm taking ER advice from  
acc and law in last 2 yrs .56** 2.49** 
dummy for feeling temps have 
 low epl and perms have high epl .07 -.23** 
percent family members .11 .14* 
any non-routine subcontracting .07 -.00 
percent of temps (excluding seasonals) -.40 .53* 
any seasonal workers .40 .04 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs .29 .01 
any hires in last 2 yrs .08 -.07 
any part-time workers -.18 .23* 
percent old workers, >51  .06 .40* 
percent young workers, <21  .38 .18 
any increase in subcontract or 
part-time workers over past 5 yrs  .49* .15 
Any planned increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers over next 2 yrs -.27 .07 
managers considers workers committed  .02 -.00 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES 
number workers employed x 100 -.00 .00 
Constant -.69 -- 
Observations 
 187 187 
pseudo R
2
 .11 .153 
  
Notes: As for Table 5.14. 
a
 Replacing the minimum wage and collective bargaining variables with the ―grey 
variable gives a coefficient of -0.26, and t-value -0.88** 
  
 
Table 5.18 next considers determinants of manager opinions about the 
Labour Inspector in the area of whether he/she can be taken as an obstacle 
to taking on temp workers. The low pay and observance of collective 
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agreements variables take opposite signs, as for the employment relations 
advice case, suggesting that poorer firms do not see the labour inspectorate 
as an obstacle, and are perhaps outside the legal system (again, ―grey‖ 
firms are significantly less likely to feel the LI is an obstacle, again perhaps 
because they ignore the system – see Table 5.18‘s Notes). Backing this 
view up, we see that taking legal advice is positively linked to regarding 
the labour inspectorate as no obstacle (.56** in the unweighted column, 
2.49** in the weighted), and we have already seen in Table 5.17 that 
poorer firms are less likely to take advice. 
 Table 5.19 further considers manager opinions about whether temps 
have low EPL, which we have already seen links to them being hired. The 
weighted marginal effects column does not show much, but the unweighted 
column shows some interesting patterns. Manager opinion about temp EPL 
is not apparently linked to how prosperous the firm is, as indicated by 
whether it pays low wages and/or observes collective agreements. The 
main determinants are whether the firm has seasonal and part-time 
workers, has experienced redundancies, and employs many young workers. 
These determinants suggest that firms which have had experience of 
unusual labour situations, such as redundancies, are more likely to 
appreciate the advantages of having low EPL for temps, which is 
reasonable. 
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Table 5.19: Determinants of Feeling Temps Have Low EPL - probit 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy for feeling 
temps have low epl and perms have high 
epl 
 
Independent variable 
Unweighted, 
Coefficient 
Weighted, 
Marginal 
effects 
majority paid at or below  
the minimum wage .32 .00 
majority covered by national  
& sectoral wage agreement  .73 -.00 
Firm taking ER advice from  
acc and law in last 2 yrs -.05 -.00 
Dummy for managers feeling  
li no obstacle for temps .11 -.00 
percent family members .50 .00 
any non-routine subcontracting .58* .04 
percent of temps (excluding seasonals) .83 .01 
any seasonal workers 1.2** .26 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs .96*** .14 
any hires in last 2 yrs -.59 -.01 
any part-time workers .73** .04 
percent old workers, >51  -.76 -.02 
percent young workers, <21  3.48* .08 
any increase in subcontract or  
part-time workers over past 5 yrs  -.23 -.00 
Any planned increase in subcontract  
or part-time workers over next 2 yrs -.09 -.00 
managers considers workers committed  -.15 -.06 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES 
number workers employed x 100 -.00 .00 
Constant -2.38 -- 
Observations 
 187 187 
pseudo R
2
 .27 .64 
   
Notes: As for Table 5.14. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS  
 
 How do Greek businesses react to a comprehensive and complex 
framework of labour regulation? What are their human resources 
management strategies for finding labour flexibility? These are the main 
research questions that I try to answer in this study. Ultimately this work 
will help answer the wider question of the role of labour market institutions 
in keeping the unemployment rate in Greece so high.  
 
In the labour economics literature, there is a major debate related to 
the role of labour market institutions and policies in explaining labour 
market performance. Feldmann (2009:510) argues that this dispute has not 
been settled because the effects of labor market regulation are difficult to 
measure. In fact, Bertola et al. (2000:65) argue that it is almost impossible 
to translate laws and words into actual and expected costs. As Blanchard 
(2006:44) recently notes ―It is one thing to say that labour market 
institutions matter, and another to know is which ones and how‖. Still, 
these difficulties have not prevented a large empirical literature from 
developing (e.g., Scarpetta, 1996; Nickel, 1997; Belot and Van Ours, 2001; 
Bertola et al. 2002; Botero et al., 2004; Nickel at al, 2005; Feldman, 2009; 
Kahn 2007 and 2010). The role of labour market institutions has been 
increasingly emphasized: Blanchard (2006) points out that ―the focus of 
researchers and policy makers was initially on the role of shocks; however 
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as unemployment remained high, the focus has progressively shifted to 
institutions‖. 
 
In the Greek case, as noted earlier, there has been limited research 
on the role of labour market institutions (see Kufidou and Michail, 1999; 
Michail, 2003; Voudouris, 2004).Thus, this thesis is the first attempt. 
Through the TERS survey - that covers a large number of firms (206 
workplaces) – I investigate significant aspects of Greek labour regulation 
and flexibility from the employers‘ perspective in Thessaly. More 
particularly, I focus on mandated wage floors (corporate collective wage 
agreements) and working conditions floors (rigidities in hiring/firing 
regulations, rules for flexible employment and monitoring by the Labour 
Inspectorate). My questionnaire is based on the UK‘s WERS questionnaire, 
and hopefully scholars from the Greek and the international research 
community will profit from my results. 
 A significant point of my survey is that it covers the full range of 
business size, not just large businesses. Size leads to different labour 
flexibility decisions. I find that small firms (self-proprietorship) tend to 
search for flexibility by employing family members. On the other hand, 
large-scale firms – if only because they must run out of family employees - 
exhibit higher rates of temporary employment. It is obvious that both types 
of firms find different flexibility escape routes through the complex 
framework of labour law. 
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With these ideas in mind, let me summarise my theoretical and 
empirical findings, and consider implications for future research. In 
Chapter 2, I investigated the development of the Greek labour market 
framework. Greece has historically followed the French legal system, 
which might explain the early development of the concept of ―secure‖ 
employment under Venizelos. Overregulation continued with the 
Europeanization strategy of Greece which adopted EC Directives into its 
national laws. Moreover, the plethora of presidential fiats and circular 
ministerial letters made the burden heavier. The current position is that 
Greece is considered the fourth strictest in EPL among 26 OECD countries 
(Employment Outlook, 2004). At the same time, Greece‘s part time rate 
(Bielenski et al., 2002) is one of the lowest among OECD countries in part 
because of regulatory difficulties which discourage employers from hiring 
part-time. On the other hand, temporary employment is comparatively 
common (around 11%), and has become a major gateway to labour 
flexibility for firms. It is worth noting here that the legal framework for 
temporary employment is complicated in Greece, so employees and 
employers are able to take advantage of gaps in the law.  
 
Another gateway to labour flexibility in Greek business, as I show, 
is family employment. Members of the family are always on call and 
provide high flexibility (however in many cases under ―grey‖ conditions). 
The legal framework of tax registration for employed family employees is 
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again is not clear. What is undeniable is that businesses – under individual 
legal status – face lower labour costs if they employ family members.  
 
Chapter 2 also includes a description of Greek labour market 
organizations. First, I track the development of trade unions and centralized 
collective bargaining in Greece which is important since it determines the 
minimum wage. I also note (see Zambarloukou, 2006 and Kouzis, 2005) 
that there is a strong link in political and financial terms between trade 
unions and the state which provides insider power to unions. Second, I 
describe the operation of the Labour Inspectorate (and the Public 
Employment Services and Social Security Organization which also have a 
labour monitoring role). The Inspectorate is central, since it monitors 
hiring/firing procedures both for regular and for flexible employment, and 
also working hours and overtime. I also show how duties among 
monitoring organizations overlap and create administrative burdens and 
certainly create high costs to the establishments.  
 
In Chapter 3, I investigated theories of the causes and consequences 
of labour market regulation. This framework is needed to set up the TERS 
empirical work in chapters 4 and 5. First, I described the different 
methodologies that have developed among researchers in order to measure 
national labour market regulation. I show that authoritative research, for 
example, by the OECD (2007) rates Greece‘s comparatively strict 
regulatory environment as a factor in the country‘s poor labour market 
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performance. The legitimate question arose here as to why governments - 
including of course Greece - do not proceed to reforms in order to reduce 
unemployment and have a better labour market performance. Thus, I 
turned to the political insider-outsider hypothesis which holds that unions 
use their political (voting) power to block labour market reforms (Saint 
Paul, 2004). More particularly, Greek politicians, as I showed, do not 
conflict with unions and the closed-shop professions. The downside of this 
regulation of standard employment is that employers are forced – so the 
hypothesis goes – to find ―escape‖ routes such as temporary and family 
employment which is less regulated. Kahn‘s (2007) recent work using a 
cross-sectional dataset for 7 OECD countries is supportive here, in that he 
finds that in countries with strict EPL women, the less skilled and young 
workers are more likely to hold temporary jobs, and these effects are larger 
where wages are more sticky downwards (as in Greece). This escape 
hypothesis is the main subject of my TERS work. Are temporary and 
family work forms of insurance for the poorer firms which cannot cope 
with the wage and working conditions floors enforced by strict labour 
regulation? 
 
Chapter 4 gives all the technical details regarding the design and 
conduct of my TERS survey (this is funded by the European Social Fund 
(ESF) and Greek National Resources (EPEAEK II) through the 
Archimedes project ―Flexible Forms of Employment in Thessaly‖, TEI of 
Larissa, 2004). Here I establish that the sampling frame is representative of 
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the Thessaly region, which is an important business region in Central 
Greece. Furthermore, I establish that the sampling procedure is valid, and 
that weights can be constructed to derive results which are representative 
of the region‘s population. My empirical work can therefore be relied upon 
to give robust results.  
My basic hypothesis was tested in chapter 5. To repeat my 
question: are ttemporary and family work forms of insurance for the poorer 
firms which cannot cope with the wage and working conditions floors 
enforced by strict labour regulation? Initially, I found that most companies 
have sought employee relations advice (from lawyers and accountants) and 
this is a sign that employers generally are constrained by the legal 
framework. At the same time I found differences by size. The majority of 
small enterprises certainly try to avoid dealing with Labour Inspectorate 
and the other labour market organisations. By contrast, large enterprises 
seem to have less ―fear‖ of the Labour Inspectorate, as might be expected 
given their greater resources.  
 
We may see this picture of the ―fear‖ factor in the issue of pay 
determination. I find (Table 5.9) that the average business – particularly the 
average small business – pays a high proportion of its workers at or below 
the nationally agreed minimum wage. In other words, central collective 
agreements which also set the provincial minimum wages in Thessaly seem 
to be avoided many enterprises. I characterise these businesses as weak or 
"poor", and looking at their characteristics (see APPENDIX, Table 5.15) 
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indeed find that they tend to be small, static (few hires, mainly older 
workers) and rather demoralized (workers are not committed, in the 
manager‘s view). Importantly, I find this type of business is significantly 
more likely (Table 5.13) to employ temporary workers, which accords with 
my hypothesis that temps are a form of insurance. 
I also test for the significance of the working condition floors, in 
particular EPL, and the Labour Inspector‘s influence. An important finding 
here (Table 5.13) is that firms whose managers believe that temps have less 
strict EPL are more likely to employ temps. This result could not be 
plainer. Temps are used to avoid EPL which accords with my hypothesis, 
and bears out Kahn‘s (2007) temporary worker findings using more 
aggregate data.  
A further finding of mine links temps with lower specific training 
investments (following Voudouris 2004). In particular, I find - using Table 
13‘s weighted results, which are more robust  -  that firms with more older 
workers, and more committed workers (as judged by management) are less 
likely to employ temps, ceteris paribus. Workforces which are older, and 
more committed are arguably more likely to have specific trained 
requirements. Hence, my finding of a link between this type of workforce 
and permanent employment is plausible, and builds confidence in my other 
results 
 
Turning to family worker employment (Table 5.14), my findings in 
this case support a variant of the insurance hypothesis. In this case, the 
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hypothesis is that family workers are favoured by the ―grey‖ type of firm 
(paying below national minimum rates). Certainly I find this result is 
strongly supported by the data. My interpretation is that it is the ―grey‖ 
firms which are marginal to the market, and so employ family workers who 
are easier to lay off if need be, and less likely to complain about low 
wages.  
For family worker employment as well, I find quite strong effects 
relating to employment regulation and labour inspectorate issues. Again 
using the weighted regressions results, I find that the dummies for taking 
employment relations advice, and for feeling that the Labour Inspectorate 
is no obstacle for temp employment are both positively linked to 
employing more family workers. Moreover, there is a strongly positive 
dummy for feeling temps have low EPL. In other words, firms employing 
family workers certainly appear to be conscious of EPL, which could thus 
be a factor in their sticking to family workers for whom EPL does not 
apply.  
 In conclusion, my findings provide some grounds for supporting the 
OECD‘s (2007) view expressed at the outset of this thesis, that Greece‘s 
poor labour market performance can in part be attributed to rigidities in 
labour market institutions. My findings also provide support for 
Voudouris‘s (2004) view that an extensive use temporary contract is a 
means of circumventing the rigid EPL regime. Again, my findings which 
come from a firm-level database support Kahn‘s (2007) temporary worker 
results based on a quite different database – aggregate cross-country data. 
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That two such different approaches reach a similar result builds 
confidence.  
 It is worth concluding with some caveats, since my findings 
represent only a first attempt at a large-scale firm survey in Greece. I have 
aimed to develop a robust microeconometric evidence base, and provide 
data on employment and wages as well as management views of EPL and 
the Labour Inspectorate from a representative sample of Greek businesses. 
At the same time, my survey only covers one provincial area, namely 
Thessaly, and the evidence base should be broadened to cover more of 
Greece, including the important Athens area. It is true that my results 
support the view that Greece‘s wages and working conditions floors indeed 
appear both to promote precarious temporary employment, and also small-
scale family business. Moreover, my results imply that the national 
collective wage agreements are generally not observed in practice, and 
while this provides a valuable safety valve, it condemns many firms to a 
―grey‖ existence.  
 My TERS research implies that Greece‘s national collective 
bargaining EPL arrangements need revision. But the TERS needs to be 
substantiated by broader surveys, and furthermore, the possible form for 
the required legal revisions in collective bargaining and EPL needs much 
further research. This said, my initial results support the case for these legal 
revisions. 
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